For centuries, militaries have sought decisive battle to destroy the majority of an enemy’s forces in one tactical action. Such an action was believed to provide resounding victory in war. Several scholars argue that this desire persists in the majority of Western militaries today.^[1] In his seminal work, The Allure of Battle, Cathal Nolan highlights how seeking decisive battle has rarely succeeded in achieving victory or permanency in strategic and political outcomes.^[2] Instead, pursuit of the decisive battle often leads to long wars of attrition, ‘strategic erosion’, and sometimes defeat.^[3] Some academics argue this was the case for the United States (US) in the Vietnam War, and Germany in the First and Second World Wars.^[4] The apparent failings of decisive battle leads to the question as to what then contributes to success. Milan Vego and others posit that operational art underpins success in war.^[5] Operational art is seen by scholars as a mental framework that consists of key elements that help militaries understand how to successfully plan and act in war.^[6] These elements include orchestration, sequencing, and logistics.^[7] 

This essay argues that operational art is at odds with most Western militaries’ desire to seek decisive battle. However, while operational art may not necessarily achieve quick results, it is essential for success in war, including the achievement of operational and strategic objectives. This discussion is supported by two illustrative case studies: the First and Second World Wars. This essay focuses on the Western Front (1917-1918) and North Africa (1941-1943), respectively, to enable detailed analysis. These case studies have been chosen as Allied success in both wars was supported by operational art, while German defeat was attributable to seeking decisive battle. In demonstrating the argument, this essay discusses the elements of operational art in turn: orchestration, sequencing, and logistics. For each, this essay will explain the element, and then discuss how Germany’s pursuit of the decisive battle in each war hindered their ability to employ operational art with regard to the element. German failure is then contrasted with how the element enabled Allied success. This essay will then conclude with determining whether the Australian Defence Force (ADF) incorporates operational art into its doctrine, thinking and practice, and what operational art may entail for the ADF’s future.

Orchestration

Orchestration is a key element of operational art and is necessary for success in war. Orchestration involves the employment and arrangement of an array of actions and effects in time and space toward the achievement of a common task, purpose or mission.^[8] Effective orchestration can occur across land, maritime, air and information domains. Orchestration should also occur across the battlefront, as well as in-depth, and at the tactical and operational levels of war.^[9] As a result of this concurrent action, orchestration enables simultaneity, which may overwhelm the enemy’s decision-making cycle and ‘create a worst case for an opponent’.^[10] Methods of orchestration include the combined-arms approach and joint operations.^[11] While the decisive battle potentially may see combined-arms at the tactical level, its very nature focuses on a single grand, yet tactical, action at a specific location.^[12] Decisive battle fails to appreciate that war occurs across all warfighting domains, multiple fronts and in-depth. As such, decisive battle is at odds with orchestration as it does not attempt to employ and arrange multiple actions and effects across all domains, in multiple locations, and at both the tactical and operational level. Examples of the value of orchestration in achieving success, and its incongruency with decisive battle, can be drawn from the Western Front.   

Unlike the Allies, Germany pursued decisive battle throughout the First World War, hindering their ability to achieve effective orchestration and contributing to their defeat.^[13] While Germany did begin to develop combined-arms toward the end of the war through infiltration tactics, General Erich Ludendorff failed to appreciate the importance of applying this across the force and the need to integrate tanks.^[14] For example, to enable decisive battle, Ludendorff created two types of divisions. The first was the ‘Assault Divisions’ that were trained to a degree in combined-arms. The second were the ‘Trench Divisions’ intended for defensive purposes.^[15] However, at the commencement of the Spring Offensive, 1918, only 56 of Germany’s 192 divisions were Assault Divisions, meaning Trench Divisions were utilised in the attack. The use of these defensive divisions for offensive action limited the German ability to execute combined-arms, and thus the required orchestration necessary for success.^[16] Further, Germany did not invest in tanks, meaning they were unable to be used for combined-arms.^[17] In contrast, while the Allies pursued decisive battle in the early years of the war, they began to apply what would now be considered operational art from 1917.

Throughout the course of the First World War, the Allies developed an understanding of orchestration. This development is best illustrated through the maturation of the Allied combined-arms approach, which occurred due to several factors. First, the Allies effectively integrated tanks in combined-arms from the Battle of Cambrai, November 1917.^[18] Further, advancements in wireless communications led to greater coordination between aircraft, tanks and dismounted troops.^[19] Finally, the Allies sophisticated their use of artillery, including the use of creeping barrages.^[20] Allied orchestration contributed to the success of the Hundred Days Offensive, with notable combined-arms examples being Hamel and Amiens.^[21] As such, it can be seen how the pursuit of decisive battle by Germany was at odds with their ability to apply orchestration as part of operational art, whereas it enabled Allied success. Similarities can be drawn with the Second World War.  

Within the Second World War, orchestration is seen through the development of joint operations. Both Allied and Axis powers used combined-arms within their armies. However, , orchestration via joint operations was only achieved effectively by the Allies. Once more, Germany’s pursuit of decisive battle was at odds with operational art.^[22] In North Africa, Hitler’s intent in sending a force led by the Erwin Rommel was to prevent the defeat of the Italians.^[23] However, Rommel’s desire for decisive battle saw mission-creep via the conduct of offensives which were deprived of satisfactory air and naval support. This was due to a ‘fundamental mistake’ of German High Command (GHC) in misjudging the theatre’s significance.^[24] In launching his offensives, Rommel failed to appreciate the importance of orchestrating air and naval actions with those of land. Further, the lack of air and naval support meant Rommel’s lines of communication during his advance were vulnerable to interdiction, a point that will be expanded upon in later sections.^[25] These concerns were less pronounced in the British-led forces.

In contrast to Rommel, General Bernard Montgomery demonstrated sound operational art. Montgomery orchestrated air power in concert with his land forces during offensives. Such operations employed air assets to protect his flanks from envelopment, and provided deep interdiction of Rommel’s positions and reserves.^[26] Montgomery enabled this orchestration by establishing Joint Air Support Control cells in his divisional and corps headquarters, supplemented by Forward Air Support links at brigade level.^[27] As such, the Allies’ embraced orchestration. Such efforts enabled their success. Meanwhile, Rommel’s desire for decisive battle was at the expense of orchestration. This comparison illustrates decisive battle’s incongruency with operational art. Success through orchestration is supplemented by sequencing.

Sequencing

The second key element of operational art critical to military success is sequencing.^[28] Sequencing involves the deliberate ordering of tactical actions and operations in time and space to achieve sequential operational and strategic objectives.^[29] Sequencing is compared with decisive battle’s single ‘fell swoop’, or a focus on a single grand battle that destroys an enemy force.^[30] Through sequencing, a force can ‘maintain tempo and focus fighting power’.^[31] Further, sequencing assists in avoiding reaching a culminating point, or the point where a force loses momentum and combat power is degraded to less than the opposing force.^[32] Successful sequencing of tactical actions and operations provides three benefits. The first is a recognition of distinct phases for an operation or campaign. Such phasing leads to the second benefit, which is clearly defined limits on the scope of the campaign or operation. Finally, sequencing helps identify and allow the force to effective use operational pauses.^[33] Meanwhile, decisive battle is at odds with sequencing due to its focus on destroying the enemy force in one tactical action. Destruction of the enemy force via a single action has rarely been achieved in the modern era, which is why sequencing as part of operational art is crucial to success in war.^[34] This is evidenced in contrasting Germany’s Spring Offensive with that of the Allies’ Hundred Days.      

Ludendorff’s pursuit of the decisive battle saw minimal consideration of sequencing during the Spring Offensive, contributing to the Offensive’s failure. Rather than identify sequential operational objectives that supported linked tactical actions, Ludendorff’s aim was to simply achieve a break-through of the Allied line and exploit opportunities.^[35] While some offensives, such as Operation Michael, achieved tactical success, they achieved no operational or strategic objectives or outcomes.^[36] Thus, Ludendorff’s desire for decisive battle led to a narrow view of the battlefield and an inability to view how actions could be sequenced to achieve operational objectives. While Allied generals such as Douglas Haig and Robert Nivelle also pursued the decisive battle in the early-war years, the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander General Ferdinand Foch in 1918 saw the application of sequencing.^[37] Foch viewed the war as a whole, and his planning for the Hundred Days Offensive saw the identification of limited operational objectives that were successfully achieved via sequenced offensives across the entirety of the front.^[38] Unlike German experiences in pursuing decisive battle, Allied sequencing ensured forces did not outstrip the range of artillery and air support.^[39] Some may contend that the Allies should have switched to seeking decisive battle following the initial successes of the Hundred Days Offensive. However, such an assertion fails to appreciate that GHC continuously directed deliberate withdrawals to prepared delay positions each time their positions were tenuous, avoiding destruction. ^[40] Thus, sequencing as part of operational art was necessary for Allied success, and at odds with decisive battle. Such sequencing can also be seen within the Second World War.

In the Second World War, Rommel’s desire for decisive battle saw him forgo sequencing like Ludendorff, hindering his ability to achieve operational or strategic success. While Rommel is considered a brilliant tactician, during the North African campaign his planning was ad hoc and ‘failed to visualise what course a pending operation would take’.^[41] As a result, Rommel did not identify operational objectives that could be achieved via sequenced actions and operations. Instead, Rommel showed a preference for exploiting tactical success as Ludendorff had in 1917-18.^[42] This preference led to what Vego contends is one of the major reasons for German failure during the Second World War: a lack of sequenced operational planning. This failure is illustrated through Rommel’s focus on Egypt. After capturing Tobruk, Rommel did not pause. Instead he continued his advance toward Egypt against his superior’s intent. Such an advance undermined Germany’s opportunity to seize Malta and deny Allied naval and air basing within the Mediterranean.^[43] However, Rommel would soon come up against the newly appointed Commander Eighth Army, Montgomery.

Montgomery had learnt the lessons of the First World War well, and developed an operational plan that saw the sequencing of tactical actions toward the achievement of operational objectives.^[44] Montgomery’s application of sequencing denied Rommel the opportunistic attacks he had employed against an ill-coordinated Allied force in 1941-1942. These opportunistic attacks had made Rommel famous. However, Montgomery’s measured and sequenced approach removed these opportunities from Rommel. Furthermore, operational sequencing contributed to the successful Allied advance across North Africa.^[45] As such, it can be seen how the preference of German commanders in both the First and Second World War for decisive battle was at odds with sequencing as part of operational art. In constrast, the Allies adapted in both wars to embrace the success that came with sequencing. Sequencing and effective logistics are mutually supportive.

Logistics

Logistics is the third element of operational art. When the importance of logistics is considered, its relevance to operational art is clear. Academics argue that logistics is a critical element of operational art in achieving success in war.^[46] Decisive battle sees logistics as a subsidiary consideration to massing force. As such, acolytes of decisive battle provide negligible thought to sustainment and logistics. However, successful logistics involves the resourcing and sustainment of all levels of war.^[47] While it is acknowledged that logistics involves a degree of science, the art of logistics comes with the requirement to integrate force sustainment into the larger operational design. Such integration requires an artful determination of the balance between ensuring combat power can be sustained while not unduly restricting courses of action.^[48] Within planning, logistics informs the operational reach of forces, or the distance and duration of which force can be projected and employed effectively.^[49] Such understanding assists in sequencing and orchestration. Furthermore, understanding the logistics involved in successful operational sequencing also assists in avoiding culmination. Therefore, logistics should be a consideration that informs the sequencing and orchestration of tactical and operational objectives.^[50] Logistics further enables sequencing and orchestration by ensuring the ability of forces to manoeuvre and conduct multiple (or sequential) tactical actions toward the achievement of objectives.^[51] As such, sound logistics provides the ability to pursue multiple objectives and simultaneity of action. The discussion above illustrates how logistics, as it pertains to operational art, is at odds with the narrow, singular focus of decisive battle. The German’s pursuit of the decisive battle in 1918 is evidence of the incompatibility of decisive battle and sound logistics.

In imagining spectacular success through decisive battle, Ludendorff paid little consideration to the sustainment and logistics of his Spring Offensive. This is best evidenced through the first offensive, Operation Michael. Although the Germans achieved tactical success, they exceeded their supply lines within three days.^[52] As a result, the German advance culminated and soldiers went days without food.^[53] It took ten days for sufficient resources to be brought forward. Due to this delay, the offensive had to be terminated by Ludendorff, as Foch had reinforced the Allied lines.^[54] Operation Michael illustrates how Ludendorff’s pursuit of decisive battle was at odds with sound logistics that underpins successful operational art. While blunting Ludendorff’s Spring Offensive for months, Foch applied operational art regarding logistics by improving lines of communication via building up railway networks to the Western Front.^[55] Further, Foch deliberately considered sustainment of the Hundred Days offensive during planning, ensuring that the rate of advance would not outstrip the logistics system. Such considerations contributed to the application of the Hundred Days Offensive sequencing.^[56] Foch’s operational art regarding logistics proved fortuitous, with Niall Barr contending that Allies’ success was in large part due to the effectiveness of Allied logistics.^[57] Thus, the contrast between Ludendorff and Foch concerning logistics illustrates that sound logistical planning is vital for operational art and is ignored by a focus on decisive battle. In the Second World War, Rommel and Montgomery reflected the approaches of their forebears, respectively.

Rommel’s pursuit of the decisive battle in North Africa was at odds with the sound consideration of logistics. A failure to effectively incorporate logistics in planning at the tactical and operational levels contributed to Rommel’s defeat.^[58] During his offensives, Rommel pushed his German panzer divisions beyond their logistical support, resulting in drastic fuel shortages and substantial vehicle breakdowns.^[59] Rommel was also hindered by a failure of GHC to actively replace lost equipment and troops. Allied joint air-sea operations in the Mediterranean; a form of orchestration; led to Allied sea control. Such orchestrated sea control further hampered German logistical efforts.^[60] Despite these concerns, scholars contend that Rommel should have understood his force’s logistical constraints. Further, if Rommel had recognised these constraints, he may have ceased or paused the German offensive. Instead, in June 1942, Rommel decided to continue his pursuit of the British Eighth Army. This pursuit resulting in the first battle of El Alamein and the culmination of Rommel’s force. This culmination caused Rommel to cease his advance and conduct defensive operations.^[61] Rommel’s initial tactical success in 1941 was, in part, due to a corresponding poor appreciation of logistics on behalf of General Alan Cunningham, Commander Eighth Army.^[62] Cunningham failed to interdict the supply lines of Rommel during Operation Crusader in late 1941, which may have resulted in an earlier culmination of Rommel’s forces.^[63] However, when Montgomery became Commander Eighth Army, he changed Allied thinking about logistics. In addition to the orchestration of air power to interdict Rommel’s supply lines, Montgomery’s sequenced advance in November 1942 post-El Alamein saw the identification and seizing of objectives of logistical value to ensure the sustainability of operations.^[64] One example was Derna, Libya, which provided both air and sea lines of communication for strategic logistics.^[65] As such, Montgomery’s understanding and application of logistics as part of operational art contributed to Allied success, whereas Rommel’s pursuit of decisive battle evidenced its incompatibility with operational art.  

The ADF and Operational Art

A review of the First and Second World Wars has illustrated that decisive battle is at odds with operational art. Furthermore, the above discussion indicates that operational art is key for success in war. This leads to a question: is operational art incorporated into ADF doctrine, thinking and practice? A review of ADF doctrine highlights that the ADF theoretically views operational art as critical to success in war.^[66] Aaron Jackson believes operational art is present in ADF contemporary thinking and practice. He suggests that operational art is present in both scholarly discourse and the implementation of operational planning at Headquarters Joint Operations Command.^[67] It is difficult to assess whether operational art, as defined in doctrine, really translates into ADF thinking and practice. Furthermore, within the constraints of this essay, it may be difficult to assert that such thinking translates into the ADF successfully leading complex, kinetic campaigns and operations. Yet, the ADF’s recent operational experiences, particularly INTERFET in 1999, may provide some insight.^[68] During this campaign, the ADF demonstrated good understanding and application of orchestration, sequencing and logistics.^[69] As such, while scholars do posit that the majority of Western militaries seek decisive battle, this does not seem to be the case for the ADF. The ADF’s operational art will prove useful in the future.

A review of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU) highlights that the ADF will be required to apply operational art to achieve the strategic objectives outlined in the document. Operational art will be required for several reasons. First, orchestration is necessary to ‘shape’ the strategic environment.^[70] For example, shaping may see the ADF conduct mentoring training teams simultaneous with construction works and joint regional engagement tours. Such actions may be in concert with DFAT-led humanitarian aid programs, such as recent activities in Vanuatu, Fiji and PNG.^[71] Second, the sequencing of actions and operations would be necessary in any requirement to ‘respond’ to a kinetic threat in the region.^[72] A fictional scenario may broadly see engagement first occurring in the deep via the soon to be purchased long-range strike capabilities, before interdiction via air and naval assets on the northern maritime approaches, followed by amphibious operations in the archipelago to the north.^[73] Finally, the large distances and archipelagic nature of Australia’s region will necessitate complex logistics planning and securing of vulnerable lines of communication, much like Allied efforts in the Mediterranean.^[74] As such, operational art will only become increasingly important to the ADF’s future. Such a future is incompatible with the desire for decisive battle.

Conclusion

This essay demonstrated that operational art is at odds with the majority of Western militaries’ desire to seek decisive battle. Furthermore, the essay highlighted how operational art is necessary for success in war. In demonstrating this argument, the essay discussed each of the key elements of operational art in turn: orchestration, sequencing and logistics. Together, these elements form the mental framework that is operational art. Such a framework assists militaries in understanding, planning and acting in war. For each element, the essay explained the element and outlined how it was at odds with decisive battle. Then, the essay illustrated the effects of the element through the two illustrative case studies of the First and Second World Wars. The review of the First World War discussed how Ludendorff’s pursuit of the decisive battle in the Spring Offensive stood in stark contrast to Foch’s Hundred Days Offensive. For the First World War, the application of operational art ensured Allied victory. An examination of the Second World War then highlighted how Rommel’s desire for decisive battle in North Africa hindered the Germans three mechanisms. First, decisive battle undermined the orchestration of joint level action. Second, Rommel’s decisive focus neglected the sequencing of actions. Finally, Rommel failed to appreciate the necessary logistics to sustain the force. As such, despite Rommel’s tactical prowess, Montgomery’s nous in applying the elements of operational art saw the reversal of fortunes and Allied success. The essay concluded by reviewing how operational art manifests in the ADF and what this may mean for the future. This review determined that the ADF does not hold a desire for decisive battle. Therefore, the ADF and Australia are unlike other Western militaries in this regard. Furthermore, the review highlighted that operational art will be essential to successfully meet the requirements of the DSU. In closing, it behoves ADF commanders and planners to understand the lessons the First and Second World Wars. These lessons outline the importance of operational art, and should dissuade any notions concerning decisive battle.  

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[1] Milan N Vego, Joint operational warfare: Theory and practice (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2009), V-5; Cathal J. Nolan, The Allure of Battle: a History of how Wars have been Won and Lost (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 18, 23; Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War - Within the Framework of Political History, English language ed., vol. IV, The Modern Era (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 202, 303.

[2] Nolan, The Allure of Battle, 23.

[3] Nolan, The Allure of Battle, 23; Carter Malkasian, A History of Modern Wars of Attrition (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 1. Quote from Nolan.

[4] Lewis Sorley, Westmoreland: the general who lost Vietnam (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), 92; Nolan, The Allure of Battle, 23.

[5] John Andreas Olsen and Martin Van Creveld, "Conclusion," in The evolution of operational art: from Napoleon to the present, ed. John Andreas Olsen and Martin Van Creveld (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 224; Milan N Vego, Operational Warfare (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2000), 1; Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis, MN: East View Information Services, 1992), 38.

[6] Svechin, Strategy, 330; Vego, Operational Warfare, 3; Olsen and Van Creveld, "Conclusion," 226; Georgii Samoilovich Isserson, The evolution of operational art, trans. Bruce W. Menning, 2nd ed. (Fort Leavenworth, KA: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), 5.

[7] Vego, Joint operational warfare: Theory and practice, I-3; Bruce W. Menning, "Operational Art’s Orgins," in Historical perspectives of the operational art, ed. Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2005), 11; Antulio J. Echevarria, "American Operational Art, 1917–2008," in The evolution of operational art: from Napoleon to the present, ed. John Andreas Olsen and Martin Van Creveld (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 135; Olsen and Van Creveld, "Conclusion," 1.

[8] Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0 - Campaigns and Operations, 2nd ed. (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2012), 105; Menning, "Operational Art’s Orgins," 9.

[9] Menning, "Operational Art’s Orgins," 9; Olsen and Van Creveld, "Introduction," 1.

[10] Edward A. Smith, "Effects-Based Operations," Security Challenges 2, no. 1 (2006): 50. ; Department of Defence, Land Warfare Doctrine 1 - The Fundamentals of Land Power (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2014), 45. Note: there is a 2018 version of LWD 1 however it is not open-source. Quote from Smith.

[11] Department of Defence, LWD 1, 45; Menning, "Operational Art’s Orgins," 9.

[12] Malkasian, A History of Modern Wars of Attrition, 3.

[13] Nolan, The Allure of Battle, 23; David T. Zabecki, The German 1918 offensives: a case study in the operational level of war (New York: Routledge, 2006), 41.

[14] Zabecki, The German 1918 offensives: a case study in the operational level of war, 67-68.

[15] Zabecki, The German 1918 offensives: a case study in the operational level of war, 68; Ian Drury, "German Stormtrooper," in War on the Western Front. In the Trenches of World War 1, ed. Gary Sheffield (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007), 38.

[16] Zabecki, The German 1918 offensives: a case study in the operational level of war, 70, 200-201.

[17] It is assessed that the Germans built just 20 tanks in the First World War, see Frédéric Guelton, "Technology and armaments," in The Cambridge History of the First World War. Volume 2: The State, ed. Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 263-264.

[18] Elizabeth Greenhalgh, "Technology Development in Coalition: The Case of the First World War Tank," The International History Review 22, no. 4 (2000): 830-831. ; John Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War (London: UCL Press, 1999), 55; Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, "Combat and tactics," in The Cambridge History of the First World War. Volume 2: The State, ed. Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 170.

[19] Niall J. A. Barr, "The Elusive Victory. The BEF and the Operational Level of War, September 1918," in War in the age of technology: myriad faces of modern armed conflict, ed. Geoffrey Jensen and Andrew Wiest (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 215.

[20] William Philpott, Attrition: Fighting the First World War (London: Little, Brown, 2014), 321.

[21] Barr, "The Elusive Victory," 216.

[22] Nolan, The Allure of Battle, 23.

[23] Simon Ball, "The Mediterranean and North Africa, 1940–1944," in The Cambridge History of the Second World War. Volume 1: Fighting the War, ed. Evan Mawdsley and John Ferris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 371. Hitler had plans for the domination of the Mediterranean, to include North Africa, but this could only come after operations against the Soviet Union.

[24] Albert Kesselring, Memoirs (London: William Kimber, 1953), 157.

[25] David French, Raising Churchill's army: the British army and the war against Germany, 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 237-238.

[26] French, Raising Churchill's army: the British army and the war against Germany, 1919-1945, 237-238.

[27] French, Raising Churchill's army: the British army and the war against Germany, 1919-1945, 237, 262.

[28] Milan Vego, "Military History and the Study of Operational Art," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 57 (2010): 128.

[29] Menning, "Operational Art’s Orgins," 9; Department of Defence, ADDP 3.0 - Campaigns and Operations, 120.

[30] 

[31] Department of Defence, ADDP 3.0 - Campaigns and Operations, 120.

[32] Department of Defence, ADDP 3.0 - Campaigns and Operations, 123; Isserson, The evolution of operational art, 54; Svechin, Strategy, 361.

[33] Department of Defence, ADDP 3.0 - Campaigns and Operations, 123.

[34] Nolan, The Allure of Battle, 22-23.

[35] Philpott, Attrition: Fighting the First World War, 312.

[36] Nolan, The Allure of Battle, 395.

[37] Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power: the Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 196; Zabecki, The German 1918 offensives: a case study in the operational level of war, 172; Jonathan Krause, "Ferdinand Foch and the Scientific Battle," The RUSI Journal 159, no. 4 (2014): 70.

[38] Krause, "Ferdinand Foch and the Scientific Battle," 72-73.

[39] Christoph Mick, "1918: Endgame," in The Cambridge History of the First World War. Volume 1: Global War, ed. Jay Winter, The Cambridge History of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 170.

[40] Barr, "The Elusive Victory," 232, 235.

[41] Vego, Joint operational warfare: Theory and practice, XI-29.

[42] Vego, Joint operational warfare: Theory and practice, XI-29.

[43] Vego, Joint operational warfare: Theory and practice, XI-29.

[44] French, Raising Churchill's army: the British army and the war against Germany, 1919-1945, 263.

[45] French, Raising Churchill's army: the British army and the war against Germany, 1919-1945, 263.

[46] Menning, "Operational Art’s Orgins," 10; Vego, Operational Warfare, 259; Michael Howard, "Prologue," in The evolution of operational art: from Napoleon to the present, ed. John Andreas Olsen and Martin Van Creveld (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ix.

[47] Vego, Operational Warfare, 259; Menning, "Operational Art’s Orgins," 5.

[48] Menning, "Operational Art’s Orgins," 10; Vego, Operational Warfare, 259.

[49] Vego, Operational Warfare, 261.

[50] Vego, Operational Warfare, 260.

[51] Menning, "Operational Art’s Orgins," 11.

[52] David T. Zabecki, "Military Developments of World War I," in 1914-1918 online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. Peter Gatrell Ute Daniel, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, and Alan Kramer Jennifer Keene, and Bill Nasson (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2014), 68; Christopher Phillips, Civilian Specialists at War: Britain's Transport Experts and the First World War (London: University of London Press, 2020), 246; Zabecki, The German 1918 offensives: a case study in the operational level of war, 139.

[53] Phillips, Civilian Specialists at War, 247.

[54] Phillips, Civilian Specialists at War, 247.

[55] Phillips, Civilian Specialists at War, 353.

[56] Barr, "The Elusive Victory," 219.

[57] Barr, "The Elusive Victory," 219.

[58] Vego, Joint operational warfare: Theory and practice, IX-29.

[59] Vego, Joint operational warfare: Theory and practice, X-81-82; Martin van Creveld, "Rommel's Supply Problem 1941-42," Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies 119, no. 3 (1974): 71.

[60] Vego, Joint operational warfare: Theory and practice, VII-89.

[61] Vego, Joint operational warfare: Theory and practice, VII-89.

[62] Vego, Joint operational warfare: Theory and practice, X-81-82.

[63] Vego, Joint operational warfare: Theory and practice, X-81-82.

[64] French, Raising Churchill's army: the British army and the war against Germany, 1919-1945, 237-238.

[65] Ball, "The Mediterranean and North Africa, 1940–1944," 365; Nigel Hamilton, Monty: Master of the Battlefield, 1942–44 (Sevenoaks, UK: Sceptre, 1987), 56.

[66] Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 5.0 - Joint Planning, 3rd ed. (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2019), 22; Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 5.0.1 - Joint Military Appreciation Process, 2nd ed. (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2019), 18; Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.1 - Command and Control, 2nd ed. (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2019), 50.

[67] Aaron P. Jackson, "Innovative within the Paradigm: The Evolution of the Australian Defence Force’s Joint Operational Art," Security Challenges 13, no. 1 (2017): 60, 62.

[68] John Blaxland, "A Geostrategic SWOT Analysis for Australia," The Centre of Gravity Series, no. 49 (2019): 7.

[69] Kevin Burnett, "The Significance of New Zealand’s Contribution," in East Timor Intervention: A Retrospective on INTERFET, ed. John Blaxland (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2015), 333-334; Mark Evans, "A Tactical Commander’s Perspective," in East Timor Intervention: A Retrospective on INTERFET, ed. John Blaxland (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2015), 199-200.

[70] Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2020), 24-25. Shape is one of three specified strategic objectives.

[71] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Stepping Up Australia’s Engagement with our Pacific Family (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2019); "Defence Pacific Engagement - Infrastructure", Department of Defence. Accessed October 18, 2020. https://www.defence.gov.au/SPI/defence-pacific-engagement/infrastructure.asp; Taylor Lynch, "Tapping into a better future," Defence News, September 25, 2019, https://www.defence.gov.au/StrategicUpdate-2020/docs/Factsheet_Force_Posture_and_Engagement.pdf.

[72] Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 24-25. Respond is one of three specified strategic objectives.

[73] Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 27; Hugh White, How to defend Australia (Carlton: La Trobe University Press, 2019), 108; Adam Lockyer and Michael D. Cohen, "Denial strategy in Australian strategic thought," Australian Journal of International Affairs 71, no. 4 (2017): 428. ; Department of Defence, 2020 Force Structure Plan (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2020), 41.

[74] Paul Dibb, "Is Morrison’s strategic update the defence of Australia doctrine reborn?," The Strategist, July 9, 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/is-morrisons-strategic-update-the-defence-of-australia-doctrine-reborn/; White, How to defend Australia, 97, 113.