Introduction

Plan Pelorus 2022, launched under Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN, was designed to steer Navy towards his vision of “A Thinking Navy, A Fighting Navy, An Australian Navy”. At first glance this is a reasonable, realistic demand of the force; however, when you look at the infrastructure that leads our men and women into their Navy functions, in this case their training, there appears to be a significant disconnect, specifically in generating the momentum required to support a momentous cultural change as “A Thinking Navy”.

There have been some significant changes throughout the past decade, from categories, capability, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), alliances, and yet the core element to enable integration of these changes, training, has not noticeably changed its approach to support these changes. It seems to be more a case of “if it ain’t broke; don’t fix it” rather than any form of malice against change, but what if it is simply not efficient or fit for purpose? Does that not also warrant a review to repair this deficit?

If so, and I propose it well is, then the next question may be akin to asking, “How do you train ‘A Thinking Navy?’” There is an abundance of literature and studies that proposes ways to stimulate creative thought processes, predominantly in STEM fields, but then how to do you go about fostering this cultural change of “A Thinking Navy” and still maintain a compliant force? In a disciplined organisation, such is the ADF, do you not need your men and women to be able to engage in challenging, thought provoking discussions, challenge the status quo, present new ideas to match or surpass emerging technologies, and yet maintain a level of compliance and subordination reflective of subservient service to their nation? The answer may be as simple, albeit unattractive, as failure.

Defining and Conceptualising Failure

The definition of failure is either implied or broadly defined throughout various resources. However, it should be only as prescriptive as appropriate to meet the intent, understanding that it cannot be one value, at all times, always and without question.

Defining Failure

Interestingly, albeit not surprisingly, failure is not defined within any of the searched ADF documents and is therefore implied to be an assumed element; as surely as the sun will rises, it will set. However, to propose rewarding something as vague, and yet absolute, the term failure demands more detail. “To come short or be wanting in action, detail, or result; disappoint or prove lacking in what is attempted, expected, desired, or approved.” (Macquarie, 2022) Therefore, failure must be inexplicably identified as to what the want, detail or action is, and, as importantly so, what the threshold of this want, detail or action is, that it shall warrant awarding failure for anything less than that fact.

Conceptualising Failure

Failure is a historically negative term, but, in this article, it holds the key to a wealth of positive lessons and opportunities that may be experience by an individual. There will be examples where failure and success are binary as black versus white, for example: a hostile air symbol versus a friendly submarine symbol requires acknowledgement of a shape type (circle, diamond or square) and a shape part (top, bottom or whole). Another example may be in navigation, where the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) are prescriptive in explaining what cautions must be exercised when overtaking another vessel in unrestricted waters. Or, when vital ship equipment requires a part that the original equipment manufacturer approves only one replacement part of a stockpile of three options in order to return it to full capability. In each situation, there are often several options but only one will ever be correct. However, this is to become the exception and not the rule, specifically when assessing the individual’s cognitive application, and in turn teaching them to think.

Failure is not to be confused with negligence. Negligence towards an effort or an outcome are deliberate acts of meeting a presentation with adversary like effort or action, and resulting in a similar conclusion. Failure, in this discussion, presents a positive form when thought is permitted to take place.

Framing the discussion

The direction of this essay is framed by the experiences and exposures, predominantly through the Navy’s maritime warfare training environment, delivered to both sailors and officers, as well as limited experience to US Navy and US Marine Corps training curriculum. It is not in an appropriately informed position to call out other services or agencies; however, regular discussions suggest that this is likely to be experienced throughout the ADF and the Defence as a whole.

Status Quo

As it stands, the current maritime warfare training continuum, for officers and sailors, is a series of modules, in which students are encouraged, implicitly or explicitly, to apply a Surface Approach (SA) to learning, through a rote learning method (Tan, 2011). This denies the ability to apply a Deep Approach (DA) method to learning, and as such students will regurgitate what is required to get above the 80 percent threshold (or whatever the mandated pass mark happens to be). Respite is awarded at the mandated control points (Navy, 2022), in which the training progress report process (the “3-strike” process applied to formative assessment failures) is, theoretically, reset and a sigh of relief is breathed. This process is repeated until the completion and accomplishment of their nominated professional qualification (PQ) standard and they are awarded their title of rate, or PQ, and expected to know, perform and act as a seasoned professional.

So what does this actually prepare our so-called modern “war-fighter” for? A mental “Maginot Line” that when stressed by a scenario that is presented beyond the bounds of their rote learned SA method they will look, as they have been trained, outward to others to seek answers or apportion blame for their own shortcomings.

We are told that we are to be, or to become, “A Thinking Navy”, but out training approach methods are not conducive to stimulate thought in our service men and women. That is not to suggest they are not capable; on the contrary the conversations experienced in the past years show an increasingly capable cohort of men and women that have the requisite intellect, but lack the courage to tackle the fear of failure that tormented most of us through our own training. There is also a strong consideration to be made of obedience to authority (Milgram and Gudehus, 1978), which may also unveil why our instructors do not challenge the status quo more.

The aforementioned control points and training progress reports are at least 20-years-old and are fundamental to each Navy course, but what happens when the material instructed should not be so binary?

Warfare as an art

This is well described in numerous doctrine that any effective application in warfare demands a keen eye and a critical mind, and yet our training method falls woefully short of teaching, coaching and mentoring our service men and women to think. From Clausewitz and Tolstoy to Grossman and Horner, there are is an overwhelming abundance of literature that explores the psychology of warfare (Clausewitz, 1950, Tolstoy, 1869, Grossman, 2014, and Horner, 2022) and its impact on individuals and society. So why is that important? Clearly, through the aforementioned literature, there is a resounding link between the individual capacity, and the psychology of how we function in the face of adversity (Grossman, 2014), with the spoils going to the tactically sound, tactically creative or tactically courageous victors. So what is tactics, as an art? The art of tactics lies in how we creatively form and apply military force in a given situation (Corps, 1997). Backed by historical examples, these lessons prescribe what should be considered in making decisions: do not underestimate your enemy, do not overvalue your own capabilities, understand your environment, and honour the situation you are presented with, but most of all, THINK! This may be a low resolution summary of some hard-hitting literature, but the genesis of message supports the former CN’s vision of “A Thinking Navy”.

If we shelf the artistic notion for a moment, and focus on the training structure and how it holds a place here, we will begin to shed a light on the delta(s) that exist. Throughout initial entry, intermediate and advanced training, there is a doctrinal approach to lesson content, delivery and assessment. Sure, some of these elements are quite rudimentary and SA and rote learning may be the appropriate method to establish the fundamentals, but when are our men and women afforded the opportunity to apply a DA method, and ask “Why”? To put it simply, we are not; or at least, not during formalised training. There is a small cohort amongst the instructor cadre that will challenge their students, adopting DA methods, blowing out break or secure times, and all in the name of learning. However, theirs is the exception and, by a gross margin, not the rule.

Where to from here?

The situation we find ourselves in today is no one body’s fault, but it is also everybody’s responsibility. Therefore, accountability must be shared by all involved and yet must not be passed or offered beyond identifying our own shortcomings; what could I have done to better prepare myself, and what should I have done to prepare those around me, to work with me? The error is also not solely on the individual as it is not on the instructional cadre. Our SA training methods, interpretation and application of time, and, blessedly, our recent lack of experience in conflict preclude us form truly appreciating what we need.

What is acceptable to fail, and what failures should be encouraged in a controlled environment (as beyond that offer themselves to catastrophic consequences)?

In this case, maritime operations, and potentially numerous other ADF fields, needs to foster an environment that rewards failure, that is, if that failure presents opportunities for learning and growth. It may require deliberate actions such as divorcing ourselves from time-based certification, to an outcomes-based graduation. It may require developing doctrine and training material that prescribes thought and not action such as “Winning in combat depends upon tactical leaders who can think creatively and act decisively.” (Corps, 1997), or uses examples dire consequences, such as “If the Section cannot remain here alive, it will remain here dead, but it will remain here” (Bethune, 1918). Such proposals are key to grab the attention through shock and stimulate the reader into thought. Regardless of the changes, it is imperative that these occur and that they provoke thought in our service men and women.

Training for failure

So, what could training for failure look like? The aforementioned binary conditions may remain suited within the bounds of the current, traditional training doctrine, and would be necessary in establishing the fundamentals required to train for failure. Next, it may be appropriate to transition from purely theory, to a positive reinforcement-style approach. This may be as simple as taking a proven method such as “clicker” training (Skinner, 1951) to identify when the fundamentals are applied in the correct order. This would permit the instructional cadre to “control” (Skinner, 1957) the student’s actions up to a defined point, marked clearly as the end of a correct/incorrect assessment period and into the realm of potential failure.

One example, in maritime warfare training, this may look as such:

1. Stage one (fundaments). Rules of Engagement, Weapons Posture, core TTPs, degrees of readiness, etc. These fixed definitions set the rules for the next stages and remain suitable to be delivered in the traditional training approach. It does not necessarily demand SA or DA methods, but may be binary in their assessments i.e. true or false answers.
2. Stage two (basic application). Applying some of the above elements to meet a defined outcome such as “Report to the Officer in Tactical Command for duty as the Local Anti-Air Warfare Commander, Assume command of Ships “A”, “B” and “C”, Set Weapons Posture to “X”, and set the “first” degree of readiness.” All of these fundamentals definitions have been taught and assessed, and each stage or report made could be validated with a discriminative stimuli (Dorey and Cox, 2018). The format of the messages or orders are not preventative in their message (contrary to current training, forgetting to say “out” or “over” at the end of a transmission does not change the content).
3. Stage three (complex application). After a clear indication of the completion of stage two, perhaps two “clicks”, the student now knows they have navigated their scenario to the stage where it is completely under their control to pass or fail. Such a criterion may be as simple, albeit challenging, as “no friendly unit is to receive combat damage”. Absent of walking out or complete inaction, their forthcoming failure will present to them what failure could look like, or most importantly yet, what success does not look like. They may see an event or occurrence unfold and apply one TTP, or they may wait a little longer and apply a second, different TTP. They may be wrong and fail the scenario in both instances, but they have observed their own actions, learned firsthand, and, most importantly of all, have failed in a controlled environment where lives are not lost.

In such a staged approach, we are easing our men and women into environments and situations where they are encouraged, and required, to think for themselves. They are taught fundamentals, receive stimulus when correctly applying these core elements in the appropriate manner or order, and then permitted to follow, or not follow the “rule book”, experiencing firsthand what that outcome looks like. When they fail during this last element, it is not necessarily a negative experience. Sure, the simulated loss of another ship and associated synthetic lives will temporarily weigh on them, but they now get to experience the “Why”.

How this drastically differs from the current training method is that after the fundamentals, a scenario will be assessed and a student may fail simply based on their reports, not applying the correct TTP, safety violations (albeit only synthetic), as well as a myriad of other ways. They know what they are supposed to achieve and how (some TTPs are specifically prescribed) but when they are challenged in a stressful, time-constrained simulation, the overwhelming information they are hit with often derails them from any game-plan, and their focus is driven to complete the scenario, as prescribed, and get just another “tick-in-the-box”. They resort to the SA method of learning due to the constrained resource of time and the perception that it precludes a DA method of learning. Failing one of these events may lead to awarding the student a training progress report (TPR) (Navy, 2022). Fail three of these events, receive three TPRs, and your career and aspirations may suddenly be under an immediate review for validity.

What is the reward?

Quite simply, the thrill of learning. Gul et al (2020) describe the thrill of learning, specifically in gradual over immediate information disclosure. Their study concluded that their experiment offers strong evidence that subjects prefer gradual resolution of uncertainty over early or late resolution, when information about winning yields decisive bad news but inconclusive good news (Gul et al, 2020). There are other values to this approach to learning also. The benefit of making mistakes, rather than simply trying to prevent them, allows an almost immediate appreciation to their value, the ability to adjust and tailor goals, and the increased likelihood that a set goal will actually be attained (Kupor et al, 2018).

So now we are presented with the prospect of mental stimulation through a DA method of learning, the ability to discover through own failures, the increased likelihood of goal attainment, and a keener eye, will be experienced by our men and women. Not all of these experiences may be pleasant in their attainment; however, the environments that they may foster could present a stronger esprit de corps amongst our men and women. Those that are now all burdened with the benefit of failure have a common binding that, in absence of other, unhealthy conflict, could actually serve them to grow as a collective, rather than as an individual (Junger, 2016).

Conclusion

In combat, specifically air and maritime, there are no second places for unit versus unit in kinetic action. A downed fighter will see the loss of one or two crew, and a sunk ship may take the lives of their entire crew (180-240 for most major surface combatants). But, we have the opportunity to experience this, through simulations, and fail, sometimes miserably, but most of all, we could learn. And if we are learning, thinking and challenging eachother, then we could perhaps have met the milestone of becoming “A Thinking Navy”.

Hopefully, this article has clearly presented the established milestone as “A Thinking Navy”, the shortcomings in short and deep approach methods to learning, the criticality of stimulating our men and women to think, and a few ideas that could serve as a foundational origin for a new training era.

Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics (CDLE) sought for articles of contemporary leadership, ethics and cross-cultural capability in Defence, but I challenge that at least one service remains thwarted by a legacy approach to training. This is not to propose these men and women may not be up to the task, on the contrary, but we are yet to be trained to think and challenge. If this can be overcome as an organisation, then the power potential in our collective, challenging, thoughts would be enough to endure any future adversaries.

Efforts to turn this around are currently presented by self-motivated individuals, driven, professionally curious, and have a genuine desire to see others succeed and learn as well. The concern here is that we cannot rely on these individuals, and that we absolutely need to change our organisational training policy to support DA methods of learning, wherever possible.

If we want our people to think, and become “A Thinking Navy”, then an educational foundation that promotes thought, and, in controlled conditions, rewards failure should be at the forefront of much needed organisational change.