Introduction

Late in 2019, as the Black Summer bushfires began burning across Australia, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) was called upon to assist the civil emergency services. The Black Summer period was described as ‘unprecedented’, yet much of what has followed in the intervening years has been equally extraordinary and unparalleled. Black Summer marked the beginning of a period in which the ADF’s assistance domestically has arguably outweighed that which it contributes abroad. The flurry of serious and devastating weather events, as well as the coronavirus pandemic has compromised the capacity for the traditional emergency and support agencies to respond appropriately. These agencies, as well as members in the affected communities, are continuing to experience the cumulative fatigue and distress associated with these events. The ability to rebuild and move on from such devastation has been greatly reduced by a lack of access to funds and resources, as well as the relentless barrage of catastrophic weather events. This has led to an increased reliance upon the ADF to support communities that have been affected by floods, bushfires and COVID-19, all while maintaining the capacity to meet strategic objectives and enable capability within the region. However, the ADF’s increasing contribution in domestic spheres risks confusing its role as the primary defender of Australia’s interests. In these domestic roles, the ADF’s proximity to the reality of government policies – whether on aged care, funding of emergency services or disaster relief coordination – tempts members to ask the question: “is there an enemy within?”

The Essence of Military Service

Regardless of rank, mustering, or specialisation, the duty of all ADF members is to defend Australia and its national interests. This is achieved through the application of highly specialised skills, up to and including lethal force, often in high-risk environments. With the increase in Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) across the country, as well as in Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) efforts internationally, the force is beginning to act regularly in roles that are significantly at odds to traditional military responsibilities. The recent, and drastic changes in the strategic environment, have required Government to reassess the ways in which ADF resources are applied and enable military capability. Geopolitical rivalries both near and afar, as well as mounting environmental volatility require the ADF to be adaptable, resilient and agile in order to continue delivering effects.

The ADF’s most recently published strategic objectives, as outlined in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update are to “shape Australia’s strategic environment, deter actions against Australia’s interests, and to respond with credible military force, when required.” (2020 Defence Strategic Update, 2020) Rather than trying to portion assets to exercises and operations globally, the ADF in conjunction with other government agencies is looking more to the immediate region and how assets can be used to achieve strategic influence, and continue to ensure Australia’s national interests. These policy changes reflect the increasing tensions within the strategic environment, and were used to redefine the expectations of the ADF in how the force and capabilities are applied. Within these policy changes, it is interesting to note the increasing references to DACC and how the ADF can be used as a tool of government to “support the Commonwealth and State/Territory Governments with emergency and nonemergency tasks, as well as supporting events of national significance as requested” (Moriarty & Campbell, 2022) . DACC poses an interesting conundrum for the ADF. On one side, there is an opportunity to apply highly refined skill sets in a variety of complex, ambiguous, and challenging situations that provide members an excellent range of training and skills. Such experiences are valuable as they can be drawn upon to achieve the Defence Strategic Objectives through a variety of domains across different operations. The potential downside, however, is that if this tasking is not managed correctly, and teams are not provided the necessary support and guidance, the organisation could see a degradation in military effectiveness that could have adverse effects when required to be applied in conflict scenarios. It can also pose complications in the relationship between the ADF and the communities that are being assisted, rebuilt and ultimately protected. As reported by Green, "our military serves a vital role across Australian society, whether during pandemic, flood or fire … But the ADF's core business will always be the application of lethal violence in the defence of our values, sovereignty and interests. We should never forget that.” He went on to warn that “mission clarity” is vital to ensure success (Hastie quoted in Green, 2021).

When DACC is initiated, it is important for the strategic decision makers to ensure that expectations are managed between the defence and civil organisations. This is but one way to ensure that the application of the military is not confused. In almost all ADF contexts, the aim is to limit the opportunity for an adversary to use force against the individual, the team, or the country; whether that adversary be an environmental threat, a potential intelligence collector, insurgency or a conventional army. DACC is different. Whereas other contexts require the ADF to be combative, DACC tasking asks the joint force to rebuild, be empathetic and support human life. While enabling Australian Government directives, as well as gaining the trust, respect and support of the Australian people is vital to success, the ADF must ensure that it is conducting DACC tasking in a way in which the core role, and the ability to apply these skills are not being confused. For DACC to be successful, the ADF needs to ensure that leaders have a meticulous understanding of strategic objectives, and who display high levels of emotional and social intelligence. Without thoughtful, capable leadership, the ramifications on members will be long lasting, hard to resolve and – as demonstrated in the Royal Commission into Veteran Suicide – potentially deadly for many.

The amorphous enemy

While the expectation of the ADF is to apply lethal force in the defence of national interests, that is not to say that the people within it are highly militarised, uncaring beings. In fact, it is quite the opposite, and despite the multicultural background of many Australians, there are core values that are identified and shared across the country. Mateship, courage, resilience and ingenuity are the cornerstones of the Australian spirit, with a deep-rooted desire to help brothers and sisters in times of adversity. When this work ethic is applied to the ADFs core role, the result is a force that is highly capable and highly respectful, forming trust and excellent working relationships around the world. A problem arises however, when the application of this work ethic to DACC and the strategic objectives that are communicated to teams do not align.

For many members of the ADF, the understanding of strategic policy is to prepare the force to be ready and capable to respond to foreign adversaries, or changes in the environment as soon as possible. In DACC this has potential to cause confusion in the event that members are being pulled away from mission specific training to support preparation and clean-up efforts across the country. It can be hard to see how well this fits in with “responding with credible military force,” and their understanding of the mission that has been conveyed to them through the chain of command. While the unpredictable climate and severe weather events in Australia are not a new phenomenon, they are certainly increasing in frequency and intensity. In many ways, the resourcefulness, can do attitude, and grit of ADF members is perfect for providing the support that local communities need. However, applying highly specialised skills to an environment where there is no clear ‘enemy’ has the potential to lead to confusion, disgruntlement, a dissolution of professional currency, and a degradation of resilience, which may affect future operations. If these operational difficulties are not identified and managed throughout every aspect of the deployment cycle, the organisation will surely see the long lasting, and devastating effects on its war fighters, sooner rather than later. When these multifaceted challenges are combined with leaders who openly disregard the concerns of their troops, or who seek to progress their own interests, rather than that of the joint force or the organisation, it creates a loss of trust and respect which is vital for continued success in these environments.

This has been repeatedly identified in military operations where the lack of a clear enemy, self- serving or inadequate leadership, and an emphasis on mateship and ‘larrikin’ behaviour, whether combined or isolated, can immediately degrade the good work that the ADF is doing, and further complicate the strategic environment if left unchecked and able to continue over time. This was highlighted recently in the IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry, where several instances of inadequate leadership were blamed for the violations that occurred as a part of Operation Slipper. While this inquiry highlights the many behavioural and cultural failings in the most complex of environments, the ADF should be extrapolating the findings and using them to ensure that the conditions which enabled these transgressions are never replicated, regardless of the environment. If leaders cannot explain the strategic importance of conducting activities such as security for hotel quarantine, or assistance in Aged Care homes – or even more detrimentally – if they are openly negating the validity of these activities in front of their troops, then they foment a culture of disrespect and anger, which will be almost impossible to change. From personal experience, the Aged Care task force demonstrated this sort of dissonant leadership in the early hours of the mounting process, when members were briefed on the correct ways to don and doff PPE to protect aged care residents and staff. The staff member responsible for this brief had forgotten to bring the relevant PPE, and initially made no attempts to postpone the brief in order to acquire the appropriate equipment. This oversight was played off as unimportant and not entirely necessary, as “you’ll probably learn it on the job”. While this nonchalant attitude may have been allowable in more relaxed circumstances, it was completely inappropriate for emphasising the importance of correct PPE management, for an environment as vulnerable as the aged care homes. This nonchalant attitude demonstrated a disrespect for the people to whom the deployed teams had a duty of care, and emphasised the disconnect between the ADFs core roles, and the deployed roles in the aged care homes.

ADF Presence in nursing homes

The Royal Commission into Aged Care, released in 2021 has demonstrated that the Australian aged care system has been overwhelmingly flawed in caring for the ageing population, long before COVID-19 broke out in Australia. Of course, the presence of the virus, along with the quarantine difficulties it introduced, added to the already immense workload of care staff throughout the country. For some, the use of the ADF in these homes was a great idea, for the reasons previously stated. For others, there was distinct confusion and apprehension at the relevance of having the ADF operate in care giving roles. “To the general population, the ADF is a mostly unknown entity. Generally, the public perception was that the ADF could assist in every aspect and was always readily available. This is not, in fact, the case. Nor is it a reasonable expectation of the ADF” (Air Cheif Marshall Mark Binskin (Ret'd), 2020). In making a commitment to service, ADF members know they will see pain and suffering in a range of combative or disaster relief efforts and that the associated emotional turmoil is an unfortunate side effect of this service.  Unfortunately, in the early rotations of tasking such as Aged Care Assist, members were ill prepared to see the prolonged human suffering, degrading living conditions, and utter despair that is omnipresent among people residing in the Australian aged care system.

During this deployment, members were affronted with sights of maggot-infested wounds, people left sitting or lying in their own excrement for hours, and aged residents begging every day for someone to help them die. Hearing the pain and anguish of residents who are struggling with their own mortality, and the extreme emotions that come with this, is a confronting and upsetting experience for anyone, including ADF members who have not been trained to deal with such an extreme spectrum of human emotion. This again highlights the distinct contrast in the core roles, versus the deployed roles of the ADF during DACC. The expectations and the reality of the application of skills in this scenario are two very different things. The average aviator, soldier and sailor is not trained, and arguably, not capable of conversing with a dementia patient who is trapped in a mental prison where they feel scared, alone, and vulnerable. Some ADF employees had residents pleading with them to give them a hug, however were conflicted and unable to provide this physical comfort due to the way this action could be negatively perceived by the other staff and the wider community. Managing the perception of potentially harmless behaviours also adds a layer of complexity and stress to these sorts of operations, especially when it is something that has not been briefed, or discussed in the deployment preparation. Rather than re-briefing information which is covered in annual mandatory briefs, the Aged Care task force should have focussed its training on managing the perceptions of such seemingly harmless behaviours such as giving someone a hug, or receiving or giving small gifts to the residents. This was a situation which arose often, and was very difficult for ADF members to navigate without having an in depth understanding of reputation management and the implications of being perceived to be taking advantage of such vulnerable people.

The mindset of the organisation is well set up to deal with the death, devastation and violence that comes during HADR, peace keeping or conflict, as there is a clear enemy or ‘other’ which has contributed to this situation. In Operation Aged Care Assist, it became evident that the vicious force creating these conditions is not the global pandemic, nor a strategic adversary, but the arguably negligent resourcing and ill-considered policies which long preceded the COVID-19 pandemic. Leaders must consider this dangerous situation: the ADF is called upon by the government of the day to rectify the human suffering brought about by lazy policy-making and criminally negligent corporate greed. How can members reconcile the need to put themselves at risk abroad for Australia’s interests when the interests of older Australian’s are so clearly disregarded at home?

The leadership failings that affected the effectiveness of OP Aged Care Assist.

In each phase of this operation, there were many leadership failings that furthered the complexity, stress, and emotional fatigue of members who had deployed. When queried on how to respond to a team member contracting COVID-19, emotionally rigid leaders insisted that members’ return to base and quarantine for two weeks in their on-base accommodation. This despite the fact that some members were being deployed up to 4 hours away from the base. Furthermore, the infected member was expected to consume ration packs for the entire two-week period, rather than having team members deliver fresh meals from the mess each day.  Another experience that made members feel that their wellbeing was not a priority was observing the obvious disrespect between the services, and the way in which this disdain was communicated in front of subordinates. When enlisted soldiers said to commissioned aviators that “I don’t even know what you are [in regards to equivocal rank and how they should be addressed]” it makes it hard to build an environment of trust and respect in which members feel comfortable communicating issues through the chain of command. This disdain disrupted the flow of communication, and so members were expected to deploy with no clear idea of where they were going, what time they needed to be in place, who they were meeting with or any other vital details for immediate mission success. Teams were told “just get there, you can sort everything else out later.” Of course, this led to many oversights such as accommodation for teams not being booked until late in the evening and an increased element of stress, fatigue, and mental discomfort to commence the first day of operations in the deployed environment.

When confronted with these issues, the common response throughout this operation were along these lines: "if you think this is hard, try deploying to Afghanistan", “if you think this is hard, try body recovery after a typhoon in the Philippines” or the incredibly overused “you joined the ADF, the ADF didn’t join you.” Not only do these phrases make members question their reasons for signing up to serve, but also makes them feel like they are replaceable and not valued by the organisation.

The leaders who have this sort of attitude, and use these sorts of phrases, need to be eradicated from the organisation as soon as reasonably practicable. The gas-lighting of their subordinates in this way is harmful to the wellbeing of members, and the reputation of the entire organisation. This emotional manipulation is insidious, and the rhetoric is lazy. It fails to intellectually wrestle with important factors and ignores the practical difficulties of applying a combative militaristic mindset to domestic humanitarian work. DACC members are still witness to destruction and suffering, and at times are still putting themselves at risk of floodwaters, bushfires, disease, and moral injury. Such a refrain makes the member question their own sense of reality, making them think they are too sensitive or mentally unfit. Dissonance between members' on-the-ground experiences and the minimisation of these experiences by Defence leadership undermines trust, lowers moral and motivation, causes feelings of anger and resentment, and could encourage a lack of empathy for those whom the organisation aims to serve. Observing, and hearing about, these disappointing leadership behaviours not only influences a negative workplace culture, but it also begs the question of how the Australian public perceives this ‘highly organised and effective fighting force.’

Conclusion

While the application of specialist skills in a diverse range of domestic settings have no doubt been beneficial to the preparedness of the ADF, care must be taken when conducting these roles in an environment devoid of emotionally intelligent leadership and sound public policy. Unlike other ADF contexts, DACC operations do not present a clear enemy but do uncover failings in leadership and domestic governance. Success abroad hinges upon the ADF remaining apolitical and dutifully uninterested in public policy. Yet, prolonged forays in the domestic sphere exposes the force to internal machinations to which ADF members are not usually privy. Combine this with unempathetic and adversarial leadership styles, DACC operations present a slippery slope. One where members risk asking the question: is the greater enemy within?