Operations in deception: corrupting the sensing grid of the enemy
Fooling the enemy’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) artificial intelligence system will be as critical as refining our own in a live situation. AI is the future, but it has its vulnerabilities.
Countering Robotics and Autonomous Systems through Maritime Area Denial
Muddying the waters acoustically will be equally important as guided munitions when it comes to underwater mine warfare in the new age of Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS). Let’s look at both the kinetic and the non-kinetic approaches.
Clash of Cultures: The Digger Legend of the First Australian Imperial Force
Were the values that came to embody the digger legend of the 1st AIF incompatible with the expectations of British command? Did the traits required to command a less-than-conventional military force during the First World War require a less-than-conventional style of military leadership? This article explores the questions that arise regarding the leadership of the 1st AIF during the Great War - particularly that of General William Birdwood. Was his command effective given the unique circumstances, and were his opponents right to express criticism?
Joint Warfighting - The Impact of Assumption and Bias
Are aspects of the JMAP fundamentally flawed? In the absence of a complete intelligence picture, planners often make a series of assumptions. These are based on an unproven assessment of the adversary plan. Within these assumptions lie a series of unanswered questions relating to ‘intent’. This article explores how bias and assumption can impact on the planning process and complicate the successful attainment of the end-state.
Synchronising Counterinsurgency Ops with Effective Intelligence
All combat operations need real-time, concrete intelligence, but the counterinsurgency operations’ (COINOPS) margin of error runs thinnest. In their fast, multidimensional context, COINOPS demand more comprehensive intelligence at platoon/company levels than conventional warfare does. This article explores the need for tactical unit leaders fighting insurgencies to have more intelligence assets available in the field in order to offer swift analyses to aid decision making in highly fluid environments.
Scharnhorst and Professional Mastery
To me, being 'professional' has meant striving for excellence at my everyday job. Until I attended Command and Staff Course at the Australian War College last year, I did not appreciate that being good at my job was not the same as being a military professional. The course broadened my understanding; being a professional requires one to embrace continual learning in all aspects of the profession. I became conscious that through professional mastery, individuals, even those in junior roles, can influence organisational outcomes beyond their job.
Future War – A Trinitarian Framework
In grappling with the future of war and warfare it is useful to have a mental framework to consider the potential impacts of the matters at issue. In considering futures those matters range widely from large scale societal changes through to narrower next generation technological advances that continue the service of legacy fleets.
US Marine Corps to Re-Focus on Sea Control
The US Marine Corps has just released its new Commandant’s Guidance, foreshadowing a return to their traditional role of supporting the Navy’s fight for Sea Control now that it is being increasingly challenged. There are valuable insights for the ADF in understanding this fundamental shift in US Marine Corps thinking.
Future Workforce 2025 - Scherger Group
Compiled by Wing Commander Jo Brick 1
Developing the Coalition – Can We Do More?
The aim of this paper is to provide insights into why preparing and developing a coalition environment is important for the ADF; what are the challenges that a coalition presents; and offer some recommendations on how the ADF might better prepare for the multilateral operations.
Moving tanks by water: A short history of Australia’s tank-capable amphibious capability
Responsibility for maintaining a sea-going, tank- or heavy vehicle-capable landing craft capability has historically shifted between the Army and Navy. Today, the ADF lacks a dedicated green-water amphibious capability to support operations in a region characterised by great rivers, but poor transport infrastructure.
Changes in warfare in the 16th and 17th centuries - a ‘military revolution’?
The 16th and 17th century was a period of significant change in the character of war. The drivers accounting for these changes were not all based in military reforms, despite Western Europe being engaged almost continuously in war. While tactical applications is interesting, it was the beginnings of some profound changes in the development of warfare; the professional military, the standing army, scale of warfare and subsequent emergence of the state (Crown) owning the monopoly on violence and the arrival of proper naval forces.