Military Culture, Learning and Adaptation during the Burma Campaign 1942-1945
This essay discusses how military culture and learning and adaptation on both sides affected the outcome of the Burma Campaign 1942–1945. The British 14th Army developed a military culture of learning and adaptation which led to their victory while the Imperial Japanese Army had an existing military culture based upon tenets of Bushido, which constrained their ability to learn and adapt and in turn led to their defeat.
Thucydides Trap: A lesson in strategy and chance from ancient Greece
Understanding the challenges to British and French Imperialism 1900-1939– An application of the D.I.M.E model
The period between 1900-1939 is said to have created the characteristics of modern war and the global order as we know it. This period saw two World Wars, political revolutions, unprecedented innovation, the introduction of a third military service and created the pre-conditions that resulted in the end of Western imperialism.
Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant (Part 1 of 2)
Part one of a two-part article written by Professor Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College and COL Richard Iron, British Army.
This paper explores what Clausewitz really meant by the term “center of gravity”. The authors propose that he intended it to be a strength, either moral or physical, and a dynamic and powerful agent in its own right. The authors also suggest that the current Joint and NATO definition of center of gravity is incorrect, implying it to be a source of strength, and that this mis-definition has been responsible for much of the confusion about the concept that exists today.
Managing Assumptions in Planning and Execution
Redefining the Center of Gravity
COL Dale C. Eikmeier, USA (Ret.), is an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Army Command and General staff College. COL Eikmeier shares his thoughts on identifying Center of Gravity. This method will provide campaign planners with an analytical tool that will fulfil doctrinal intent.
Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities (Part 2 of 2)
Part two of a two-part article written by Professor Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College and COL Richard Iron, British Army.
This paper examines the role of centers of gravity in operational design, looking at the relationship between centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. It suggests an analytical model that joint warfighters and planners on both sides of the Atlantic can use to assist strategic and operational-level planning. The model helps to analyze existing and potential vulnerabilities of a center of gravity, and determine which of those could be especially critical.