Victory in the Age of Cyber-Enabled Warfare
Future conflicts will not be won in cyberspace, but they can most certainly be lost there.
Operations in deception: corrupting the sensing grid of the enemy
Fooling the enemy’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) artificial intelligence system will be as critical as refining our own in a live situation. AI is the future, but it has its vulnerabilities.
Countering Robotics and Autonomous Systems through Maritime Area Denial
Muddying the waters acoustically will be equally important as guided munitions when it comes to underwater mine warfare in the new age of Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS). Let’s look at both the kinetic and the non-kinetic approaches.
Synchronising Counterinsurgency Ops with Effective Intelligence
All combat operations need real-time, concrete intelligence, but the counterinsurgency operations’ (COINOPS) margin of error runs thinnest. In their fast, multidimensional context, COINOPS demand more comprehensive intelligence at platoon/company levels than conventional warfare does. This article explores the need for tactical unit leaders fighting insurgencies to have more intelligence assets available in the field in order to offer swift analyses to aid decision making in highly fluid environments.
Scharnhorst and Professional Mastery
To me, being 'professional' has meant striving for excellence at my everyday job. Until I attended Command and Staff Course at the Australian War College last year, I did not appreciate that being good at my job was not the same as being a military professional. The course broadened my understanding; being a professional requires one to embrace continual learning in all aspects of the profession. I became conscious that through professional mastery, individuals, even those in junior roles, can influence organisational outcomes beyond their job.
Future War – A Trinitarian Framework
In grappling with the future of war and warfare it is useful to have a mental framework to consider the potential impacts of the matters at issue. In considering futures those matters range widely from large scale societal changes through to narrower next generation technological advances that continue the service of legacy fleets.
US Marine Corps to Re-Focus on Sea Control
The US Marine Corps has just released its new Commandant’s Guidance, foreshadowing a return to their traditional role of supporting the Navy’s fight for Sea Control now that it is being increasingly challenged. There are valuable insights for the ADF in understanding this fundamental shift in US Marine Corps thinking.
Future Workforce 2025 - Scherger Group
Compiled by Wing Commander Jo Brick 1
Developing the Coalition – Can We Do More?
The aim of this paper is to provide insights into why preparing and developing a coalition environment is important for the ADF; what are the challenges that a coalition presents; and offer some recommendations on how the ADF might better prepare for the multilateral operations.
Changes in warfare in the 16th and 17th centuries - a ‘military revolution’?
The 16th and 17th century was a period of significant change in the character of war. The drivers accounting for these changes were not all based in military reforms, despite Western Europe being engaged almost continuously in war. While tactical applications is interesting, it was the beginnings of some profound changes in the development of warfare; the professional military, the standing army, scale of warfare and subsequent emergence of the state (Crown) owning the monopoly on violence and the arrival of proper naval forces.
Lessons for Military Planning in 21st Century Warfare
Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant (Part 1 of 2)
Part one of a two-part article written by Professor Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College and COL Richard Iron, British Army.
This paper explores what Clausewitz really meant by the term “center of gravity”. The authors propose that he intended it to be a strength, either moral or physical, and a dynamic and powerful agent in its own right. The authors also suggest that the current Joint and NATO definition of center of gravity is incorrect, implying it to be a source of strength, and that this mis-definition has been responsible for much of the confusion about the concept that exists today.