The US Marine Corps has just released its new Commandant’s Guidance, foreshadowing a return to their traditional role of supporting the Navy’s fight for Sea Control now that it is being increasingly challenged. There are valuable insights for the ADF in understanding this fundamental shift in US Marine Corps thinking.
Core Areas of Study
Compiled by Wing Commander Jo Brick
The aim of this paper is to provide insights into why preparing and developing a coalition environment is important for the ADF; what are the challenges that a coalition presents; and offer some recommendations on how the ADF might better prepare for the multilateral operations.
Responsibility for maintaining a sea-going, tank- or heavy vehicle-capable landing craft capability has historically shifted between the Army and Navy. Today, the ADF lacks a dedicated green-water amphibious capability to support operations in a region characterised by great rivers, but poor transport infrastructure.
The 16th and 17th century was a period of significant change in the character of war. The drivers accounting for these changes were not all based in military reforms, despite Western Europe being engaged almost continuously in war. While tactical applications is interesting, it was the beginnings of some profound changes in the development of warfare; the professional military, the standing army, scale of warfare and subsequent emergence of the state (Crown) owning the monopoly on violence and the arrival of proper naval forces.
As technological advances increasing automate the control of weapons, it is timely to review the skills we need in our warfare professionals. Their core skills will increasingly be maintaining SA and making decisions in confusing and evolving circumstances. We need to ensure the ‘science’ and ‘art’ of warfare are balanced.
The Governor-General of Australia, General Sir Peter Cosgrove, AK, MC, addresses ADFA staff and trainees
The period between 1900-1939 is said to have created the characteristics of modern war and the global order as we know it. This period saw two World Wars, political revolutions, unprecedented innovation, the introduction of a third military service and created the pre-conditions that resulted in the end of Western imperialism.
This essay discusses how military culture and learning and adaptation on both sides affected the outcome of the Burma Campaign 1942–1945. The British 14th Army developed a military culture of learning and adaptation which led to their victory while the Imperial Japanese Army had an existing military culture based upon tenets of Bushido, which constrained their ability to learn and adapt and in turn led to their defeat.
Part one of a two-part article written by Professor Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College and COL Richard Iron, British Army.
This paper explores what Clausewitz really meant by the term “center of gravity”. The authors propose that he intended it to be a strength, either moral or physical, and a dynamic and powerful agent in its own right. The authors also suggest that the current Joint and NATO definition of center of gravity is incorrect, implying it to be a source of strength, and that this mis-definition has been responsible for much of the confusion about the concept that exists today.