The Australian Military and Logistics: When Preparedness Equals Survival
The material comprises a 2014 interview with Air Vice Marshall John Blackburn (Retired), in which he poses a number of questions relating to the resilience of Australia’s Defence logistics capabilities. The questions and tacit solutions he proposes have become more relevant given recent instability in the South China Sea and the current shifts in US foreign policy.
The Importance of Knowledge sharing in Military Organizations
When General Stanley McChrystal started fighting al Qaeda in 2003, information and secrets were the lifeblood of his operations. But as the unconventional battle waged on, he began to think that the culture of keeping important information classified was misguided and actually counterproductive. In a short but powerful talk McChrystal makes the case for actively sharing knowledge.
Understanding Why a Ground Combat Vehicle That Carries Nine Dismounts Is Important to the Army
The Army has examined the lessons of half a dozen significant conflicts, starting with World War II, has conducted numerous studies over the last 65 years, and has found time and again that an ability to conduct dismounted fire and maneuver is the fundamental squad-level tactic.
Development of an Algorithm for Calculating the ‘Risk’ of Terrorist CBRN
In order to avert a disaster from a terrorist chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attack, it is important to study the likelihood of terrorists using CBRN weapons. This study reports on the development of an algorithm for calculating the ‘risk’ of a terrorist seeking CBRN weaponry with 67.3 percent prediction accuracy.
Age of Empires: Balancing Imperial Commitments between the First and Second World Wars
This article explores how the interwar period resulted in imperial commitments, military, strategic and political culture that severely constrained Britain and France’s ability to prepare for and fight war in Europe.
Balancing Empire and War: Britain and France in the Early 20th Century
This paper argues that while Britain and France did face some constraints in their need to balance imperial commitments with European war preparations in the 19th and 20th centuries, their respective imperial possessions provided some essential benefits in their attempts to ready themselves for a continental war.