Defence members are not only technical professionals but also instruments of government policy and representatives of Australia's values. They should be equipped with a sound education in civics so they can engage meaningfully and credibly with foreign military personnel, and serve our civilian leaders well.
Were the values that came to embody the digger legend of the 1st AIF incompatible with the expectations of British command? Did the traits required to command a less-than-conventional military force during the First World War require a less-than-conventional style of military leadership? This article explores the questions that arise regarding the leadership of the 1st AIF during the Great War - particularly that of General William Birdwood. Was his command effective given the unique circumstances, and were his opponents right to express criticism?
One of the most important success factors for any military organisation is the ability to identify and select effective leaders. The purpose of this article is to discuss the role that emotional intelligence can play as a leadership enabler for officers and recommend how it can be incorporated into the officer training continuum. The article provides an overview of the current training curriculum and highlights the advantages of developing emotional intelligence from the ab-initio training level to application in real time situations.
2020 is a milestone year for the 'Women, Peace and Security' agenda. Chief of Army Scholar, Lyndsay Freeman outlines the basics of this agenda, and how the ADF implements its core principles of supporting women’s meaningful participation in peace processes, prioritising their protection in humanitarian crises, and increasing women’s leadership and decision-making.
Are aspects of the JMAP fundamentally flawed? In the absence of a complete intelligence picture, planners often make a series of assumptions. These are based on an unproven assessment of the adversary plan. Within these assumptions lie a series of unanswered questions relating to ‘intent’. This article explores how bias and assumption can impact on the planning process and complicate the successful attainment of the end-state.
Our command teams are charged with constant decision making, on which hinges the success and failure – the life or death – of battles, operations and campaigns. What if the frames of reference we all possess, imposed on us from our similar training, experiences, and culture, could be hindering our ability to make the best decisions? What if we are not as smart as we think we are?
Leveraging off the latest Joint Warrant Officer Course (JWOC) conducted in September 2019, the article focuses on the continued development of JWOC as part of the ADF’s Joint Professional Military Education Continuum. The article discusses the positioning of the JWOC course on the JPME Continuum and aims to assist in the preparation of senior ADF Warrant Officers for future Tier B and C appointments. It achieves this by providing an executive-level understanding of contemporary Defence issues at the strategic, operational and functional levels of command through the study of Australia’s Strategic Defence Environment, Joint Capability and Force Design and Command Leadership and Ethics. Most importantly it highlights the fact that a key ‘deliverable’ of the JWOC is to cultivate, in our senior Warrant Officers, the ability to think both critically and strategically.
Many field grade officers will serve as a Staff Officer / Military Assistant during their career within a single service, joint headquarters, or in an interdepartmental position. This article offers our perspective on the working relationship between Staff Officer and General. We hope it will be useful to those who are stepping into these roles in the future.
All combat operations need real-time, concrete intelligence, but the counterinsurgency operations’ (COINOPS) margin of error runs thinnest. In their fast, multidimensional context, COINOPS demand more comprehensive intelligence at platoon/company levels than conventional warfare does. This article explores the need for tactical unit leaders fighting insurgencies to have more intelligence assets available in the field in order to offer swift analyses to aid decision making in highly fluid environments.