The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the ADF, the Department of Defence or the Australian government.

In the context of the 21st century, what does "long range", "strike" and "strategic" actually mean and what are the range of options we might have for a 21st century deterrent build around long-range strategic strike?

Executive summary

In a degraded geostrategic environment, strategic long-range strike is fundamental to Australia's defence through the provision of deterrence. In the Australian context, deterrence is best achieved by exploiting power asymmetry, ensuring an adversary actions are costlier than any perceived benefit. This paper will argue that long-range strategic strike is a system that encompasses the entire targeting cycle (D3A), and examine how advanced technologies will increase credibility and achieve deterrence in the face of increasingly sophisticated anti area axis denial (A2AD) capabilities.

As part of a strategic long-range strike system, detection needs to be considered a critical component of strategic strike capabilities as we face threats beyond traditional kinetic strike in a complex threat environment. Reduced warning of escalation in an increasingly volatile environment means early detection is essential to providing context and strategic warning to decision-makers. This is best achieved through a cohesive, multi-disciplined approach. An integrated system would overcome information access/sharing delays, and fluidly engaged integration of detection and decision-making processes supported by AI-augmented sensor integration can enable rapid tipping and cuing of sensors, early warning, timely decision-making and execution of directives.

AI-enabled decision making will be central to the 'Decide' phase of an Australian Long-Range Strike System. The System will still rely on personnel, with AI augmenting contemporary staff systems. The Decide phase will similarly be enhanced by the fidelity of AI advice based on superior quantitative and qualitative analysis.

The crux of deterrence and the long-range strike system is delivery. Future systems will use kinetic and non-kinetic effects, synchronised and orchestrated to achieve complex effects against adversary systems. Such future systems will include EMP, Hypersonic, Swarming weapons, and Autonomous systems, all enabled by space and cyber capabilities. The layered systems provide kinetic and non-kinetic effects to the AI system to present as options to achieve desired effects on Adversary systems.

Finally, the assess phase will leverage the elements of the detect and decide capabilities to determine the efficacy of the long-range strike system. Investment in advanced battle damage assessment is a component of the assess phase, with sophisticated AI-enabled analysis of adversary decision making and response, being calculated to determine, not only physical effect but the compounding effect on adversary offensive systems.

This paper has argued that long range strategic strike is a system that encompasses the entire D3A, and has examined how advanced technologies will increase Australia's credibility and achieve modern deterrence in the face of increasingly sophisticated A2AD capabilities. Strategic long-range strike and deterrence must evolve with the changing nature of Australia's adversaries. Modern and future A2AD systems provide Australia's adversaries with a technological advantage, however, Australia is well postured to adopt a whole of government strike system to further enhance the ADFs ability to protect Australia and its national interest.

Introduction

The future consists of a high degree of uncertainty; however, it also presents a unique opportunity to shape future capability. Through the application of the “D3A targeting cycle”^[1] within a fictitious future threat scenario, this paper will outline Australia's future protection capability (2040-2050) through the acquisition of a long-range^[2] strategic^[3] strike system. To achieve this, it will demonstrate the practical application of an Australian Long-Range Strike system, demonstrating its relevance to modern conventional deterrence^[4] from a revisionist perspective. Furthermore, in the analysis of the problem set Long-Range Strategic Strike was viewed as a system of systems that encompasses the D3A targeting cycle, this was done for three reasons. Firstly, significantly enhanced future defences will require a holistic approach to ‘strike effects.’ Secondly, Australia’s middle power status and the boutique nature of our ADF requires mass to be replaced by superior decision-making. Finally, the abundance of sensor capabilities that the ADF seeks to employ ultimately need to be synchronised and orchestrated into a coherent strategy that enables said ‘strike effects.’

This paper will argue that long-range strategic strike is a system that encompasses the entire D3A, and examine how advanced technologies will increase credibility in the face of increasingly sophisticated A2AD capabilities, and achieve deterrence. This paper will achieve this by discussing future technology in the context of a future threat scenario, demonstrating the technologies involved in deterrence, long-range strike as part of a system. Firstly, it will outline the general background. Secondly it will discuss the specifics of the targeting cycle, progressing though Detect, Decide, Deliver, and Assess. During the Targeting Cycle specific technologies will be highlighted with the key impacts of each phase, and the essential systems links being articulated.

Australian security 2040-2050

As Australia approaches 2050, key regional geostrategic security actions through the period 2040-2050 require examination at the unclassified level. With the Great Energy Crisis of the 2030s and resultant global hostilities Australia must position itself to defend its national interests particularly the Southern Ocean regional energy production zone.^[5]

A critical turning point in history was the significant enhancement of deep water ocean technology in the 2020s along with the ratification of the Antarctic treaty reaffirming Australia’s claims and maintenance of Antarctic regional preservation.^[6] This technological development enabled significant land reclamation of the South West Pacific nations under threat from the rising sea levels resulting from climatic changes. Deep water ocean technology facilitated the dredging and enhancement of Southern Ocean channels which enabled not only land reclamation but also enhanced the strength of the Antarctic circumpolar currents. A critical by-product of the altered Coldwater currents increased the South West Pacific and Southern Ocean marine stocks through improved breeding grounds and migratory zones.

The increased strength and intensity of the Antarctic Circumpolar currents, indicated in Figure 1, enabled the creation of multiple Marine Hydrokinetic power generation plants located in several fields within the Southern Ocean which utilised the strength of ocean currents for mass energy production. This technology enabled Australia, New Zealand, and South West Pacific nations to protect themselves from the impact of the Great Energy Crisis which occurred during the 2030s resulting from the depletion and, in several regions, complete exhaustion of fossil fuels.

Whilst Australia maintains stable regional alliances, and existing historical alliances and agreements between the North and South Americas, Canada and most European nations there is an ongoing risk of global instability and threats to Australian national interests. As one of the principal energy providers in the Indo-Pacific rim, the key geostrategic national interest is the maintenance and security of the Southern Ocean Regional Energy Production Zones. To achieve this, Australia must continue positioning itself to defend and deter hostilities through decision, detection, delivery and assessment of threats. Due to the global nature of potential threats including cyber and space it is essential to ensure deterrence through the development and maintenance of a long-range strike system as was indicated in the 2048 conflict with Kamaria.

An additional key technological development directly impacting Australia’s capability was the development of ‘Nulla-Nulla’ an Artificial Intelligence (AI) Process, Exploitation and Dissemination (PED) program. Nulla-Nulla linked vast quantities of data generated through the systems of ADF sensors and expedited military staff functions. Nulla-Nulla was the progeny of Project Maven, AlphaGo and Data61.

Detect

Leading into the conflict, Defence Intelligence Group (DIG) analysts noted a marked drop in communications/signals intelligence of key Kamarian decision-makers, including consistent periodic outages of personal monitoring system data collection.^[8] Review of satellite imagery of known primary working locations for these individuals revealed vehicular parking patterns inconsistent with routine business over the period. Australian owned AI-augmented satellites were subsequently tasked to track vehicle^[9] and signals movements, specifically, to track available individual-associated signals of interest, determine a point of culmination for these key Kamarian members, image the location, initiate visual vehicle tracking, and ultimately image and scan the final destination. This identified a new heavily secured, command and control capable underground bunker.

Nulla-Nulla rapidly reviewed available databases, determining there had been an increase in activity at this location, following the break-down in Kamarian-AUS engagement. This new information increased Nulla-Nulla’s assessed likelihood of further escalatory action to 90% certainty. Tasked with identifying any related activity in Kamaria over the defined period, Nulla-Nulla scanned databases and open source resources (including social media). Nulla-Nulla determined it was probable that personnel were being prepared for KMS 1 and KMS 2, with facial recognition confirming which naval Commanders were in the area.^[10] Additionally, based on the number of personnel and support staff detected at that location it was determined that there was at least one fighter wing now stationed at Woody Island. Nulla-Nulla also flagged increased activity detections at an anti-satellite^[11] site in Laeg and near the Mimbe submarine base. Satellite monitoring of each of these locations was increased, Joint Operations Command (JOC) commenced preparations for reduced notice to move as well as preparations for the deployment of networked Automated Underwater Vehicles (AUV)^[12] to monitor territorial boundaries at sea.^[13]

Imagery analysis identified a naval task group comprising 3 Frigates and 2 support tankers, had departed Port Preparatory. Nulla-Nulla initiated satellite tracking procedures and essential workforce call out, however surveillance coverage was sporadic and ineffective. Diplomatically Kamaria insisted they were conducting routine naval exercises. Based on recorded historical tracking data and the decision-preference profiles of the onboard commanders, Nulla-Nulla identified the three most likely locations for incursion of the AUS Area Of Responsibility (AOR) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Within hours AUVs were deployed to these locations, their placements along the boundary enabling persistent sensor monitoring for any approaching underwater or surface vessels. Reduced notice to move orders were issued, to be enacted if any Kamarian vessels veered off-course and crossed AUS trip-lines. Broad area infra-red satellite monitoring^[14] was tasked, with Nulla-Nulla programmed to trigger urgent warning to DIG analysts in the National Operations 24-hour Monitoring Centre of any anomalous detections for trip-line confirmation. A cyber team was also assembled to monitor and prepare to disrupt power^[15] to the anti-satellite site should any further preparations be detected from the location. Following several false positive returns, an urgent infra-red detection was received by Defence Intelligence analysts, with Nulla-Nulla identifying a 63% probability of a match to the vessels which had deployed from Port Preparatory. DIG analysts conducted a visual analysis, reviewed the details of the detection, and confirmed it met the trip-line threshold.

Upon receiving confirmation Nulla-Nulla commenced JOC contingency protocols, notifying Command Joint Operations (CJOPS) immediately of the confirmation, and standing by for approval to issue orders. CJOPS reviewed the notification, activated the contingency plan, approved and issued orders before commencing the return to work. This initiated the contingency response – Nulla-Nulla simultaneously issued updated orders to the respective service heads and commanders and contacted the members of the Crisis Response Team and the War Cabinet. Nulla-Nulla established and disseminated access to a Common Operating Picture for the response, informed by all streams of relevant data Nulla-Nulla had been utilising to this point and enabling interactive engagement. Nulla-Nulla also fed the updated information to the deployed AUVs enabling extended range monitoring at the assessed most likely location of incursion.

The contingency plan saw the (1) rapid deployment of UAVs to provide visual confirmation, monitoring and, if required, disruption of the surface vessels,^[16] (2) preparation of AUS Strike assets inclusive of supporting autonomous weapons system swarms,^[17] (3) rapid deployment of submarines and supporting AUVs to defend the Marine Hydrokinetic power generation plants, (4) preparation of autonomous missile defence and coastal defence cruise missile sites, (5) immediate recall of remainder of the cyber capability in anticipation of disruption requirements, and (6) re-tasking of satellites for infra-red and change detection warnings at Woody Island and Kamarian bomber and long-range missile sites. Enabled by Nulla-Nulla and an integrated AUS national security system, this was achieved within 15 minutes of receiving the initial urgent infra-red detection. Joint AUV/UAV patrols using a combination of on-board AI and centralised Nulla-Nulla control, maintained active surveillance of Kamarian assets, however AUVs were receiving active signal interruption with a 75% certainty of jamming, providing the information to the AUS COP and DIG signals, prior to losing contact.

A notification from the UAV was received in the COP, with cross-referenced object detection confirming that it had observed the Kamarian vessels approaching. The War Cabinet requested a warning be issued for the vessels to redirect. CJOPS instructed Nulla-Nulla to issue the warning message via the UAV. The UAV was tasked to maintain observation and provided immediate notification of incursion into AUS EEZ to the CRT and War Cabinet. Connection was re-established with the forward deployed AUVs and the video feed confirmed at least two Kamarian submarines had been deployed to the area, based on speed and time from location Nulla-Nulla estimated underwater incursion of AUS EEZ from this secondary approach in one hour. The CRT instructed Nulla-Nulla to re-task the AUVs to detect and track the submarines from a distance that would not disrupt connectivity, feeding their location immediately into the COP. Less than two hours after the AUS fighters were deployed notification was received of satellite change detection at Woody Island, imagery revealing that Kamaria had commenced preparations to deploy their long-range fighters. UAV footage confirmed the Kamarian surface vessel formation had crossed into the AUS EEZ.

Recommendations and Linkages

• Facing threats beyond traditional kinetic strike in a complex threat environment, detection needs to be considered a critical component of strategic strike capabilities.
• Reduced warning of escalation in an increasingly volatile environment makes early detection critical in providing context and strategic warning to decision-makers.
• Early detection is best achieved through a cohesive, multi-disciplinary approach.
• Detection and timely decision-making enabled by an integrated operating system would overcome information access/sharing delays and facilitate efficient systems of cross-cuing of collection across sensors and platforms.
• New technologies can act as a force multiplier, mitigating challenges of detection across the expansive geography Australia is responsible for defending.
• Engaged integration of detection and decision-making processes supported by AI-augmented sensor integration can enable rapid tipping and cuing of sensors, early warning, rapid decision-making and dissemination of updates or orders.

Decide

The tools and products used during military planning prior to the proliferation of AI would see radical transformation in the face of deep learning^[18] and quantum computing^[19]. This was reflected in the roles of the Staff Officers embedded to JIATF 001 Joint Fires and Effects Cell in the conflict with Kamaria in 2042.

In understanding the conflict with Kamaria and the ADF’s success it is essential to understand not just the effectiveness of Deep Strike assets and the detection systems used, but also the processes that led to expediating the targeting of Kamarian high-value targets and support regional actors provided in enabling this to occur. Therefore, this short reflection summarises how AI enabled kinetic effects on Kamarian forces and highly conducive policy work with Non-Aligned nations within the region during the inter-war period. It will be argued that AI, specifically the CSIRO^[20] built Nulla-Nulla^[21] construct, enabled superior decision-making for both lethal and non-lethal outcomes.

Nulla-Nulla’s predictive modelling allowed for traditional Military Appreciation Process^[22] products such as the Enemy Situation Template,^[23] Attack Guidance Matrix^[24] and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance plans^[25] to be developed with such effectiveness that the co-ordination of Strike effects were without historical precedent. The use of AI reduced the errors associated with the subjective analysis of the JIATF – JFECC Staff Officers and the speed at which it derived options would unhinge the larger Kamarian Vanguard as well as the Kamarian Government. Nulla-Nulla incorporated large amounts of data built over the preceding inter-war period, with substantial information on weapon effects obtained freely from Military Industry. This enabled optimised Strike effects on targets and a highly accurate predictive model of Kamarian movements. When this was overlaid with the confirmatory intelligence derived from the ADF’s complement of sensors it meant two things in the opening stages of the conflict.

Firstly, that the Kamarian public rhetoric could be disproven with relative ease noting the abundance of sensors and, secondly, that Nulla-Nulla provided targeting options for the JIATF almost instantaneously. The speed at which this was done even surprised the most ardent staff officer in the TF, particularly noting many were veterans of recent low intensity regional conflicts. Though intended for deterrence, the AI-enabled ability to take a first Strike approach ultimately set the conditions for victory. Nulla-Nulla enabled a smaller comparative force to qualitatively Observe, Orientate, Decide and Assess within a faster cycle than the Kamarians.

It is worth noting how Nulla-Nulla also predicted the behaviours of both the Kamarian Government, its military and citizens, and that of other Non-Aligned and supportive actors within the Indo-Pacific. Often captured within an Intelligence Officers subjective assessment of the dimensions of PMESII^[26], understanding what other regional stakeholders were likely to do was done almost instantaneously and far more comprehensively than a traditional Intelligence Cell ever could. Nulla-Nulla automatically interrogated open source information available on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Weibo and LINKEDIN as well as official government statements. When it compared this data to the histories of both principal decision makers and the history of each nation it allowed for an understanding of the regional responses to ADF military action. In turn this allowed a level of Australian Governmental risk understanding to occur if the response was negative or allow exploitation if the response was positive. The work of many dozens of Intelligence Analysts driven and shaped by an experienced Intelligence Officer was now truly accurate and automated.

The use of Nulla-Nulla had confirmed the hypothesis that many of the Non-Aligned nations were fearful of taking sides in a conflict, in part due to their strong economic ties with Kamaria but were equally concerned about a uni-polar environment within the Indo-Pacific. Nulla-Nulla had determined that many nations would remain independent until such time as a victor could be determined, thus elevating the importance of an initial decisive victory. It remains unclear whether it was completely the AI or the staff at the JFECC, but a consensus was generated that if the ADF were to use its arsenal of land, air, sea, and cyber based Strike options^[27], it needed to do so quickly and decisively.

This segues to the use of AI during the inter-war period. Specifically, how its ability to discern public opinion within the Indo-Pacific, guided political rhetoric for the Australian Government (AUSGOV). Nulla-Nulla had provided recommendations on talking points during key Indo-Pacific forums, such as APEC and ASEAN, ultimately creating favourable security agreements with India and Indonesia and enabling an effective Information Operations campaign across the region, promoting AUSGOV trade and agenda items. So successful were these discussions that the Five Powers Defence Agreement was ratified to the Seven Powers Defence and Peace Agreement in 2030. Of principal note was the sharing of mensurated^[28] data obtained from the various sensors of each nation. As access was granted to Nulla-Nulla, this meant the AI was able to incorporate every feed in the region to generate near perfect real time understanding of what was happening. Multi-national co-operation was free from the friction of interpersonal interactions underscored by cultural and political differences. The process was algorithmic, it was science rather than art.

AI was essential to the victory against the Kamarians. The ability to fuse nationally-sourced data and allied data allowed the JIATF to Decide which targets to Strike quickly. Just as importantly, AI assessments guided policy discussions during the inter-war period allowing a comprehensive understanding of second and third order effects of said kinetic activities. While the investments in long-range Strike assets made post-COVID-19 would cause the destruction of Kamaria's military force, the AI enabled a small but capable military to out-think a larger force.

Recommendations and Linkages

• Detection and decision are intimately linked, with ISR providing necessary information, and AI enabling higher fidelity assumption-based planning
• Defence is a part of the whole of government decision-making cycle
• Artificial intelligence will aid in the decision-making cycle by improving fidelity and speed of decision-making
• Artificial intelligence will not be a ‘win button’ due to the enduring nature of war; friction, uncertainty and chance.

Deliver

Long range strike background

Nulla-Nulla-enabled ISR assets layered with an interconnected all-round defence of meshed underwater Hypersonic Scramjet missiles^[29] formed the backbone of Australia's deterrent standoff long-range strike capability. Miniaturised hypersonic missile pods (12 missiles) (annex 1) are small and manoeuvrable and have replaced previous land-based rocket systems such as HIMARS. This makes them difficult to track and are now the long-range weapon of choice for most nations, both on land and at sea.^[30] The hypersonic revolution has resulted in the demise of aerial platforms as airborne assets are now easily trackable and interceptable due to predictable flight paths and relative slow speeds (less than Mach 5), making them susceptible to targeting by hypersonic platforms worldwide. Nations no longer rely upon air superiority, which dominated the 20th century, as relatively inexpensive hypersonic missile technologies dominate any traditional aircraft capabilities. Space borne weapon systems and directional Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP)^[31] ensure that specific aircraft can be shot down moments after take-off almost anywhere in the world from any middle or major power. Evolution has resulted in the obsolescence of aircraft as main strike weapons, favouring unidentifiable underwater systems and eye in sky space weapon systems.

Context

The threshold for engagement of the Kamarian advance guard was discussed and the Australian War Cabinet made a strategic decision to conduct ‘Long-Range Strike on Kamarian expeditionary force in order to abandon their territorial expansion into the Australian EEZ at a scale that would not result in war.’ The premise was that a pre-emptive engagement in a conflict short of triggering war, would assert Australia’s sovereign claims, and demonstrate globally that Australia would not be coerced out of its legally owned resources.

JIATFs challenge was striking sufficiently to force Kamarians to desist their operations without triggering an escalation that would result in mainland attacks on Australian territory. The options developed, were integrated to predict any retaliation and counter any hostile responses. The Kamarian expeditionary force (KMS1 and KMS2) consisting of six frigate-destroyer class vessels and their supporting autonomous vessels was identified as the primary target. AI calculated that rendering two vessels combat ineffective would achieve the end state of denying options of continuing their expeditionary pursuit but not inflict so much destruction of the formation that the Kamarians would be forced to escalate. The expeditionary advance force could affect the rescue of their own personnel and return to Kamarian waters without extreme political embarrassment. This engagement would be conducted by integrated D3A process focusing on long-range strike assets.

Nulla-Nulla generated attack options based on the set parameters including lethality, redundancy, attribution, likelihood of retaliation and geography. The basis for making the decision like any previous Military Appreciation Process was based on Feasibility, Acceptability, Sustainability. The AI ran thousands of options instantly with integrated access into the logistics and combat systems. This increase in the tempo of operations driven by AI running options based on percentage of success enabled a rapid targeting cycle and a prediction of second and third order effects. These predictions allowed for narratives to be developed and weaponised in response post-kinetic engagement.

Convergence window

It was vital to establish a kinetic and non-kinetic convergence window in time and space for the engagement sequence to enable the delivery of effects with minimum disruption for an attack to be successful. Commencing in the 2020s, the increase in disruption technology throughout the entire electromagnetic spectrum, coupled with highly potent strike weapon systems mean unsynchronised and indiscriminate systems are easily countered. Therefore, unlike in the early part of the 20th Century, Strike is no longer a single shot capability but rather necessitates layering of multiple assets and concurrent execution to enable a ‘converge window’ for one or more of these effects to succeed.^[32] Counter-measures to long-range strike are readily available and require strike redundancy in the magnitude of 4 to 1 to have a reasonable chance of success.^[33] Therefore, Australia required a multi-layered response spanning the electromagnetic spectrum and including deception to maximise the anticipated success percentage, with four times the Kinetic ordnance delivered to achieve the destruction of two Surface vessels to achieve mission success.

Cyber space

Offensive and defensive cyber was layered throughout the engagement sequence to enable the kinetic strike and control the post-strike narrative. Integrated space disruption of communications at the time of the strike was paramount. Australia had the means available to destroy Kamarian dual use space capabilities through land based hypersonics,^[34] however Nulla-Nulla predicted 91% of magnified retaliation by Kamaria (due to the dual use civil nature of Kamarian satellites) if this option was selected, which is outside the acceptable AUSGOV risk threshold.

Nulla-Nulla advised the best option was to disrupt Kamarian integrated space communications through geographic EMP which could be focused at specific layers of the atmosphere to disrupt strategic downlinks from space and radar from the surface fleet.^[35] This temporary disruption (over destruction) was cheaper and reduced the expected severity of retaliation down by 72%. This disruption was targeted at two specific links rather than the forces themselves. The first link was between the Kamarian expeditionary force and their external communications reducing their ability to coordinate with higher headquarters. The second link was navigational between mainland Australia and mainland Kamaria to remove accuracy and time synchronization between potential mainland coordinated strategic responses which could then be countered (shot down) in a more piecemeal fashion. This disruption was to be layered over the top of kinetic targeting from H-5 minutes through to H+24 hours from a mixture of space based and ground based EMP options.

The offensive cyber layer was controlling the narrative post-strike. This involved disrupting the links between Kamarian and mainland news networks and an insertion of the Australian narrative of 'conducting legitimate defence of legally recognised sovereign waters by painting the picture of a Kamarian invasion.' This disruption window would allow offensive information campaigns to be executed while controlling the strategic narrative, highlighting that Australia's sovereignty was being threatened and by law Australia needed to respond.

Layered strike options

Once Nulla-Nulla had confirmed the effectiveness of the EMP disruption, the conditions for kinetic strike within the D3A process could proceed. Layered long-range strike from multiple platforms were readied. This included manoeuvring Australia’s main strike asset of integrated mesh of kinetic hypersonic Underwater Autonomous Weapon Systems (UAWS)^[36]. Australia largely replaced their manned submarine fleet in 2040 with UAWS as the vulnerability and redundancy in technology and capability made UAWS a more cost effective capable and continuous threat. The UAWS fleet are fully integrated in Australia’s AI defence and are distinguished by their ability to, once activated, select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.^[37] Nulla-Nulla calculates the data it is receiving from satellites, meteorological conditions, secondary underwater sensors and sends encrypted initiation sequences to selected platforms. This communication link has multiple levels of redundancy such as, satellite, sonar, HF seismographic.

Once activated the UAWS rises from an underwater seafloor ambush location and can manoeuvre underwater undetected to an optimum firing position normally within 300km radius of their original ambush position. UAWS has multiple kinetic options including hypersonic missiles effective range (10000km), directional EMP (3000km) and Direct Energy Weapon (DEW) focused on LOS anti-aircraft and self-protection.^[38] The UAWS system is tasked with a set of human-approved operational parameters, within which it may seek out and attack targets as its AI sees fit, with no need for direct supervision at any point between the generation of the mission data and the system’s return to base (or, in the case on an expendable munition, its own destruction upon execution of an attack). Indeed this level of autonomous trust is seen culturally as a natural extension of mission command.

Engagement sequence

The kinetic engagement sequence lasted 34 minutes from JIATF authority to strike, Nulla-Nulla execution programming, movement of UAWS systems, to striking surface vessels. Two UAWS platforms provided the primary hypersonic salvos. Layered secondary strike options of land-based hypersonics from Australia's West coast including small concealed highly deployable hypersonics were ready and online but were not required due to integral BDA achieved through AI. These secondary hypersonic options also acted as potential interceptors from any Kamarian based kinetic counterattack or defensive measures directed at Australian mainland.

Post-engagement from two separate UAWS platforms in the Southern Ocean each firing four hypersonic salvos synchronized in time and with defensive and offensive cyber directed at two command vessels, they achieved decisive effects. Aimed at the stern of the ship, to minimise casualties but maximize ship damage, reduced the expected retaliation percentage by 31%. Five salvos appear to have been intercepted from unknown onboard self-defence capabilities, likely hypersonic interceptors, reinforcing the 4 to 1 overmatch required for successful kinetic strike. The UAWS systems engaged post-engagement sequences, sinking back into the depths of the Indian Ocean and Southern Ocean and reposition remaining poised to receive and execute future missions.

The kinetic strike was executed relatively easily, however, controlling the post-strike narrative was the centre of gravity which involved the most strategic risk and could be easily weaponised through disinformation and a counter-narrative painting Australia as an unprovoked aggressor. Controlling the non-kinetic targeting took days to setup and weeks to counter the disinformation claims post-strike.

Recommendations and Linkages

• Engagement is a single component of the ‘strike system’ and is unachievable without the Detect phase, and is unlikely to nest operational outcomes within strategic objectives without an effective Decide phase.
• Defence needs to invest in multiple redundancy ‘engage’ systems, kinetic and non-kinetic, to increase survivability and options for decision-makers.

Assess

Australia's Kinetic and non-kinetic strike in defence of its territory was a resounding success. Nulla-Nulla automatically fused BDA data from satellite tracking, UAWS weapons data, and adversary communications providing real-time updates to the JIATF TOC. Two enemy vessels were disabled, demonstrating Australia's resolve, forcing Kamaria to withdraw its forces to its own territory.

Throughout, Australian Government messaging, enabled by Nulla-Nulla and the reduction in Kamarian capability owing to the EMP Strike, allowed AUSGOV to control the strategic narrative. Australian Detect and Strike capabilities were once again able to return to their principal role of deterrence.

Recommendations and Linkages

• Assessment is intimately linked to efficacy of engagement, and relies on the detect phase for confirmation and speed of decision-making in the decide phase to complete further required action nested to operational and strategic objectives.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that long range strategic strike is a holistic system that encompasses the entire D3A, and has examined how advanced technologies will increase Australia’s credibility in the face of increasingly sophisticated A2AD capabilities, achieving modern deterrence. This paper has discussed future technology in the context of a future threat scenario, demonstrating the technologies involved in deterrence and long-range strike as part of an effective system. It outlined the general background. It then went through the specifics of the targeting cycle, progressing though Detect, Decide, Deliver, and Assess. During the cycle it demonstrated the linkages between the various components of the D3A cycle and the key future technologies required to enable it.

Strategic long-range strike and deterrence must evolve with the changing nature of Australia’s adversaries. Modern and future A2AD systems provide Australia’s adversaries with a technological advantage. Australia is well postured to adopt a modern whole of government strike system to further enhance the ADF’s ability to protect Australia and its national interest.

This paper was completed by Ray Brin, Theresa Cunningham, Christina Dubej, Simon Frewin, and Michael Smith. Ray and Simon have extensive experience in the RAA and Michael in the RAE within training, operations and staff appointments. Christina has diverse GEOINT experience across national security and joint defence environments. Theresa has extensive service in the RAN with a focus on Training and Capability.

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Nowlin, A Orsi and T Whitworth and W. "On the Meridional Extent and Fronts of the Antarctic Circumpolar Current." Deep Sea Research 42, 5 (1995): 641-73.

Payne, Kenneth. "Artificial Intelligence: A Revolution in Strategic Affairs?". Survival 60, no. 5 (2018): 7-32. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2018.1518374.

Porras, Daniel. "Anti-Satellite Warfare and the Case for an Alternative Draft Treaty for Space Security." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4 (2019): 142-47. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628470.

Sharikov, Pavel. "Artificial Intelligence, Cyberattack, and Nuclear Weapons — a Dangerous Combination." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74, no. 6 (2018): 368-73. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1533185.

Umali, Teresa. Open Gov Asia, 2020.

Yan, Hairong, Li Da Xu, Zhuming Bi, Zhibo Pang, Jie Zhang, and Yong Chen. "An Emerging Technology – Wearable Wireless Sensor Networks with Applications in Human Health Condition Monitoring." Journal of Management Analytics 2, no. 2 (2015): 121-37. https://doi.org/10.1080/23270012.2015.1029550.

Young, Sean D., Caitlin Rivers, and Bryan Lewis. "Methods of Using Real-Time Social Media Technologies for Detection and Remote Monitoring of Hiv Outcomes." Preventive Medicine 63 (2014): 112-15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ypmed.2014.01.024.

Zhou, Jie, Dashan Gao, and David Zhang. "Moving Vehicle Detection for Automatic Traffic Monitoring." IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology 56, no. 1 (January 2007): 51-59.

Zhu, Zhe, and Curtis E.Woodcock. "Continuous Change Detection and Classification of Land Cover Using All Available Landsat Data." Remote Sensing of Environment 144 (2014): 152-71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rse.2014.01.011.

Annex A

Top Strike System Technologies

Endnotes

^[1]Jimmy Gomez, "The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EAD," Small Wars Journal (2011).

^[2]For this paper Long Range strike no longer means dropping ordnance on an enemy's homeland. The concept has evolved due to range being irrelevant, with the proliferation of space based and energy directed weapons. Long Range Strike now means having the ability to render an enemy capability redundant in the electromagnetic spectrum by creating a convergence window to execute desired kinetic and or non kinetic effects.

^[3]Strategic means "the use of engagements for the object of the war". Principally it will be used in the context of the employment of all aspects of national security against an adversary for the purpose of war.

^[4]Finally deterrence can be viewed in “two primary forms of deterrence are deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment”.Simplistically, deterrence seeks to impose a high cost relative to the political benefit on an Adversary, with punishment seek to impose a higher transactional cost relative to any political gain.

^[5]The Southern Ocean Regional Energy Production Zone encompasses all Marine Hydrokinetic power generation fields located between Australia, New Zealand and Antarctica states.

^[6]Whilst the ratification of the Antarctica treaty imposed increased Australian Southern Ocean protection commitment it enabled the research and development of Marine Hydrokinetic capability.

^[7]A Orsi and T Whitworth and W Nowlin, "On the meridional extent and fronts of the Antarctic Circumpolar Current," Deep Sea Research 42, 5 (1995). Antarctic Circumpolar Current is the strongest current system in the world oceans and the only ocean current linking all major oceans: the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. Seawater density fronts

^[8]Hairong Yan et al., "An Emerging Technology – Wearable Wireless Sensor Networks with Applications in Human Health Condition Monitoring," Journal of Management Analytics 2, no. 2 (2015): pp.122-23, 26, 35, https://doi.org/10.1080/23270012.2015.1029550.

^[9]Jie Zhou, Dashan Gao, and David Zhang, "Moving Vehicle Detection for Automatic Traffic Monitoring," IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology 56, no. 1 (January 2007): pp.51, 58.

^[10]Sam Liu and Sean D. Young, "A survey of social media data analysis for physical activity surveillance," Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine 57 (2018): pp.33, 36, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jflm.2016.10.019.; Sean D. Young, Caitlin Rivers, and Bryan Lewis, "Methods of using real-time social media technologies for detection and remote monitoring of HIV outcomes," Preventive Medicine 63 (2014): p.112, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ypmed.2014.01.024.

^[11]Daniel Porras, "Anti-satellite Warfare and the Case for an Alternative Draft Treaty for Space Security," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4 (2019): pp.142-44, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628470.

^[12]Automated Underwater Vehicles are an advancement of unmanned underwater vehicle and automated weapons systems technologies, with the potential to “locate and attack submarines in real time, and enhance the stealth and endurance of submarines and their attendant weapon systems.” James Johnson, "Artificial Intelligence, Drone Swarming and Escalation Risks in Future Warfare," The RUSI Journal(2020): p.6, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2020.1752026.

^[13]Johnson, "Artificial Intelligence, Drone Swarming and Escalation Risks in Future Warfare," pp.5-6, 9.

^[14]Mia M. Bennett and Laurence C. Smith, "Advances in using multitemporal night-time lights satellite imagery to detect, estimate, and monitor socioeconomic dynamics," Remote Sensing of Environment 192 (2017): p.176.; Chang Huang et al., "Detecting, extracting, and monitoring surface water from space using optical sensors: A review," Reviews of Geophysics 56 (2018): p.133, https://doi.org/10.1029/2018RG000598.; Masroor Hussain et al., "Change detection from remotely sensed images: From pixel-based to object-based approaches," ISPRS Journal of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing 80 (2013): p.91, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isprsjprs.2013.03.006. Ashish Ghosh, Niladri Shekhar Mishra, and Susmita Ghosh, "Fuzzy clustering algorithms for unsupervised change detection in remote sensing images," Information Sciences 181 (2011): p.699, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2010.10.0. Zhe Zhu and Curtis E.Woodcock, "Continuous change detection and classification of land cover using all available Landsat data," Remote Sensing of Environment 144 (2014): p.152, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rse.2014.01.011.

^[15]Pavel Sharikov, "Artificial Intelligence, Cyberattack, and Nuclear Weapons — A Dangerous Combination," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74, no. 6 (2018): p.371, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1533185. James Johnson, "Artificial intelligence & future warfare: implications for international security," Defense & Security Analysis 35, no. 2 (2019): p.154, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1600800.

^[16]Loch K. Johnson et al., "An INS Special Forum: Intelligence and Drones/Eyes in the Sky for Peacekeeping: The Emergence of UAVs in UN Operations/The Democratic Deficit on Drones/The German Approach to Drone Warfare/Pursuing Peace: The Strategic Limits of Drone Warfare/Seeing but Unseen: Intelligence Drones in Israel/Drone Paramilitary Operations Against Suspected Global Terrorists: US and Australian Perspectives/The ‘Terminator Conundrum’ and the Future of Drone Warfare," Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 4 (2017): pp.411, 22-24, 29, 31, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1303127.

^[17]Johnson et al., "An INS Special Forum: Intelligence and Drones/Eyes in the Sky for Peacekeeping: The Emergence of UAVs in UN Operations/The Democratic Deficit on Drones/The German Approach to Drone Warfare/Pursuing Peace: The Strategic Limits of Drone Warfare/Seeing but Unseen: Intelligence Drones in Israel/Drone Paramilitary Operations Against Suspected Global Terrorists: US and Australian Perspectives/The ‘Terminator Conundrum’ and the Future of Drone Warfare," pp.433-34.; Johnson, "Artificial Intelligence, Drone Swarming and Escalation Risks in Future Warfare," pp.1-10.

^[18]JoJo John Moolayil, "Towards Data Sceince: A Layman's Guide to Deep Neural Networks," (24 July 2020 2016). https://towardsdatascience.com/a-laymans-guide-to-deep-neural-networks-ddcea24847fb,. Deep Learning - Deep Learning is a sub-field of machine learning in Artificial intelligence (A.I.) that deals with algorithms inspired from the biological structure and functioning of a brain to aid machines with intelligence.

^[19]Amitm Katwala, "Quantum computing and quantum supremacy, explained," (16 July 2020 2020). Quantum Computing – Computing that uses quantum mechanics thereby performing certain tasks far superior to what a normal computer can.

^[20]Teresa Umali,(Open Gov Asia, 2020). CSIRO released an AI roadmap in 2019, though it did not include a Defence component it is offered that this would mark a reasonable start point for Defence AI research and Development.

^[21]NULLA-NULLA – a wooden club used by indigenous Australians, a hypothetical name for an Australia AI construct.

^[22]The Military Appreciation Process is the ADF methodology for both understanding and generating a solution to a problem.

^[23][1] The Attack Guidance Matrix provides military planners an understanding of what weapon system can be used on a particular target for best effect.

^[24]The ISR Plan indicates where an adversary may be and allocates sensors to that location.

^[25]The Enemy Situation Template is a visualization of an adversary’s movement and likely and most dangerous predicted behaviors. This is based on the subjective analysis of the doctrinal norms of an adversary reflecting their assessed objectives, their capabilities and environmental factors.

^[26]PMESSII - Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure – a tool typical used by the Intelligence community to focus an understanding of a nations capability.

^[27]The STRIKE options made mentioned include those such as long-range fires, cyber options and the provision of RAAF F-35. Australian Government: Department of Defence. 2020 Defence Strategic Update. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020.

^[28]Mensuration is the process of measurement of a feature or location on the earth to determine an absolute latitude, longitude, and elevation. Mensuration consists of geometric measurements from monoscopic and stereoscopic imagery, under a variety of acquisition conditions. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Mensuration. 10 Jul. Accessed Jul 16, 20. https://www.nga.mil/ProductsServices/PrecisePositioningandTargeting/Pages/Mensuration.aspx#:~:text=Page%20Content,a%20variety%20of%20acquisition%20conditions. 2015

^[29]Scramjets use a rocket to attain high speeds, then an air-breathing engine to sustain the speed.

^[30]Haffa, Robert, and Ananad Datla. Report. American Enterprise Institute, 2017. Accessed August 3, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03280.

^[31]Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) and direct energy weapons will evolve into small mobile platforms that can be launched from a range of sea-based and land-based sites. Vision of Future Warfare

^[32]Training, US Army, and Doctrine Command. "Multi-domain battle: Evolution of combined arms for the 21st century, 2025-2040." (2017).

^[33]https://www.defenceiq.com/air-land-and-sea-defence-services/articles/playing-catch-up-how-the-us-plans-to-counter-hypersonic-missiles

^[34]Hypersonic vehicles from 2040 (those exceeding Mach 5) are capable of global strike operations that could put any target on Earth or within earth's orbit within reach in less than an hour of decision and launch. They are effective at penetrating defences due to their ability to manoeuvre and change altitude at flat trajectory to avoid defences. O’Hanlon, Michael. "Forecasting change in military technology, 2020-2040." Military Technology 2020 (2018): 2040.

^[35]Wilson, Clay. "High altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) and high power microwave (HPM) devices: Threat assessments." Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service, 2008.

^[36]Altmann, Jürgen, and Frank Sauer. "Autonomous weapon systems and strategic stability." Survival 59, no. 5 (2017): 117-142.

^[37]Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic

^[38]Directed Energy Weapons