Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine – Five Lessons for Taiwan
Beijing is closely watching the West’s response to the 24 February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine for its own plans regarding the eventual subjugation of the independent country of Taiwan. The West’s desultory response to the crisis has revealed plain vulnerabilities and false assumptions about what the West would likely do in the event of an amphibious invasion or blockade of Taiwan by mainland China.
Joint Warfighting - The Impact of Assumption and Bias
Are aspects of the JMAP fundamentally flawed? In the absence of a complete intelligence picture, planners often make a series of assumptions. These are based on an unproven assessment of the adversary plan. Within these assumptions lie a series of unanswered questions relating to ‘intent’. This article explores how bias and assumption can impact on the planning process and complicate the successful attainment of the end-state.
Balancing the Science and Art of Warfare
As technological advances increasing automate the control of weapons, it is timely to review the skills we need in our warfare professionals. Their core skills will increasingly be maintaining SA and making decisions in confusing and evolving circumstances. We need to ensure the ‘science’ and ‘art’ of warfare are balanced.
The Future is here! 5th Generation Air Force
The F-35 heralds a revolution in how the ADF will fight, as units learn to integrate with 5th Generation technologies and operate as a network, leveraging stealth and information fusion. This article explores the ‘night versus day’ change, which opens the door for related opportunities including man-machine teaming and the ‘loyal wingman’ concept.
ADFA Presentation 2019 – General Sir Peter Cosgrove, AK, MC
The Governor-General of Australia, General Sir Peter Cosgrove, AK, MC, addresses ADFA staff and trainees
Scenario Planning and Strategy in the Pentagon
Dr. Michael Fitzsimmons at the U.S. Army War College examines scenario planning in the Pentagon. He demonstrates how uncertainty and complexity converge with the DOD’s bureaucratic decision-making to subvert what should be a straightforward process. His recommendations for reorienting this invite debate among strategists, planners, and the broader joint community.
US Defense Implications of Expanding China
This U.S. DoD report assesses China’s global expansion efforts and the implications for the U.S. in terms of military access, logistics, force posture and training. The report has generated discussion and various assessments can be found online across the national security community.
Thoughts from The Edge
Mick Ryan is the Commander of the Australian Defence College. This column from Ryan and his contributors focusses on intellectually preparing members of the profession of arms for strategic competition and future conflict.
How to Think (and How Not To)
In this piece, Ben McLennan discusses the pressing need to educate the Army’s workforce on how to think (and how not to). In his discussion, McLennan cogently addresses systems thinking, inherent biases and the need for open-mindedness as part of understanding the recipe to transform Army’s thinking. While specific to McLennan’s Army experience, his observations are equally applicable to other Services and anyone who aspires to think in a way that harnesses a competitive advantage.
Is AI Really a Threat to Humanity?
This article comments on the impact of Cognitive Bias, found in AI systems, on our future. It provides the examples of the biased systems and asks the fundamental questions on our strategy going forward. The article is suitable for all the levels of JMPE continuum, and will be of interest to those particularly interested in Cognitive computing or Artificial Intelligence.
Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant (Part 1 of 2)
Part one of a two-part article written by Professor Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College and COL Richard Iron, British Army.
This paper explores what Clausewitz really meant by the term “center of gravity”. The authors propose that he intended it to be a strength, either moral or physical, and a dynamic and powerful agent in its own right. The authors also suggest that the current Joint and NATO definition of center of gravity is incorrect, implying it to be a source of strength, and that this mis-definition has been responsible for much of the confusion about the concept that exists today.