JMAP image

Joint Warfighting - The Impact of Assumption and Bias

Are aspects of the JMAP fundamentally flawed? In the absence of a complete intelligence picture, planners often make a series of assumptions. These are based on an unproven assessment of the adversary plan. Within these assumptions lie a series of unanswered questions relating to ‘intent’. This article explores how bias and assumption can impact on the planning process and complicate the successful attainment of the end-state.

Dougal Robertson
8min
COIN Ops image

Synchronising Counterinsurgency Ops with Effective Intelligence

All combat operations need real-time, concrete intelligence, but the counterinsurgency operations’ (COINOPS) margin of error runs thinnest. In their fast, multidimensional context, COINOPS demand more comprehensive intelligence at platoon/company levels than conventional warfare does. This article explores the need for tactical unit leaders fighting insurgencies to have more intelligence assets available in the field in order to offer swift analyses to aid decision making in highly fluid environments.

Anant Mishra
6mins
Battle image

Scharnhorst and Professional Mastery


To me, being 'professional' has meant striving for excellence at my everyday job. Until I attended Command and Staff Course at the Australian War College last year, I did not appreciate that being good at my job was not the same as being a military professional. The course broadened my understanding; being a professional requires one to embrace continual learning in all aspects of the profession. I became conscious that through professional mastery, individuals, even those in junior roles, can influence organisational outcomes beyond their job.

SQNLDR Agam Sheldon
3mins

Lessons for Military Planning in 21st Century Warfare

ADF

 

Rob Alsworth and Andrew Tidmarsh
4 min
Lightbulb resting on a blackboard

First Principles Review - Creating One Defence

The Review Team were tasked with ensuring that Defence is fit for purpose and is able to deliver against its strategy with the minimum resources necessary. Using a structured framework, the team have conducted an end-to-end holistic review based on the outcomes required of Defence and founded on the first principles agreed by the review team.

Department of Defence
2h
Two people tugging on a rope from opposite ends

Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant (Part 1 of 2)

Part one of a two-part article written by Professor Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College and COL Richard Iron, British Army.

This paper explores what Clausewitz really meant by the term “center of gravity”. The authors propose that he intended it to be a strength, either moral or physical, and a dynamic and powerful agent in its own right. The authors also suggest that the current Joint and NATO definition of center of gravity is incorrect, implying it to be a source of strength, and that this mis-definition has been responsible for much of the confusion about the concept that exists today.

Joseph Strange and Richard Iron
2h
Map laid out on a table with people working around it

Managing Assumptions in Planning and Execution

Jeffery Marshall
2h
Illuminated human brain

Redefining the Center of Gravity

COL Dale C. Eikmeier, USA (Ret.), is an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Army Command and General staff College. COL Eikmeier shares his thoughts on identifying Center of Gravity. This method will provide campaign planners with an analytical tool that will fulfil doctrinal intent.

Dale Eikmeier
2h
Open book with spectacles on top

Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities (Part 2 of 2)

Part two of a two-part article written by Professor Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College and COL Richard Iron, British Army.

This paper examines the role of centers of gravity in operational design, looking at the relationship between centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. It suggests an analytical model that joint warfighters and planners on both sides of the Atlantic can use to assist strategic and operational-level planning. The model helps to analyze existing and potential vulnerabilities of a center of gravity, and determine which of those could be especially critical.

Joe Strange
2h
People using phones at a cafe

What If Your Data Was Valued Like Currency? At This Café, It Is.

Shiru café offers students a free coffee in exchange for personal data. The data is related to their future employment desires, their habits during work and their use of social media. The café is open in informing students that this information will be passed to employment agencies and potential employers.

Thomas Hornigold
15m
Document being signed

17 - 18 Annual Report

This is the Secretary of Defence and Chief of the Defence Force’s performance report to the Minister for Defence, the Parliament of Australia and the Australian public for the 2017–18 financial year. The report addresses the purposes and outcomes of the Department of Defence, including the Australian Defence Force—collectively known as Defence.

Department of Defence
2h
Document being signed

2018-19 Defence Corporate Plan

The 2018–19 Defence Corporate Plan sets out Defence’s role, objectives and functions and describes how we will measure our performance in achieving our Purposes. Performance against the Corporate Plan will be reported through annual performance statements, to be included in the Defence Annual Report for 2018–19.

Department of Defence
4h