The Competition Prism
“Our traditional way that we differentiate between peace and war is insufficient …….we think of being at peace or war…our adversaries don’t think that way.”
General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 21 September and 5 October 2016
ADF Concept for Command and Control of the Future Force
by DL Johnston, AO Vice Admiral, RAN
Vice Chief of the Defence Force
Time to Review the Rings
Dr David Connery proposes a new way to conceive the levels of war, building on the work of historian Michael Handel. Does a liner model offer a more useful way to apply doctrinal levels in an Australian context?
Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant (Part 1 of 2)
Part one of a two-part article written by Professor Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College and COL Richard Iron, British Army.
This paper explores what Clausewitz really meant by the term “center of gravity”. The authors propose that he intended it to be a strength, either moral or physical, and a dynamic and powerful agent in its own right. The authors also suggest that the current Joint and NATO definition of center of gravity is incorrect, implying it to be a source of strength, and that this mis-definition has been responsible for much of the confusion about the concept that exists today.
Managing Assumptions in Planning and Execution
Redefining the Center of Gravity
COL Dale C. Eikmeier, USA (Ret.), is an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Army Command and General staff College. COL Eikmeier shares his thoughts on identifying Center of Gravity. This method will provide campaign planners with an analytical tool that will fulfil doctrinal intent.
Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities (Part 2 of 2)
Part two of a two-part article written by Professor Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College and COL Richard Iron, British Army.
This paper examines the role of centers of gravity in operational design, looking at the relationship between centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. It suggests an analytical model that joint warfighters and planners on both sides of the Atlantic can use to assist strategic and operational-level planning. The model helps to analyze existing and potential vulnerabilities of a center of gravity, and determine which of those could be especially critical.
Dr. Phillip Karber on the Russian Way of War
Speaking to staff and cadets at the United States’ West Point Academy, Dr. Phillip Karber describes what he has learned about the Russian way of war from thirty trips he has made to Ukraine, including six months on the front lines of the war in the country's east. This lecture highlights how a re-imagined Russian military is conducting technologically advanced joint-land combat against a ‘near peer’ military – the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Center of Gravity Analysis “Down Under”
Dr. Aaron P. Jackson is a Joint Operations Planning Specialist in the Joint and Operations Analysis Division of Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Group. The article expresses his view on Center of Gravity Analysis and The Australian Defence Force’s New Approach.
The Australian Military and Logistics: When Preparedness Equals Survival
The material comprises a 2014 interview with Air Vice Marshall John Blackburn (Retired), in which he poses a number of questions relating to the resilience of Australia’s Defence logistics capabilities. The questions and tacit solutions he proposes have become more relevant given recent instability in the South China Sea and the current shifts in US foreign policy.
A Theory-based Framework for Critical Thinking in Defence Planning and Assessment
This article was written by Dr Mazourenko and Mr Jobst from the Defence Science and Technology Organisation and it describes how military planning and assessment processes can benefit from ‘Program Theory’. It argues that a ‘theory-based framework’ will support better-informed decision making in a time-sensitive matter.
The Lost Operational Art: Invigorating Campaigning into the Australian Defence Force
In this study paper, LTCOL Trent Scott expresses his view that the absence of relevant operational art may result in future ADF leaders being inadequately prepared to use operational art when required.