Commandant for a Day: Preparing War Colleges for the Future
War colleges around the world have endured significant challenges over the past two years. COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on faculties as they wrestled with lockdowns and restrictions that tested the achievement of learning objectives.
To the credit of many, the show has gone on with minimal disruption. Yes, there have been a healthy dose of remote learning periods, but the lectures continued and the assignment deadlines remained largely untouched (much to the dismay of the students).
Streamlining Air Land Operations for Better Outcomes
Rethinking Strategies in Modern Urban Conflicts
The increasingly blurred line between state and non-state actors in tight urban warfare zones requires allied forces to have clearly defined and fully informed communication and command chains to minimise unintended consequences.
The Competition Prism
“Our traditional way that we differentiate between peace and war is insufficient …….we think of being at peace or war…our adversaries don’t think that way.”
General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 21 September and 5 October 2016
ADF Concept for Command and Control of the Future Force
by DL Johnston, AO Vice Admiral, RAN
Vice Chief of the Defence Force
Human Development at ADFA
The talk emphasises the need for a comprehensive development of staff, including aspects such as Cognitive, Social, Psychological, Physical and Social. Professional development is incomplete without personal development.
Time to Review the Rings
Dr David Connery proposes a new way to conceive the levels of war, building on the work of historian Michael Handel. Does a liner model offer a more useful way to apply doctrinal levels in an Australian context?
Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant (Part 1 of 2)
Part one of a two-part article written by Professor Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College and COL Richard Iron, British Army.
This paper explores what Clausewitz really meant by the term “center of gravity”. The authors propose that he intended it to be a strength, either moral or physical, and a dynamic and powerful agent in its own right. The authors also suggest that the current Joint and NATO definition of center of gravity is incorrect, implying it to be a source of strength, and that this mis-definition has been responsible for much of the confusion about the concept that exists today.
Managing Assumptions in Planning and Execution
Capability Boost: Trials Demonstrate Enhanced ViDAR/ScanEagle Package
This article from Jane’s International Defence Review discusses the use of Visual Detection and Ranging (ViDAR) technology on the ScanEagle unmanned aerial system (UAS) platform to provide detection capabilities comparable to radar using Electrooptical (EO) and Infra Red (IR) sensors.
Redefining the Center of Gravity
COL Dale C. Eikmeier, USA (Ret.), is an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Army Command and General staff College. COL Eikmeier shares his thoughts on identifying Center of Gravity. This method will provide campaign planners with an analytical tool that will fulfil doctrinal intent.
Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities (Part 2 of 2)
Part two of a two-part article written by Professor Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College and COL Richard Iron, British Army.
This paper examines the role of centers of gravity in operational design, looking at the relationship between centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. It suggests an analytical model that joint warfighters and planners on both sides of the Atlantic can use to assist strategic and operational-level planning. The model helps to analyze existing and potential vulnerabilities of a center of gravity, and determine which of those could be especially critical.