Negotiating the military-political interface
Negotiating the military-political interface against the backdrop of a war zone is just one of the many complex and invaluable experiences that can be gained through secondment to the United Nations.
What ‘RIGHT’ Looks Like: Linking Command and Moral Authority
…you don’t follow an order because you know for sure it’s gonna work out. You do what you are told, because your CO has the moral authority that says you may not come back. But the cause is just, and fair, and necessary.
Suicide, Male Honour and the Masculinity Paradox: its impact on the ADF
In this powerful article, Anne Goyne the Senior Psychologist and Deputy Director Research at the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics (CDLE) at the Australian Defence College (ADC) explores the reason for male suicide and its high prevalence in wider society. She highlights the paradox of low ADF male suicide rates and the very high rates of suicide of ex-serving military men.
The Defence Coach
This article follows WGCDR Jacqueline Carswell’s excellent contribution to the Forge ‘One Step to Maximising our People’s Potential’ of 15 Jul 19.
One Defence needs one Performance Report
This article calls for a consolidation of Australian Defence Force personal appraisal reports in order to tighten and strengthen ADF organisational alignment and integration within the broader One Defence enterprise.
Harnessing the Intellectual Edge: Reform of the ADO from a Loss-focused culture to an Outcomes-focused culture
“There is no intelligence where there is no change and no need of change” H.G. Wells (Time Machine)
Joint Warfighting - The Impact of Assumption and Bias
Are aspects of the JMAP fundamentally flawed? In the absence of a complete intelligence picture, planners often make a series of assumptions. These are based on an unproven assessment of the adversary plan. Within these assumptions lie a series of unanswered questions relating to ‘intent’. This article explores how bias and assumption can impact on the planning process and complicate the successful attainment of the end-state.
Synchronising Counterinsurgency Ops with Effective Intelligence
All combat operations need real-time, concrete intelligence, but the counterinsurgency operations’ (COINOPS) margin of error runs thinnest. In their fast, multidimensional context, COINOPS demand more comprehensive intelligence at platoon/company levels than conventional warfare does. This article explores the need for tactical unit leaders fighting insurgencies to have more intelligence assets available in the field in order to offer swift analyses to aid decision making in highly fluid environments.
Scharnhorst and Professional Mastery
To me, being 'professional' has meant striving for excellence at my everyday job. Until I attended Command and Staff Course at the Australian War College last year, I did not appreciate that being good at my job was not the same as being a military professional. The course broadened my understanding; being a professional requires one to embrace continual learning in all aspects of the profession. I became conscious that through professional mastery, individuals, even those in junior roles, can influence organisational outcomes beyond their job.
Changes in warfare in the 16th and 17th centuries - a ‘military revolution’?
The 16th and 17th century was a period of significant change in the character of war. The drivers accounting for these changes were not all based in military reforms, despite Western Europe being engaged almost continuously in war. While tactical applications is interesting, it was the beginnings of some profound changes in the development of warfare; the professional military, the standing army, scale of warfare and subsequent emergence of the state (Crown) owning the monopoly on violence and the arrival of proper naval forces.
Lessons for Military Planning in 21st Century Warfare
Scenario Planning and Strategy in the Pentagon
Dr. Michael Fitzsimmons at the U.S. Army War College examines scenario planning in the Pentagon. He demonstrates how uncertainty and complexity converge with the DOD’s bureaucratic decision-making to subvert what should be a straightforward process. His recommendations for reorienting this invite debate among strategists, planners, and the broader joint community.