Negotiating the military-political interface
Negotiating the military-political interface against the backdrop of a war zone is just one of the many complex and invaluable experiences that can be gained through secondment to the United Nations.
What ‘RIGHT’ Looks Like: Linking Command and Moral Authority
…you don’t follow an order because you know for sure it’s gonna work out. You do what you are told, because your CO has the moral authority that says you may not come back. But the cause is just, and fair, and necessary.
Suicide, Male Honour and the Masculinity Paradox: its impact on the ADF
In this powerful article, Anne Goyne the Senior Psychologist and Deputy Director Research at the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics (CDLE) at the Australian Defence College (ADC) explores the reason for male suicide and its high prevalence in wider society. She highlights the paradox of low ADF male suicide rates and the very high rates of suicide of ex-serving military men.
The Defence Coach
This article follows WGCDR Jacqueline Carswell’s excellent contribution to the Forge ‘One Step to Maximising our People’s Potential’ of 15 Jul 19.
One Defence needs one Performance Report
This article calls for a consolidation of Australian Defence Force personal appraisal reports in order to tighten and strengthen ADF organisational alignment and integration within the broader One Defence enterprise.
Harnessing the Intellectual Edge: Reform of the ADO from a Loss-focused culture to an Outcomes-focused culture
“There is no intelligence where there is no change and no need of change” H.G. Wells (Time Machine)
Understanding the Women, Peace and Security agenda
2020 is a milestone year for the 'Women, Peace and Security' agenda. Chief of Army Scholar, Lyndsay Freeman outlines the basics of this agenda, and how the ADF implements its core principles of supporting women’s meaningful participation in peace processes, prioritising their protection in humanitarian crises, and increasing women’s leadership and decision-making.
Joint Warfighting - The Impact of Assumption and Bias
Are aspects of the JMAP fundamentally flawed? In the absence of a complete intelligence picture, planners often make a series of assumptions. These are based on an unproven assessment of the adversary plan. Within these assumptions lie a series of unanswered questions relating to ‘intent’. This article explores how bias and assumption can impact on the planning process and complicate the successful attainment of the end-state.
Synchronising Counterinsurgency Ops with Effective Intelligence
All combat operations need real-time, concrete intelligence, but the counterinsurgency operations’ (COINOPS) margin of error runs thinnest. In their fast, multidimensional context, COINOPS demand more comprehensive intelligence at platoon/company levels than conventional warfare does. This article explores the need for tactical unit leaders fighting insurgencies to have more intelligence assets available in the field in order to offer swift analyses to aid decision making in highly fluid environments.
Scharnhorst and Professional Mastery
To me, being 'professional' has meant striving for excellence at my everyday job. Until I attended Command and Staff Course at the Australian War College last year, I did not appreciate that being good at my job was not the same as being a military professional. The course broadened my understanding; being a professional requires one to embrace continual learning in all aspects of the profession. I became conscious that through professional mastery, individuals, even those in junior roles, can influence organisational outcomes beyond their job.
Pakistan’s Unconventional War Failure
Since 2009 the Afghan government, with international support, has pursued a policy of opening the door to a political solution to the war in their nation. That policy decision was backed up by a massive push to professionalize the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and to continue to militarily pressure the taliban and others on the battlefield. The underlying premise was that the Taliban movement (senior and low-level members) would be forced to react to the legitimate Afghan government olive branch in many ways.
The Competition Prism
“Our traditional way that we differentiate between peace and war is insufficient …….we think of being at peace or war…our adversaries don’t think that way.”
General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 21 September and 5 October 2016