Commandant for a Day: Preparing War Colleges for the Future
War colleges around the world have endured significant challenges over the past two years. COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on faculties as they wrestled with lockdowns and restrictions that tested the achievement of learning objectives.
To the credit of many, the show has gone on with minimal disruption. Yes, there have been a healthy dose of remote learning periods, but the lectures continued and the assignment deadlines remained largely untouched (much to the dismay of the students).
Streamlining Air Land Operations for Better Outcomes
Rethinking Strategies in Modern Urban Conflicts
The increasingly blurred line between state and non-state actors in tight urban warfare zones requires allied forces to have clearly defined and fully informed communication and command chains to minimise unintended consequences.
Joint Warfighting - The Impact of Assumption and Bias
Are aspects of the JMAP fundamentally flawed? In the absence of a complete intelligence picture, planners often make a series of assumptions. These are based on an unproven assessment of the adversary plan. Within these assumptions lie a series of unanswered questions relating to ‘intent’. This article explores how bias and assumption can impact on the planning process and complicate the successful attainment of the end-state.
The Commander’s call: Re-defining rules of engagement (ROE) during Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations
The author writes on the inherent contradiction that exists between the implementation of international humanitarian law and the military operations in the conflict environment. The case in study is about ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Syria, where the U.S troops along with their ISAF colleagues face a dual challenge fighting the insurgents while working within the framework of international humanitarian and domestic laws. The article discusses the necessity of involving the field commander's view while developing rules of engagement so that the operational imperatives aren't lost while guarding against collateral damage.
ANU's support to JPME at the ACSC
A short essay on the Military and Defence Studies Program taught by the ANU's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the significance of ANU's research-based teaching on strategy, leadership and military history, and on the need to remain nimble minded for what happens next.
How to Think (and How Not To)
In this piece, Ben McLennan discusses the pressing need to educate the Army’s workforce on how to think (and how not to). In his discussion, McLennan cogently addresses systems thinking, inherent biases and the need for open-mindedness as part of understanding the recipe to transform Army’s thinking. While specific to McLennan’s Army experience, his observations are equally applicable to other Services and anyone who aspires to think in a way that harnesses a competitive advantage.
Officers’ Call: The Profession of Arms
In 1962, General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, GCB, CBE, DSO & Bar, MC delivered a series of lectures on the Profession of Arms at Trinity College, Cambridge. A renowned soldier, author and historian, General Hackett served with distinction in the Second World War and his career culminated in his appointment as the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army of the Rhine. Following the success of these lectures, he released a well-received book on the same subject, also called ‘The Profession of Arms’. The lectures provide a good historical basis for officers who wish to conduct further study of the profession of arms.
Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant (Part 1 of 2)
Part one of a two-part article written by Professor Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College and COL Richard Iron, British Army.
This paper explores what Clausewitz really meant by the term “center of gravity”. The authors propose that he intended it to be a strength, either moral or physical, and a dynamic and powerful agent in its own right. The authors also suggest that the current Joint and NATO definition of center of gravity is incorrect, implying it to be a source of strength, and that this mis-definition has been responsible for much of the confusion about the concept that exists today.
Managing Assumptions in Planning and Execution
The Royal Australian Air Force Leadership Companion
The Air Force Leadership Companion is designed to assist Air Force personnel in understanding and contextualising the foundations of leadership as espoused in ADDP 00.6 Leadership. This companion explores the context of Social Mastery: Character, Professional Ethics, Followership and Leadership in the Air Force.
CDLE Command Paper 1 - 2016
The CDLE Command Paper 1-2016 is Commodore Peter Scott’s CSC, RAN account of Submarine Command and the issues he faced during his Command. In his paper CDRE Scott covers: qualification to command an Australian submarine, leadership with ultimate accountability and authority, the essential elements of command, purpose, vision and realism as guiding concepts, methods of submarine command, lessons from submarine command, obligations inherent in submarine command, behaviours, and traits to value and nurture.