All combat operations need real-time, concrete intelligence, but the counterinsurgency operations’ (COINOPS) margin of error runs thinnest. In their fast, multidimensional context, COINOPS demand more comprehensive intelligence at platoon/company levels than conventional warfare does. This article explores the need for tactical unit leaders fighting insurgencies to have more intelligence assets available in the field in order to offer swift analyses to aid decision making in highly fluid environments.

Many field grade officers will serve as a Staff Officer / Military Assistant during their career within a single service, joint headquarters, or in an interdepartmental position. This article offers our perspective on the working relationship between Staff Officer and General. We hope it will be useful to those who are stepping into these roles in the future.

The doctrinal approach to planning and conducting campaigns is flawed for the simple fact that war is fundamentally a human endeavour—and humans are unpredictable.

Leveraging off the latest Joint Warrant Officer Course (JWOC) conducted in September 2019, the article focuses on the continued development of JWOC as part of the ADF’s Joint Professional Military Education Continuum. The article discusses the positioning of the JWOC course on the JPME Continuum and aims to assist in the preparation of senior ADF Warrant Officers for future Tier B and C appointments. It achieves this by providing an executive-level understanding of contemporary Defence issues at the strategic, operational and functional levels of command through the study of Australia’s Strategic Defence Environment, Joint Capability and Force Design and Command Leadership and Ethics. Most importantly it highlights the fact that a key ‘deliverable’ of the JWOC is to cultivate, in our senior Warrant Officers, the ability to think both critically and strategically.

Our command teams are charged with constant decision making, on which hinges the success and failure – the life or death – of battles, operations and campaigns. What if the frames of reference we all possess, imposed on us from our similar training, experiences, and culture, could be hindering our ability to make the best decisions? What if we are not as smart as we think we are?

Are aspects of the JMAP fundamentally flawed? In the absence of a complete intelligence picture, planners often make a series of assumptions. These are based on an unproven assessment of the adversary plan. Within these assumptions lie a series of unanswered questions relating to ‘intent’. This article explores how bias and assumption can impact on the planning process and complicate the successful attainment of the end-state.