The Intellectual Edge
This piece challenges common stereotypes and assumptions about intellectualism and puts a price on the pursuit of knowledge for Defence.
What ‘RIGHT’ Looks Like: Linking Command and Moral Authority
…you don’t follow an order because you know for sure it’s gonna work out. You do what you are told, because your CO has the moral authority that says you may not come back. But the cause is just, and fair, and necessary.
An Introduction to Moral Injury in Defence
The difference between an individual who returns from a deployment morally injured, and an individual who returns unharmed, may be defined by whether they can answer the following questions: ‘what do I really believe? Who am I? Where do I belong? What is my purpose?’. Can you answer those questions?
Unsurprisingly, ‘knowing thyself’ is not a standardised training package delivered by Defence. Should it be so the ADF can craft efficient personnel encapsulating the totality of fitness: physical, intellectual, moral/ethical, and spiritual?
The Value of Building Civics Education into Defence
Defence members are not only technical professionals but also instruments of government policy and representatives of Australia's values. They should be equipped with a sound education in civics so they can engage meaningfully and credibly with foreign military personnel, and serve our civilian leaders well.
Clash of Cultures: The Digger Legend of the First Australian Imperial Force
Were the values that came to embody the digger legend of the 1st AIF incompatible with the expectations of British command? Did the traits required to command a less-than-conventional military force during the First World War require a less-than-conventional style of military leadership? This article explores the questions that arise regarding the leadership of the 1st AIF during the Great War - particularly that of General William Birdwood. Was his command effective given the unique circumstances, and were his opponents right to express criticism?
The Thinking Combat Brigade: A Dominant and Prestigious Force
Our command teams are charged with constant decision making, on which hinges the success and failure – the life or death – of battles, operations and campaigns. What if the frames of reference we all possess, imposed on us from our similar training, experiences, and culture, could be hindering our ability to make the best decisions? What if we are not as smart as we think we are?
The 2019 ADF Joint Warrant Officer Course in review
Leveraging off the latest Joint Warrant Officer Course (JWOC) conducted in September 2019, the article focuses on the continued development of JWOC as part of the ADF’s Joint Professional Military Education Continuum. The article discusses the positioning of the JWOC course on the JPME Continuum and aims to assist in the preparation of senior ADF Warrant Officers for future Tier B and C appointments. It achieves this by providing an executive-level understanding of contemporary Defence issues at the strategic, operational and functional levels of command through the study of Australia’s Strategic Defence Environment, Joint Capability and Force Design and Command Leadership and Ethics. Most importantly it highlights the fact that a key ‘deliverable’ of the JWOC is to cultivate, in our senior Warrant Officers, the ability to think both critically and strategically.
A Year in the Life of a Staff Officer and a General
Many field grade officers will serve as a Staff Officer / Military Assistant during their career within a single service, joint headquarters, or in an interdepartmental position. This article offers our perspective on the working relationship between Staff Officer and General. We hope it will be useful to those who are stepping into these roles in the future.
Synchronising Counterinsurgency Ops with Effective Intelligence
All combat operations need real-time, concrete intelligence, but the counterinsurgency operations’ (COINOPS) margin of error runs thinnest. In their fast, multidimensional context, COINOPS demand more comprehensive intelligence at platoon/company levels than conventional warfare does. This article explores the need for tactical unit leaders fighting insurgencies to have more intelligence assets available in the field in order to offer swift analyses to aid decision making in highly fluid environments.