Rethinking Strategies in Modern Urban Conflicts

Abstract

The increasingly blurred line between state and non-state actors in tight urban warfare zones requires allied forces to have clearly defined and fully informed communication and command chains to minimise unintended consequences.

Anant Mishra
16min

Defining ‘Right’: What are the ADF’s Ethics?

Overture

Andrew Stokes
30min

How Australia’s ethical failures with Timor-Leste should inform a future shaping strategy for the Indo-Pacific

Australian military planners are grappling with a grey-zone Chinese shaping strategy that threatens to disrupt[1] ‘stability, security and sovereignty’[2] in the Indo-Pacific. China’s strategy utilises a whole-of-government approach to influence competitors and potential partners through all means short of war.

Daniel-Thomson
34min

The Competition Prism

“Our traditional way that we differentiate between peace and war is insufficient …….we think of being at peace or war…our adversaries don’t think that way.” 

General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 21 September and 5 October 2016 

Brigadier Grant Mason
4 min

ADF Concept for Command and Control of the Future Force

FOREWORD

by DL Johnston, AO Vice Admiral, RAN

Vice Chief of the Defence Force

Department of Defence
10min
Title Why “To Change an Army” Still Matters

Why “To Change an Army” Still Matters

A short piece on why the 1983 article by General Don Starry retains contemporary relevance to future-focused, adaptive national security institutions.

COMADC Mick Ryan
3 min

Time to Review the Rings

Dr David Connery proposes a new way to conceive the levels of war, building on the work of historian Michael Handel. Does a liner model offer a more useful way to apply doctrinal levels in an Australian context?

Dr David Connery
10min
People working over a map

Thucydides Trap: A lesson in strategy and chance from ancient Greece

Paul Taylor
20m
Two people tugging on a rope from opposite ends

Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant (Part 1 of 2)

Part one of a two-part article written by Professor Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College and COL Richard Iron, British Army.

This paper explores what Clausewitz really meant by the term “center of gravity”. The authors propose that he intended it to be a strength, either moral or physical, and a dynamic and powerful agent in its own right. The authors also suggest that the current Joint and NATO definition of center of gravity is incorrect, implying it to be a source of strength, and that this mis-definition has been responsible for much of the confusion about the concept that exists today.

Joseph Strange and Richard Iron
2h
Map laid out on a table with people working around it

Managing Assumptions in Planning and Execution

Jeffery Marshall
2h
Illuminated human brain

Redefining the Center of Gravity

COL Dale C. Eikmeier, USA (Ret.), is an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Army Command and General staff College. COL Eikmeier shares his thoughts on identifying Center of Gravity. This method will provide campaign planners with an analytical tool that will fulfil doctrinal intent.

Dale Eikmeier
2h
Open book with spectacles on top

Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities (Part 2 of 2)

Part two of a two-part article written by Professor Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College and COL Richard Iron, British Army.

This paper examines the role of centers of gravity in operational design, looking at the relationship between centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. It suggests an analytical model that joint warfighters and planners on both sides of the Atlantic can use to assist strategic and operational-level planning. The model helps to analyze existing and potential vulnerabilities of a center of gravity, and determine which of those could be especially critical.

Joe Strange
2h