Technology and Capability https://theforge.defence.gov.au/ en Journals https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/journals <div class="contextual-region node node--type-publication node--view-mode-rss ds-1col clearfix"> <div data-contextual-id="node:node=171:changed=1573003038&amp;ds_bundle=publication&amp;ds_view_mode=default&amp;langcode=en" data-contextual-token="2hxckHXwikLux3ELCLQK6DsMtZo-qkwBi6Irvwo0MDg"></div> <div class="author-wrapper"> <div class="field-label-inline">Author:</div> The Forge </div> <hr> <div><h2>Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies</h2> <p><a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/publications/AJDSS/" target="_blank">https://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/publications/AJDSS/</a></p> <p>The Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies (AJDSS) is the flagship journal of the Australian Defence Force. It publishes multidisciplinary peer-reviewed papers, commentary and analysis, reviews and correspondence on Australian defence and strategic concerns. The AJDSS is an open-access journal published twice annually in print and electronic format online.</p> <h2>Australian Defence Force Journal</h2> <p><a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/adfj/">www.defence.gov.au/adc/adfj/</a></p> <p>The official journal of the Australian profession of arms. It aims to promote discussion, stimulate thinking, and create debate around critical issues facing the modern military. It is an avenue for practitioners and commentators within, and those engaged with, the profession of arms.</p> <h2>The Journal of Military Operations</h2> <p><a href="http://www.tjomo.com">www.tjomo.com</a></p> <p>A peer reviewed publication concerned with warfare and the conduct of war. It focuses on engagement with the enemy, combat and fighting. It seeks to develop insights into the nature of war, in order to better understand and conduct it. It seeks to identify what changes in warfare, what doesn’t and why.</p> <h2>Military Review</h2> <p><a href="http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Military-Review/">www.armyupress.army.mil/Military-Review/</a></p> <p>The professional journal of the US Army which focuses on advancing the ideas and insights military professionals need to lead and succeed. It includes contemporary thought and discussion on topics important to the Army and national defense</p> <h2>MIT Technology Review</h2> <p> <a href="http://www.technologyreview.com">www.technologyreview.com</a></p> <p>A journal that aims to bring about better-informed and more conscious decisions about technology through authoritative, influential and trustworthy journalism.</p> <h2>Parameters</h2> <p><a href="https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/Parameters/">https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/Parameters/</a></p> <p>The US Army War College Quarterly published by its Strategic Studies Institute. The Institute conducts strategic research and analysis to support the US War College curricula, provides direct analysis for Army and Department of Defense leadership, and serves as a bridge to the wider strategic community.</p> <h2>Small Wars Journal</h2> <p><a href="http://www.smallwarsjournal.com">www.smallwarsjournal.com</a></p> <p>This site facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders and students in Small Wars in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field. Look here for regular articles, news feeds and blogs from a range of stakeholders in the field.  It includes a page dedicated to exploring issues associated with disruptive technologies and ideas drawing on insights from conventional and unconventional sources.</p> </div> <div class="topic-wrapper"> <h2 class="field-label-above">Topics</h2> <a href="/core-study-areas/national-security-policy-and-strategy" hreflang="en">National Security Policy and Strategy</a> <a href="/core-study-areas/command-leadership-and-ethics" hreflang="en">Command Leadership and Ethics</a> <a href="/core-study-areas/joint-warfare" hreflang="en">Joint Warfare</a> <a href="/core-study-areas/technology-and-capability" hreflang="en">Technology and Capability</a> </div> <div><div class="share-wrapper"> <p class="text-upper letter-spacing">Share</p> <div class="share-links"><a class="close share-link"><i class="fal fa-times"></i></a><a href="https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/journals" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-facebook-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Facebook</span></a> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&amp;url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/journals" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-linkedin"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to LinkedIn</span></a> <a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/journals" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-twitter-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Twitter</span></a> <a href="mailto:?subject=Journals;body=Read this article on https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/journals" class="share-link"><i class="fas fa-envelope-open-text"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post via email</span></i></a></div> </div></div> </div> Tue, 13 Nov 2018 07:01:22 +0000 Adelphi 171 at https://theforge.defence.gov.au Countering Robotics and Autonomous Systems through Maritime Area Denial https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/countering-robotics-and-autonomous-systems-through-maritime-area-denial <div class="contextual-region node node--type-publication node--view-mode-rss ds-1col clearfix"> <div data-contextual-id="node:node=459:changed=1602656733&amp;ds_bundle=publication&amp;ds_view_mode=default&amp;langcode=en" data-contextual-token="LpjmeoESCIdz-O8UXixuR58P9rU13rYs6TXbpXJ4ilU"></div> <div class="author-wrapper"> <div class="field-label-inline">Author:</div> Nate Streher </div> <hr> <div><p>The rise of Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) in all spheres of warfare has accelerated in recent times to a point where constant revision of tactics and procedures is now common practice<sup><a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a></sup>. The domain of Mine Warfare, and in particular Mine Counter Measures (MCM), is no exception. A heavy reliance on RAS has not only replaced proven tactics but has also placed a heavy reliance on the autonomous systems working efficiently, frequently at the cost of effective redundancy planning. This leads to the question: can we counter the autonomous systems in order to exploit the adversary’s decision-making process?</p> <p>A natural byproduct of increased scrutiny on MCM has been the divergence of attention from purely mine clearance to offensive/defensive mining operations<sup><a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a></sup>. As RAS become the new normal in the context of MCM, one cannot help but seek to identify and exploit the known vulnerabilities of these autonomous systems for the purpose of increasing effectiveness of offensive mining efforts. The critical vulnerability of the MCM system, manned or otherwise, is the dependence of acoustic and magnetic search techniques as a means of location and identification of potential threats. This is in addition to the communications link vulnerability that plagues all unmanned technology and leaves it susceptible to electronic attack<sup><a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" id="_ftnref3">[3]</a></sup>. From an adversarial perspective, future opportunities to counter autonomous MCM operations exist through both kinetic and non-kinetic means.</p> <p> </p> <h2>Kinetic Attack</h2> <p>A simple model for countering autonomous assets is area denial of the minefield through kinetic attack tailored specifically for autonomous assets. This may take the form of underwater guided munitions, sowed amongst a real or distraction minefield, that specifically targets autonomous MCM assets. This could be achieved relatively simply and inexpensively, due to the small size of the munition required and the simplicity of a sensor package that actively seeks known operating frequency ranges of enemy autonomous search systems. The cost vs damage ratio would be favourable and the kinetic destruction of an autonomous asset by a counter measure does not confirm a minefield’s location, rather it leaves a sense of ambiguity of threat presence. The psychological effect of an autonomous asset being destroyed seconds after being sown into a possible minefield may also serve to quickly and efficiently enter the decision-making process of the enemy commander.</p> <p>Argument could be made that a simple fishing net placed in the probable path of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) could delay the MCM effort. This is somewhat true; however, a lone kinetic counter measure could serve to provide the illusion of a persistent mine threat where there is none and degrade the adversary’s physical ability to conduct MCM operations through asset attrition at a favourable cost vs damage ratio. This concept is not restricted to underwater RAS, as Unmanned MCM Surface Vessels could also be targeted by these counter measures through search frequency identification and targeting.</p> <p> </p> <h2>Non-Kinetic Attack</h2> <p>Opportunities also exist for non-kinetic and clandestine countering of RAS behaviour models. Like any system that operates on a feedback loop (search/ return/ identify/ locate/ analysis/ action) there exists the opportunity to manipulate the flow of information overtly or clandestinely. One such opportunity would be the manipulation of information, namely the acoustic signature to delay, or prevent entirely, the positive identification and location of sea mines through acoustic jamming or acoustic signal manipulation.</p> <p>This concept can be displayed through the provision of a hypothetical scenario.</p> <p><em>The Blue force MCM UUV proceeds ahead of the main Amphibious Task Group (ATG), clearing a path through the contested waters surrounding Orange force-held littoral regions. The clearance route identified for UUV clearance will allow the Blue ATG to close to an optimal distance to launch amphibious forces to regain control of the islands. Intelligence suggests the sea approaches have been mined and the MCM forces have already located and neutralised a number of conventional sea mines. An unknown threat, a sea mine with the ability to subtly manipulate acoustic sonar returns from MCM RAS, waits in the approaches. The UUV proceeds along the clearance route, actively searching for anomalies that may indicate a possible mine, providing a visual representation of the acoustic return to the operator through a mission interface on the surface. The mine lays dormant until the acoustic signal from the UUV reaches it. A module within the mine identifies the frequency of the signal and triangulates the position of the UUV. Instantaneously the mine emits an acoustic signature that is received by the UUV’s receivers. This acoustic signal has been created by the sea mine, using the position and movement of the UUV, to alter the acoustic return of the UUV transponder, altering any possible return signal identifying an anomaly. The UUV continues receiving acoustic signals consistent with known sea bottom types, displaying a flat sea bottom with no contacts of interest, or a signal that represents a large submerged wreck that does not present a hazard to surface navigation, back to the operator. No anomalies are detected and the channel is assessed clear by the MCM forces. As the ATG moves through the channel, the sea mine functions, breaking the back of the high value target critical to Blue force success. A simple underwater weapon has not only managed to intercept and manipulate the information and behaviour cycles of enemy RAS, but has also managed to kinetically function as designed, proving the occupying forces with a relatively cheap mission kill.</em></p> <p>Whilst this is somewhat beyond the scope of the function of current generation sea mines, the effect of manipulating sonar returns has been shown in nature. The tiger moth uses well-timed acoustic signals to evade predation by bats through jamming  the bat’s echolocation method of hunting. Upon hearing the echolocation of the bat enter its terminal attack phase, the tiger moth emits a series of signals on the same frequency that is expected by the bat. The unexpected clicks emitted by the moth confuse (whilst not completely jamming) the echo location receptors of the bat by disrupting its known terminal location behaviour. This creates an error in the bat’s echolocation of the moth and affects the bat’s terminal attack phase. In controlled studies, the “silent” moths (not emitting the disruptive clicks) were 10 times more likely to be successfully caught by the bats than the moths emitting the acoustically disruptive clicks<sup><a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" id="_ftnref4">[4]</a></sup>.</p> <p>This behaviour displays the ability of the moths to use acoustics to successfully disrupt the echo location behaviour of the bats. In warfare, this could mean to intercept and disrupt the expected acoustic return and manipulate the information to disrupt the identification behaviour cycle of the RAS. Whilst current military examples of acoustic jamming exist, they are all overt countermeasures which completely block the acquisition of the desired acoustic return; none currently can manipulate the desired acoustic return and disruption of the identification behaviour cycle that is displayed by the tiger moth.</p> <p>A consideration of this example of the tiger moth is that it displays an inherently overt method of acoustic manipulation not entirely appropriate for a clandestine weapon such as a sea mine. The overt manipulation of an acoustic signal would provide an exceptionally quick way of anomaly identification drawing unwanted attention to the mine. More importantly, this concept of information warfare through acoustic manipulation could be developed upon and introduced as a means for countering autonomous technologies and may significantly disrupt the mine warfare sphere if successfully developed.</p> <p>Overall, significant opportunity exists for RAS to be countered in Mine Warfare, particularly in MCM operations. From an MCM standpoint, unmanned systems will reduce risk to human operators through provision of results from a distance, and may also serve to increase effectiveness of MCM operations through higher fidelity information. However, whilst these opportunities exist, so does the ability to subtly manipulate the technologies against the owner/user, or to even quickly remove the RAS asset from the battlefield altogether using a system with a favourable cost-to-damage ratio.</p> <p> </p> <h2>Biography – LCDR Nate Streher, RAN</h2> <p>LCDR Streher joined the Royal Australian Navy in 2005 as a Maritime Warfare Officer, before specialising as a Mine Warfare &amp; Clearance Diving Officer in 2011. After service as Executive Officer - Australian Clearance Diving Team Four and multiple operational deployments, LCDR Streher chose to discharge for a period of 18 months where he worked in Commercial Maritime and Unmanned systems. Rejoining in 2018, LCDR Streher has since been selected as the Tactical Underwater Warfare Instructor on exchange with the Royal Malaysian Navy in Lumut, Malaysia.</p> <p> </p> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /> <p><sup><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a></sup><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Evans, A. William, Matthew Marge, Ethan Stump, Garrett Warnell, Joseph Conroy, Douglas Summers-Stay, and David Baran. "The future of human robot teams in the army: Factors affecting a model of human-system dialogue towards greater team collaboration." In <em>Advances in Human Factors in Robots and Unmanned Systems</em>, pp. 197-209. Springer, Cham, 2017.</span></p> <p><sup><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" id="_ftn2">[2]</a></sup><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Doubleday, Justin. "Navy's expeditionary warfare office putting focus on offensive mining." <em>Inside the Navy</em> 29, no. 23 (2016): 1-5.</span></p> <p><sup><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" id="_ftn3">[3]</a></sup><a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/us-navy-quietly-starting-drone-revolution-naval-warfare-164683"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/us-navy-quietly-starting-drone-revolution-naval-warfare-164683</span></a></p> <p><sup><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" id="_ftn4">[4]</a></sup><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Fullard, JAMES H., JAMES A. Simmons, and PRESTOR A. Saillant. "Jamming bat echolocation: the dogbane tiger moth Cycnia tenera times its clicks to the terminal attack calls of the big brown bat Eptesicus fuscus." Journal of Experimental Biology 194, no. 1 (1994): 285-298.</span></p> </div> <div class="topic-wrapper"> <h2 class="field-label-above">Topics</h2> <a href="/core-study-areas/future-operating-concepts" hreflang="en">Future Operating Concepts</a> <a href="/core-study-areas/technology-and-capability" hreflang="en">Technology and Capability</a> <a href="/core-study-areas/current-and-emerging-technology-cyber-ai-robotics" hreflang="en">Current and Emerging Technology (Cyber, AI, Robotics)</a> </div> <div><div class="share-wrapper"> <p class="text-upper letter-spacing">Share</p> <div class="share-links"><a class="close share-link"><i class="fal fa-times"></i></a><a href="https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/countering-robotics-and-autonomous-systems-through-maritime-area-denial" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-facebook-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Facebook</span></a> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&amp;url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/countering-robotics-and-autonomous-systems-through-maritime-area-denial" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-linkedin"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to LinkedIn</span></a> <a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/countering-robotics-and-autonomous-systems-through-maritime-area-denial" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-twitter-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Twitter</span></a> <a href="mailto:?subject=Countering Robotics and Autonomous Systems through Maritime Area Denial;body=Read this article on https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/countering-robotics-and-autonomous-systems-through-maritime-area-denial" class="share-link"><i class="fas fa-envelope-open-text"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post via email</span></i></a></div> </div></div> </div> Thu, 08 Oct 2020 00:28:27 +0000 gerard.roche@iconagency.com.au 459 at https://theforge.defence.gov.au Watch this space: a whole new war domain https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/watch-space-whole-new-war-domain <div class="contextual-region node node--type-publication node--view-mode-rss ds-1col clearfix"> <div data-contextual-id="node:node=458:changed=1602138058&amp;ds_bundle=publication&amp;ds_view_mode=default&amp;langcode=en" data-contextual-token="MbydqLuQvYhi19YQcwa4aomvBUpnzR47jR7PSsCw04U"></div> <div class="author-wrapper"> <div class="field-label-inline">Author:</div> Cameron Porter </div> <hr> <div><p>Review of US Space Force Space Capstone Publication—<em>Spacepower</em><sup><a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a></sup></p> <p><em>Spacepower </em>is the first articulation of this distinct form of military power. This review seeks to assess the publication’s relevance to the ADF in the creation of its own space warfighting culture.</p> <p> </p> <h2>What is it and what does it seek to do?</h2> <blockquote><p>“The doctrine … elevates spacepower as a distinct formulation of military power on par with landpower, seapower, airpower, and cyberpower.”</p> </blockquote> <p align="right">p. xi</p> <p>The recognition of a new warfighting domain is a rare event in history and naturally follows human innovation and exploration. While the origins of land and sea power were the genesis of military history itself, the Industrial Revolution and Information Age enabled the projection of power into the air and cyber domains only last century. In recent decades, social and military dependence on space-based capabilities, accelerated by commercial access to space, has been a catalyst for the establishment of dedicated space forces around the world. Just as navies were raised to secure channels for commerce, space forces are now being established to assure access to comparable channels in the space domain.<sup><a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a></sup> The United States Space Force’s Space Capstone Publication, Spacepower, is the first articulation of space power as a separate and distinct form of military power. The Space Capstone Publication is intended to serve as a foundation upon which to build additional doctrine as expanding challenges are continually addressed in the changing space domain.<sup><a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" id="_ftnref3">[3]</a></sup></p> <p> </p> <h2>What is the ADF’s current situation?</h2> <blockquote><p>“Space is a unique physical domain, contiguous only with the air domain, but interconnected with all domains.”</p> </blockquote> <p align="right">p. 5</p> <p><em>Spacepower </em>has been published at a critical juncture for the Australian Defence Organisation. No sooner had responsibility for the Information Domain been assigned to Chief of Joint Capabilities than talk of responsibility for the Space Domain began in earnest. Now, just as Chief of Air Force is assuming these responsibilities as the Space Domain Lead, the new Chief of Defence Intelligence has been added to the equation. It is also noteworthy that this is all occurring in a period of normalisation after the Australian Signals Directorate became a statutory agency. These new structures and authorities will certainly influence how the Australian Defence Force defines the somewhat amorphous concept of information warfare and its relationship to technical pursuits such as Offensive Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.</p> <p> </p> <h2>Why is this important and how is it useful?</h2> <blockquote><p>“As an inherently technical domain, military space professionals must embrace the science and art of military spacepower, developing an identity that elevates and integrates both into a seamless warfighting culture.”</p> </blockquote> <p align="right">p. 59</p> <p>The Space Capstone Publication is valuable in this context because of the breadth of its applicability. The document is split into five chapters that espouse both the science and the art of space warfare. The first chapter discusses the unique characteristics of the Space Domain and sets the scene for how space power can be employed as an instrument of national power. The publication then analyses space power through a military lens in chapters three to five by explaining its applicability in war, providing the foundation requirements for space forces and, finally, offering ideals for professional mastery. The most important elements of <em>Spacepower</em> are its representations of the Physical, Network and Cognitive Dimensions. These are carried throughout the doctrine as recurring themes creating a lattice with the scientific and artistic elements of warfighting. This is important because it offers a dissected model for information warfare in the Space Domain, with likely multi-domain applicability.</p> <p> </p> <h2>How should the ADF use the document?</h2> <blockquote><p>“Our primary purpose is to secure U.S. interests through deterrence and, when necessary, the application of force. A warfighting culture is the defining difference between operating space-based information systems and employing credible military space power.”</p> </blockquote> <p align="right">p. 48</p> <p>The global nature of the Space Domain combined with the philosophical character of <em>Spacepower </em>as a ‘doctrine for space forces’ means that the document is readily adaptable for militaries that share common service values to the US, such as Australia. It was purposefully written as an example for like-minded armed forces to follow. Of particular relevance to Australia is the emphasis it places on non-kinetic effects, such as electromagnetic warfare. This is important for Australia as it develops its space control capabilities to counter emerging space threats to its free use of the space domain.<sup><a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" id="_ftnref4">[4]</a></sup> In fact, when considering the doctrine from the opposite perspective, there is surprisingly little that is <em>irrelevant </em>to Australia. Only a small part discussing Space Mobility and Logistics — the movement and support of military equipment and personnel to, from and through the space domain — is beyond the current ability of the ADF, until a sovereign spacelift capability is established.</p> <p> </p> <h2>What does the ADF need to do first?</h2> <blockquote><p>“Warfighting is a solemn endeavor. We must never let the remote aspects of space operations dilute the solemn moral dimension of warfare. Warfighters’ actions carry severe consequences. … Whether on land, in the air, at sea, or in cyberspace, warfighters must develop an intuitive understanding of their domain. Military spacepower is no different.”</p> </blockquote> <p align="right">p. 49</p> <p>Defence has a proud history of space operations. With the 1967 launch of the Weapons Research Establishment Satellite by the Defence Science &amp; Technology Group’s predecessor, Australia became the third nation to design and launch a satellite to orbit the earth.<sup><a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" id="_ftnref5">[5]</a></sup> Since then, the pace of technological development has created progress along an array of divergent paths. The Australian Defence Space enterprise now comprises numerous disciplines, such as intelligence, surveillance of space and reconnaissance from space. This cadre also includes telecommunications, which could soon involve the management of Australia’s first fully owned and controlled military satellite-communications constellation.<sup><a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" id="_ftnref6">[6]</a></sup> The time has therefore arrived for the ADF to forge its own seamless space warfighting culture committed to both warfighting and the mastery of space. While this will require tailored doctrine for Australia’s circumstances, <em>Spacepower</em> can be viewed as the first — if not the hardest — step on this journey.</p> <p> </p> <p>Major Cameron Porter is responsible for developing part of Australia’s future joint space warfare capability at Army Headquarters in conjunction with the Space Domain staff in Air Force Headquarters. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Politics and a Master of Engineering Science in C4ISREW. <a href="https://twitter.com/satellitedundee">@satellitedundee</a></p> <p>Image: <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/22/2002461708/-1/-1/0/200722-F-GO452-0001.JPG">https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/22/2002461708/-1/-1/0/200722-F-GO452-0001.JPG</a></p> <p> </p> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /> <p><sup><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a></sup><a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/07/21/space-admiral-house-lawmakers-want-navy-ranks-space-force.html"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/07/21/space-admiral-house-lawmakers-want-navy-ranks-space-force.html</span></a></p> <p><sup><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" id="_ftn2">[2]</a></sup><a href="https://www.spaceforce.mil/Portals/1/Space%20Capstone%20Publication_10%20Aug%202020.pdf"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">https://www.spaceforce.mil/Portals/1/Space%20Capstone%20Publication_10%20Aug%202020.pdf</span></a></p> <p><sup><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" id="_ftn3">[3]</a></sup><a href="https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/2306828/space-force-releases-1st-doctrine-defines-spacepower-as-distinct-form-of-milita"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/2306828/space-force-releases-1st-doctrine-defines-spacepower-as-distinct-form-of-milita</span></a></p> <p><sup><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" id="_ftn4">[4]</a></sup><a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/statements/defence-space-securing-new-frontier"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/statements/defence-space-securing-new-frontier</span></a></p> <p><sup><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" id="_ftn5">[5]</a></sup><a href="https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/innovation/wresat-%E2%80%94-weapons-research-establishment-satellite"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/innovation/wresat-%E2%80%94-weapons-research-establishment-satellite</span></a></p> <p><sup><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" id="_ftn6">[6]</a></sup><a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/statements/defence-space-securing-new-frontier"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/statements/defence-space-securing-new-frontier</span></a></p> </div> <div class="topic-wrapper"> <h2 class="field-label-above">Topics</h2> <a href="/core-study-areas/adf-capabilities" hreflang="en">ADF Capabilities</a> </div> <div><div class="share-wrapper"> <p class="text-upper letter-spacing">Share</p> <div class="share-links"><a class="close share-link"><i class="fal fa-times"></i></a><a href="https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/watch-space-whole-new-war-domain" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-facebook-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Facebook</span></a> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&amp;url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/watch-space-whole-new-war-domain" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-linkedin"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to LinkedIn</span></a> <a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/watch-space-whole-new-war-domain" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-twitter-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Twitter</span></a> <a href="mailto:?subject=Watch this space: a whole new war domain;body=Read this article on https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/watch-space-whole-new-war-domain" class="share-link"><i class="fas fa-envelope-open-text"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post via email</span></i></a></div> </div></div> </div> Wed, 07 Oct 2020 23:59:30 +0000 gerard.roche@iconagency.com.au 458 at https://theforge.defence.gov.au Synchronising Counterinsurgency Ops with Effective Intelligence https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/synchronising-counterinsurgency-ops-effective-intelligence <div class="contextual-region node node--type-publication node--view-mode-rss ds-1col clearfix"> <div data-contextual-id="node:node=348:changed=1587684938&amp;ds_bundle=publication&amp;ds_view_mode=default&amp;langcode=en" data-contextual-token="8hhd_bjdFve5Exn3GxlDXujgRlbK545Xn3leE3-ncoU"></div> <div class="author-wrapper"> <div class="field-label-inline">Author:</div> Anant Mishra </div> <hr> <div><hr /> <p dir="ltr">It can take less than a day for a Taliban commander to go from Kabul to Herat; yet, days could pass before any U.S. platoon leader along his route ever knows he’s moved. Before that intelligence can get to the tactical leadership, it must first clear rounds of division and brigade deliberation. This should not be. </p> <p dir="ltr">All combat operations need real-time, concrete intelligence, but counterinsurgency operations’ (COINOPS) margin of error runs thinnest. In their fast, multidimensional context, COINOPS demand more comprehensive intelligence at platoon/company levels than conventional warfare does. It’s hard enough for field commanders to assess insurgencies; conventional military intelligence protocols can make it harder, by dedicating resources too narrowly within specific areas of operations (AOs). Field commanders should, therefore, allocate both technical assets (such as UAVs, SIGINT equipment) and non-technical assets (such as intelligence analysts, language translators, etc) assets and fund training that cater to COINOPS’ specific needs, which include adapting to fluid challenges and providing lower echelons with a variety of assessments. Without such adjustments, future <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg964osd.11">COINOPS will struggle to succeed</a>.</p> <p dir="ltr">Former military leaders’ insights and extensive studies point toward possible factors that differentiate COIN-centric intelligence from the conventional kind. To begin with, COINOPS mainly focus on local civilian entities, not conventional forces. Field commanders need extensive knowledge of things like host country populations, their choices of government, insurgent actors, and what’s motivating insurgent behaviours. Far beyond updates on persons of interest’s movements, commanders need a complete socio-political picture of their AO, including (but not limited to) the needs, requirements, persuasions, and critical decision-making abilities of various actors and parties. </p> <p dir="ltr">During COINOPS, intelligence flows from the bottom to the top, and leaders at all levels must draw from it. This is largely because insurgencies involve patchworks of conflict, woven from bits and pieces of various domains, warfare types, topography, or tactics. Furthermore, tactics vary among insurgents from one place to another around the world. Hence, the platoon and company units fighting them have heavy demands for all kinds of intelligence, which traditional/fixed intelligence architectures often <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/e26201910">can't meet</a>. Hence, it is imperative for field commanders operating from a joint operations centre, to cooperate and to coordinate their intelligence assessments with coalition partners and the host nation’s military/intelligence institutions.</p> <p dir="ltr">Field commanders must comprehend a COIN environment’s challenges, along with the components that differentiate it from a traditional warfare setting. They must then relocate intel personnel and technical equipment accordingly. Intelligence officers are generally deputed to assist higher echelons, with only a handful serving at the battalion and below levels. This protocol persists, even though in COINOPS, it is primarily the intelligence analysts deputed at platoon or company-sized units who supply the immediate demands for actionable intelligence. Their abilities to swiftly analyse raw information are vital for counterinsurgency operations. Such speed was one of the factors that contributed to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529108432092">successful COIN operations by American forces in the Philippines.</a></p> <p dir="ltr">The U.S. Marine Corps quadrupled the size of its military intelligence battalions in Iraq, and bumped them over to battalion and divisional headquarters’ levels. This was effective and potentially could increase the effectiveness and efficiency of sister services’ units in future insurgencies; however, it would force field commanders to drop intelligence officers from higher echelons down to battalion headquarters.</p> <p dir="ltr">Relocating more intelligence personnel from higher echelons to tactical ones would improve the tactical decision-making ability of all field commanders, by maximising intelligence-gathering capabilities by platoon-size units. Putting intelligence analysts closer to insurgent groups on the ground could yield more timely information for commanders at brigade and division levels. Once relocated, these (clandestine) intelligence assets would embed as combat platoon-sized units. Human intelligence (HUMINT) operators could lead them, supported by counter-intelligence professionals and case officers -- as well as by signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets. </p> <p dir="ltr">At the very least, intel analysts reinforcing ground-level combat platoons would be closer to the enemy, and could, therefore, gather relevant information for actionable intelligence. Such intel could then answer critical questions for senior military leaders at division or brigade levels. However, in ongoing counter-insurgency ops such as in Afghanistan, intelligence analysts both at battalion and above do not have direct access to patrol briefs and therefore cannot compare them with information from other sections to formulate truly comprehensive briefings.</p> <p dir="ltr">Company headquarters should also be reinforced with intel analysts, particularly those companies that have recently set up a command post in an AO, and who therefore need fast, credible intelligence on local masses and insurgents, <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/%22Twenty-Eight-Articles%22%3A-Fundamentals-of-Kilcullen/91cc26a9d101aab967f903a5a75f76e9bc608898">ahead of missions</a>. </p> <p dir="ltr">To enhance success, tactical intel analysts must further be supplemented by language translators, who can interact freely with locals, read locally-gathered information, and participate in confidence-building mechanisms. </p> <p dir="ltr">Field commanders should also focus their attention on formulating a permanent joint-intelligence fusion centre, or a dedicated intelligence collection headquarters, exclusively for analysing intelligence received from the combat theater. This would streamline the flow of intelligence. Functionally, such a command would comprise two sections, one for catering intelligence to theater commanders and below; the other, for streamlining it for U.S. political leadership. To ensure operational and organisational capacity, the commander heading such an institution should rotate officers and staff between the two sections frequently.</p> <p dir="ltr">The theater-centric fusion centre should lead the processing of all intelligence flowing in and out of the theater. In the light of how insurgencies occur at regional levels, platoon and company-size units must formulate their own intelligence units. This would enable both division and company commanders to supplement intelligence received at all levels, enabling them to see a holistic picture of intelligence at both the tactical and divisional levels.</p> <p dir="ltr">Intelligence officers trained to gather, assess, and analyse critical intelligence will at times coordinate with ground forces to verify intelligence, and are not necessarily the principle gatherers of intelligence. As stated earlier, however, all actors in a theater can be potent intelligence gatherers. Intelligence gathering initiatives should involve all ground-based tactical operations. Every platoon that moves out to its AO should be given an intelligence package along with a debrief on tactical operational requirements. Post-patrol debriefs are critical to COIN operations; hence, all platoon commanders should be encouraged to write detailed accounts upon returning to base.</p> <p dir="ltr">The goal of analysis is to glean reliable, actionable intelligence from raw information. Analysing COINOPS intelligence is a monumental task. Teams of analysts extensively study complex societal relationships along with ethnic and cultural taboos, numerous actors, stakeholders, past violence, history, host societies’ behaviours, and relationships between two or more ethnic communities. Such factors are further reinforced by insurgencies’ fluid natures, their discrete actors and stakeholders, and the trust patterns between parties. </p> <p dir="ltr">The nature of complex scenarios and constant fluid environments would definitely cost analysts significant time to analyse situations and come up with effective tactics. Additionally, insurgencies are not days or weeks long, but often go on for years, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40664070">which also forces analysts to take the long road</a>. They should, therefore, maintain/observe the situation minutely, while constantly referring to regularly intelligence reports in support, with specific divisions looping in from time to time (HUMINT, SIGINT and logistics). </p> <p dir="ltr">One possible way to ease access to intelligence could involve a dedicated list of key personnel serving within the intelligence sections at brigade or division levels. This would enable the concerned ground force commander to identify the key personnel and share intelligence. The sharing could be done using secure communications, email groups, and division-linked chat boxes for intelligence exchange. </p> <p dir="ltr">The drafting process for effective intelligence-sharing mechanisms would be incomplete without involving technological advances. To further strengthen COINOPS, Department of Defense-partnered agencies and private enterprises should develop strategic network capabilities dedicated to platoon commanders, to enable them to quickly share enemy battle tactics, maneuvering techniques, and re-engagement capabilities within an AO. </p> <p>Effective COINOPS entail extensive intelligence gathering and analysis, as field commanders at all levels constantly monitor mission progress and adapt objectives in real-time. Often, however, they must divert warfighters to gather information about their AOs rather than having trained, inherent intel assets alongside them. Instead of waiting on higher echelons’ analysts to analyze ground-level data, tactical unit leaders fighting insurgencies deserve to have more intelligence assets with them in the field, there to offer swift analyses in highly fluid environments. Without them, the fight takes longer, accomplishes less, and wastes lives. It’s high time DoD gave timely intelligence capabilities to leaders facing the multidimensional challenges of insurgencies.</p> </div> <div class="topic-wrapper"> <h2 class="field-label-above">Topics</h2> <a href="/core-study-areas/strategy-theory-and-practice" hreflang="en">Strategy, theory and practice</a> <a href="/core-study-areas/preparedness-and-mobilisation" hreflang="en">Preparedness and Mobilisation</a> <a href="/core-study-areas/profession-arms-military-values-and-characteristics" hreflang="en">The Profession of Arms, military values and characteristics</a> <a href="/core-study-areas/future-operating-concepts" hreflang="en">Future Operating Concepts</a> <a href="/core-study-areas/operational-art" hreflang="en">Operational Art</a> <a href="/core-study-areas/staff-planning-process" hreflang="en">Staff Planning Process</a> <a href="/core-study-areas/tactics-across-spectrum-conflict" hreflang="en">Tactics across the spectrum of conflict</a> <a href="/core-study-areas/application-technology-operations" hreflang="en">Application of Technology for Operations</a> </div> <div><div class="share-wrapper"> <p class="text-upper letter-spacing">Share</p> <div class="share-links"><a class="close share-link"><i class="fal fa-times"></i></a><a href="https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/synchronising-counterinsurgency-ops-effective-intelligence" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-facebook-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Facebook</span></a> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&amp;url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/synchronising-counterinsurgency-ops-effective-intelligence" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-linkedin"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to LinkedIn</span></a> <a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/synchronising-counterinsurgency-ops-effective-intelligence" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-twitter-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Twitter</span></a> <a href="mailto:?subject=Synchronising Counterinsurgency Ops with Effective Intelligence;body=Read this article on https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/synchronising-counterinsurgency-ops-effective-intelligence" class="share-link"><i class="fas fa-envelope-open-text"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post via email</span></i></a></div> </div></div> </div> Sun, 16 Feb 2020 06:26:34 +0000 mark.will 348 at https://theforge.defence.gov.au Product innovation success in the ADF – an exploratory study https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/product-innovation-success-adf-exploratory-study <div class="contextual-region node node--type-publication node--view-mode-rss ds-1col clearfix"> <div data-contextual-id="node:node=293:changed=1573782240&amp;ds_bundle=publication&amp;ds_view_mode=default&amp;langcode=en" data-contextual-token="SumF6e4psTOiimypAGtr3Q0-8K9QxL9iu391Cyty8OY"></div> <div class="author-wrapper"> <div class="field-label-inline">Author:</div> Dr Gregor Ferguson </div> <hr> <div><p>It is possible for Australian defence companies and the Australian Defence Organisation to achieve greater success and better mitigate the financial, technical and schedule risks in developing new, technology-based  equipment and services for the ADF.</p> <p>The research leading to this conclusion was based on case studies of 20 successful and unsuccessful Australian defence projects, and addressed three key questions:</p> <ul> <li>What are the factors which determine the success or failure of product innovation projects by companies in Australia’s defence industry?</li> <li>Can these factors be measured and used to create a model, or a more general set of pre-conditions, for successful product innovation within Australia’s defence industry?</li> <li>To what extent is Research and Development (R&amp;D) investment an indicator of product innovation success in the Australian defence industry?</li> </ul> <p>The research showed that a set of pre-conditions does indeed exist for Product Innovation Success in Australia’s defence market. The case study results showed a direct and positive association between Product Innovation Success and 62 separate factors – the essential pre-conditions for that success - which are grouped as follows:</p> <ul> <li>Innovator Attributes</li> <li>Innovator Behaviour</li> <li>Customer Attributes</li> <li>Customer-controlled Factors</li> <li>Market Environment</li> </ul> <p dir="ltr" id="docs-internal-guid-4cf36f33-7fff-759a-c45b-ce3ced38b369">The innovator lies at the heart of the process: a successful innovation outcome is the product of Innovator Behaviour, influenced by intrinsic Innovator Attributes and three external forces acting on him: Customer Attributes, Customer Controlled Factors and the Market Environment. The relationship between the Innovator, Customer and Market Environment is shown in Figure 1.</p> <p dir="ltr"><a href="https://theforge.defence.gov.au/innovation_components" target="_blank">Figure 1: The Components of Innovation Success and how they relate to each other (Copyright: Gregor Ferguson 2012)</a></p> <p dir="ltr" id="docs-internal-guid-e02b8143-7fff-7e84-6b0b-b7ac81b1c747">The literature on defence product innovation in Australia is sparse but a search of the wider literature on product innovation showed that the defence market resembles other markets for high-technology scientific and industrial capital equipment which have been studied extensively. </p> <p dir="ltr">The case studies showed that innovation success factors which apply in non-defence high-technology industry sectors apply also in the defence industry, at least to the extent they shape the characteristics and behaviour of the innovating companies. In this sense, the defence industry is not so very different from those other sectors.</p> <p dir="ltr">However, the defence market in Australia is very different. It is a monopsony, because there is only one customer and he controls the size and behaviour of the market and the barriers to entry. It is also monolithic, in that the customer seeks uniformity of equipment for a particular task and therefore buys ’fleets’ of equipment, rather than purchasing items singly, so the supplier’s (or innovator’s) market share in a particular segment is typically either 100% or zero. </p> <p dir="ltr">Finally, it is shaped fundamentally by the Customer-Active Paradigm, or CAP, arising from the fact that the customer is a community of expert practitioners who develop their user requirements on the basis of classified information and critical assumptions that are generally withheld from the marketplace. This means that innovators can’t safely anticipate the user requirement, however pro-active they may be in engaging the customer and trying to inform him about options for tackling operational challenges.  And therefore the customer plays an important role in defence product development, both triggering and shaping the innovation process.</p> <p dir="ltr">The effect of the CAP is amplified by the monopsony and monolithic nature of the defence market. This means in turn that Product Innovation Success depends far more on the customer’s attributes and behaviours (including his shaping effect on the market environment) than in other sectors.</p> <p dir="ltr">There are two important conclusions from this research: firstly, that while the Australian defence market is unique, the defence industry is not. And secondly, that in Australia’s defence market there are indeed pre-conditions for Product Innovation Success. Some of these relate to the innovator, some to the customer and some to the market itself. </p> <p dir="ltr">The research identified some 62 separate factors relating to Product Innovation Success and attempted to ascribe different levels of value to them. These can be termed Pre-Conditions which, if satisfied appropriately in the context of the project in question, will help to increase the likelihood of success. This provides both a working tool for practitioners (the innovators and their customers) and a rudimentary predictive tool for these as well as for policy-makers and other stakeholders such as sources of project finance. The predictive powers of this tool, shown in Figure 2 below, enable practitioners and stakeholders to assess the strength of a project at the outset and to monitor its health as the project proceeds.</p> <table border="1" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="1"> <tbody> <tr> <td>1.  INNOVATOR ATTRIBUTES</td> <td>Satisfied</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Familiarity with this market</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Familiarity with technology and manufacturing in this sector</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>In-house prototyping capability</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>In-house Software and Hardware capabilities</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>The availability of in-house IP</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sound project screening capabilities</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>The ability to make accurate cost, schedule and technical forecasts</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>The ability to manage schedule</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Organic rather than Mechanistic structure</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>A supportive, engaged CEO</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Absorptive capacity</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td> <p>2. INNOVATOR BEHAVIOUR</p> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr> <td>Reliance on external partners and sources of technology</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>A methodical, systematic approach to marketing</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Innovator’s focus on market position</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Innovator’s willingness to consider incremental innovation</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>A close customer relationship</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Intimate understanding of both DSTO and customer</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Pro-active in seeking to test ideas and hypotheses on customer</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Pro-active in determining user needs</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Pro-active in shaping customer’s view of his needs</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Understanding customer price sensitivity</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>A methodical, systematic approach to R&amp;D</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Consistent, systematic R&amp;D investment</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Relationship with DST</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Teaming or collaboration agreement with DST</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Appointment of a Senior Project Leader/Champion</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Use of cross-functional project teams</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Adequate schedule allowance for T&amp;E</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td> <p>3. CUSTOMER ATTRIBUTES</p> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr> <td>Customer understands and articulates own needs</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Customer familiarity with product/system type</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Customer has funded or undertaken previous work by DST/ other R&amp;D organisation</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Customer seeks to innovate in practices and processes</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Customer has high level of risk tolerance</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Customer seeks innovative technical solutions</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Customer’s technical and professional understanding</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td> <p>4. CUSTOMER-CONTROLLED FACTORS</p> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr> <td>Urgency of user need</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Urgency of user need reflected in acquisition strategy</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Customer validates needs through modelling/simulation</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>User’s needs and desired outcome reflected in acquisition process</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Access to Defence T&amp;E facilities</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Value of DST’s IP</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Customer sticks to his own schedule for decisions and processes</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Development partnership with Defence</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Defence support in export market</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Risk factors reflected in Capability Development and Acquisition processes</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Stable operational requirement (no changes during development)</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Customer appoints a project champion</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td> <p>5. MARKET ENVIRONMENT</p> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sufficient information to build a sound business case</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Emerging market with growing demand</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TRL of External IP</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Size of domestic market</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Niche market, little competition</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Business Case satisfied by domestic market</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Potential for repeat sales to same or other customer</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Innovator’s ability to tackle export market without Defence support</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Strong link with White Paper/ higher level guidance</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>High operational tempo</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Rapidly evolving threat environment</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ongoing technology growth</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>External R&amp;D funding access</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>External Access to critical technology</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ITAR effect on exportability or export market access</td> <td> Y / N</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p dir="ltr" id="docs-internal-guid-581472df-7fff-8d33-8ba3-a5901870838d">The second column titled ‘Satisfied?’ simply turns this list of Pre-Conditions into a check list which the innovator should complete as part of his planning process, and then revisit throughout the project in order to ensure he remains on track and that key external factors – Customer Attributes, Customer Behaviour and Market Environment – haven’t changed in significant ways.</p> <p dir="ltr">This Table includes four factors highlighted in red and which can be termed ‘Red Flags’:</p> <ul> <li>Customer understands and articulates own needs</li> <li>Sufficient information to build a sound business case</li> <li>Emerging market with growing demand</li> <li>TRL of External IP</li> </ul> <p dir="ltr" id="docs-internal-guid-ae2b35a3-7fff-9a35-a154-a474a8ad905f">The Case Studies show a very strong link between these factors and project failure. To some extent they are all self-evident, but the research suggests they are fundamentally important: if the customer doesn’t understand and/or cannot articulate his own needs; if there’s insufficient market information on which the innovator can build a strong business case for the project; and if the market is mature and demand is either static or declining, then the project is probably at high risk of failure. Similarly, if the project demands external IP, the innovator must ensure this is of an appropriate level of maturity or, again, the project faces a high risk of failure. </p> <p dir="ltr">The ‘Red Flags’ should not be seen as a reason for automatic termination of the project, but are so strongly associated with the risk of project failure they should be treated as an automatic trigger for review of the project.</p> <p dir="ltr">While not all factors will be critical to all projects, completing this check list is important for two reasons: first, it requires the innovator to take a methodical approach to the innovation process; and second, it helps him to identify attributes and behaviours which require change or improvement in some fashion in order to enhance his prospects for success. </p> <p dir="ltr">One of those important behaviours is R&amp;D investment. Australian defence companies which undertake successful product innovation projects spend significant amounts of their revenue on self-funded R&amp;D: 9.62% of revenue compared with 6.99 per cent for unsuccessful companies.</p> <p dir="ltr">Secondly, it would appear that smaller firms are more likely to be product innovators than larger ones, although a number of defence industry prime contractors have been relatively prolific developers of new products. This would seem to be a consistent with the rise of small, high-technology startups whose products and services have the potential to be extremely disruptive if developed and harnessed properly by the end user.</p> <p dir="ltr">Thirdly, size is not a predictor of success: of eight projects undertaken by companies with a revenue of greater than $100 million a year, half were judged unsuccessful. However, of the 12 companies whose revenue was less than $50 million a year, eight were successful innovators. Failures only outnumbered successes where revenue fell below $5 million a year, which points to a potential structural issue: smaller defence companies may be too small to command the non-technical resources required for Product Innovation Success in the rather demanding defence market. This has implications also for high-technology start-ups and suggests that, if he wants to pursue genuinely disruptive innovations, the defence customer may need to be more pro-active in supporting small companies with disruptive technologies through the project funding ‘Valley of Death’. </p> <p dir="ltr">This combination of the conceptual model in Figure 1 and the predictive model in Figure 2 represents a tool which may help defence product innovators and their customers to choose whether or not to pursue a specific opportunity, how to prepare themselves if they decide to proceed, and how to structure their approach to the project.</p> </div> <div class="topic-wrapper"> <h2 class="field-label-above">Topics</h2> <a href="/core-study-areas/working-industry" hreflang="en">Working with Industry</a> </div> <div><div class="share-wrapper"> <p class="text-upper letter-spacing">Share</p> <div class="share-links"><a class="close share-link"><i class="fal fa-times"></i></a><a href="https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/product-innovation-success-adf-exploratory-study" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-facebook-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Facebook</span></a> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&amp;url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/product-innovation-success-adf-exploratory-study" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-linkedin"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to LinkedIn</span></a> <a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/product-innovation-success-adf-exploratory-study" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-twitter-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Twitter</span></a> <a href="mailto:?subject=Product innovation success in the ADF – an exploratory study;body=Read this article on https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/product-innovation-success-adf-exploratory-study" class="share-link"><i class="fas fa-envelope-open-text"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post via email</span></i></a></div> </div></div> </div> Sun, 03 Nov 2019 10:08:25 +0000 mark.lynch@defence.gov.au 293 at https://theforge.defence.gov.au Are we ready for machines to learn and make decisions for us? https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/are-we-ready-machines-learn-and-make-decisions-us <div class="contextual-region node node--type-publication node--view-mode-rss ds-1col clearfix"> <div data-contextual-id="node:node=247:changed=1564019705&amp;ds_bundle=publication&amp;ds_view_mode=default&amp;langcode=en" data-contextual-token="VGOFtXvGPqCqb1wGeDAVO5x5aF-AWvom0A7ZnmOeYHI"></div> <div class="author-wrapper"> <div class="field-label-inline">Author:</div> LTCOL Jasmin Diab </div> <hr> <div><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Over the last twelve months I have been hidden away working on a machine learning algorithm to support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) </span><a href="https://media.superevent.com/documents/20181023/5af1cd731929cbff2feb51cc771efbb2/book-of-abstracts.pdf" style="text-decoration:none;" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0563c1;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">nuclear safeguards analytical tools</span></a><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> (page 78). Essentially my little machine trawls the internet to find any non-declared uranium mining activities. This saves analysts years in scanning and reading documents in order to narrow down potential non-declared activities around the globe. So as a leader and decision maker, could we use machine learning with a military hat on? Or are we not culturally ready as an organisation to trust a machine will help us make the right decision whether in peace or at war. I seek to do this by asking a few questions. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Firstly – what is machine learning?</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Machine learning is just one of many tools in the artificial intelligence realm that helps humanity combat </span><a href="https://www.sas.com/en_au/insights/big-data/what-is-big-data.html" style="text-decoration:none;" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0563c1;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">big data</span></a><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">. In its simplest form, a machine learning model requires three key things, data, an algorithm and the ability to be iterative and learn. To be honest, the biggest part of machine learning is really in the data. If you put bad data in, you’ll get bad data out and reliance on support from the machine to make decisions will be lost. This requirement for system performance raises the first question.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Question #1 -</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Does defence store and maintain data effectively?</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">In my nuclear safeguards work I utilised a branch of machine learning, called </span><a href="https://towardsdatascience.com/an-easy-introduction-to-natural-language-processing-b1e2801291c1" style="text-decoration:none;" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0563c1;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">natural language processing or NLP</span></a><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">. It essentially uses mathematical processes to teach a machine to “read” and analyse text. This therefore opens up the world of analytics to not just numerical based data for analysis but words and phrases. Imagine how getting a machine to trawl through pages and pages of reports, which is now a structured data set, might help inform where a commander, decision maker or staff officer focusses their effort. But this is not just a “google-esk” type scanner, if your machines algorithmic parameters are set to what you need as well as have the ability to evolve and grow off your decisions, you can set it up to find patterns of information (or patterns of not the right information), to determine what is likely to be occurring.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Question #2 – </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">If we do have excellent databases, do they all have the ability to share data for analysis? </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">What do I mean? </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Let’s consider peacetime  a regular decision making event for military personnel, moving interstate. You’ve got your inventory loaded onto an online portal, you have a posting order with your locality, your family details are kept up to date on an online system including whether you have a special needs family member who needs a ramp or you have a large dog that needs a backyard. A machine with access to this data could analyse this information and what housing solutions have worked for others in a similar situation to you. Therefore, instead of spending weeks or months fighting to find a house within your price range and in your posting locality the machine does it for you and either allocates you an available DHA property, or narrows down some rental options in the area.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Question #3 - </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">If it saves you and your family the stress of finding a house would you trust the machine to find one for you? </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Now if we were to look at decision making as part of a counter insurgency campaign, your machine could be set up to trawl open source media reports, live social media feeds, classified intelligence reports, chat reps, patrol reports and so much more. You, as the commander of a Task Group, have to decide whether to drop a bomb on a target or send in a land-based force. Your machine could be set to parameters that give accurate and timely analysis on what is in that location and what the likely risks are for either option. Now this doesn’t put the green lanyards out of a job (I can hear them all hating on me already – chill – this machine is for you!), rather, this allows intelligence staff to focus their efforts on the information that is relevant to the campaign taking in hundreds or even thousands more feeds than they could ever have been able to comprehend in a short amount of time.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Question #4 - </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Would we trust a machine to steer our decisions in a certain direction even if it may result in lethal effects?</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Then finally, if we are in a state vs. state conflict, total war, the possibilities are endless. Incorporating written reports, live battle tracking feeds, radio traffic, known enemy doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), known supply routes, supply mechanisms, global supply shortages or restrictions. Your machine could give you indications on when and where is best to hit your enemy – it could link directly into a weapon system and decide when to engage (although the ethics of autonomous weapons are probably not there yet). It could also predict when your forces are likely to run out of key equipment as supply and demand ebbs and flows during the battle. Need a wargaming buddy? Why not build a machine that can understand how your enemy’s TTPs have been evolving and the machine itself could evolve its decision making off analysing enemy moves therefore allowing a commander to really wargame a plan?</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Question #5 – </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">How far are we willing to</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">let machines help us in war?</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">How do we do this?</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Some of these decisions are easier than others for humans to be comfortable in allowing a machine to steer us to a decision. I haven’t even opened the box of ethics to this argument which is an important issue to debate. However, if as an organisation, we want to be smarter with big data and using information as a weapon, then machine learning is an option we should be starting to incorporate in our daily life. The role of data scientists is crucial to help build and refine data sets and ensure we store and manage data securely and appropriately. Do we need to teach leaders how to embrace machines in their decision-making processes so that we understand both our limitations as humans (coffee and chocolate can only keep you awake for so long) but also what the limitations of our machine are? Do we need to incorporate coding as part of the school of languages so that we can build our own machines? Then we need to have the tough debates on ethics noting ethics would be likely to evolve during total war. Maybe an ethics-based machine could help us make these decisions.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><a href="https://becominghuman.ai/machine-learning-for-dummies-explained-in-2-mins-e83fbc55ac6d?gi=2ece2aed3c8e" target="_blank">Image source</a></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> </div> <div class="topic-wrapper"> <h2 class="field-label-above">Topics</h2> <a href="/core-study-areas/current-and-emerging-technology-cyber-ai-robotics" hreflang="en">Current and Emerging Technology (Cyber, AI, Robotics)</a> </div> <div><div class="share-wrapper"> <p class="text-upper letter-spacing">Share</p> <div class="share-links"><a class="close share-link"><i class="fal fa-times"></i></a><a href="https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/are-we-ready-machines-learn-and-make-decisions-us" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-facebook-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Facebook</span></a> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&amp;url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/are-we-ready-machines-learn-and-make-decisions-us" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-linkedin"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to LinkedIn</span></a> <a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/are-we-ready-machines-learn-and-make-decisions-us" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-twitter-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Twitter</span></a> <a href="mailto:?subject=Are we ready for machines to learn and make decisions for us?;body=Read this article on https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/are-we-ready-machines-learn-and-make-decisions-us" class="share-link"><i class="fas fa-envelope-open-text"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post via email</span></i></a></div> </div></div> </div> Thu, 25 Jul 2019 01:07:52 +0000 mark.lynch@defence.gov.au 247 at https://theforge.defence.gov.au Changes in warfare in the 16th and 17th centuries - a ‘military revolution’? https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/changes-warfare-16th-and-17th-centuries-military-revolution <div class="contextual-region node node--type-publication node--view-mode-rss ds-1col clearfix"> <div data-contextual-id="node:node=246:changed=1563800840&amp;ds_bundle=publication&amp;ds_view_mode=default&amp;langcode=en" data-contextual-token="thINwJduTZ579IdIAnTwhf19mwEafQvU0I_ooFYarNg"></div> <div class="author-wrapper"> <div class="field-label-inline">Author:</div> COL David Edwards </div> <hr> <div><p> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-right: 26.05pt;text-indent: -28.35pt;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;padding:0pt 0pt 0pt 28.35pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">    </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">‘</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Gentlemen: I hear many say, ‘What need so much ado and great charge in caliver, musket, pike and corslet? Our ancestors won many a battle with bows, black bills, and jacks.’ But what think you of that?</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-right: 26.05pt;text-indent: -28.35pt;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;padding:0pt 0pt 0pt 28.35pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">    </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Captain: Sir, then was then, and now is now. The wars are much altered since the fiery weapons first came up’</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-right: 4.75pt;text-indent: -28.35pt;text-align: right;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;padding:0pt 0pt 0pt 28.35pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">    </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Robert Barnet, </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Theory and Practice of Modern Wars</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, 1598 </span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[1] </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Changes in the ways and means of warfare in Western Europe during the </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">16</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">th</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> and </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">17</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">th</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> centuries have been referred to as the ‘Military Revolution’. This term was originally from the paper delivered by Michael Roberts in 1955. It describes 1560-1660 as a period of significant transformation in warfare that contributed to the elevation of Western Europe as a centre of world power.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[2] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Other historians added or modified his thesis, such as Geoffrey Parker. He expanded the original period of time to over two centuries and incorporated further lessons from the Spanish, Hapsburgs and French, emphasised the role of defensive technologies and expanded on the development of naval combat.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[3] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Others such as Jeremy Black, have questioned the value of this period in the development of warfare, the causes of this change and if the period should be referred to as truly ‘revolutionary’.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[4] </span></p> <p dir="ltr" id="docs-internal-guid-3ad0450d-7fff-8d5f-89cc-d17b9f34e26f" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Warfare in Western Europe during the </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">16</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">th</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> and </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">17</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">th</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> century  featured significant military, political-strategic, and societal factors that influenced the change in the conduct of warfare. While these were significant and important changes in the </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">character</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> of warfare, it did not change the</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> nature</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> of warfare, making the term ‘revolution’ not technically accurate despite its common use in military history. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Clausewitz provides a well known and useful means to discuss the interdependence of causal factors in the changing character of war.  In particular, Clausewitz’s ‘trinity’ can be used to examine the tactical adaptation and professionalisation of the military, the size of armies and the role of the state and developments in naval combat.  The pace of change and breadth of these changes can also be examined to to determine if they were revolutionary or evolutionary in nature. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Clausewitz and the Changing Character of War </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Clausewitz describes the nature of war in book one of </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">On War. </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">In essence, it is a duel between forces, which involves violence (fighting) in the pursuit of policy. It is very human in nature with emotions of hatred, danger, courage, uncertainty and fear.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[5] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> He also recognises that the character of war changes over time, it is a ‘true chameleon’, which adapts to the given case.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[6] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">  While the forms (</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Formen</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">) of war are new, its essence (</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Wesen</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">) remains the same.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[7] </span></p> <p dir="ltr" id="docs-internal-guid-66855733-7fff-e68b-f3a6-28fd3ae239b4" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Clausewitz saw war as a combination of passions, ‘primordial violence, hatred and enmity’; an element of chance and uncertainty demanding creative adaptation, and the subordination of the act to reason provided by political policy.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[8] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Clausewitz proposes a trinity of the commander and his army (the military) representing the creative aspect and dealing with chance; the rational government of policy and strategy; and the passions of the people. The change in one aspect (military adoption, policy and strategy or social reform) will inevitably affect the others. The </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">16</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">th</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> and </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">17</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">th</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> centuries were periods of almost continuous warfare in Europe and this may have had greater influence than the other two elements, but it may be that a change in warfare is the consequence of societal or political-strategic influence. Some of the characteristics of warfare in this period will be examined through this complex interplay of military creativity (organisation, adapted technology and tactics), government (strategy, policy, economy and geography) and people (social changes, demographics and attitudes to military affairs). </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Military Technology, Organisational Adaptation and the Military Profession</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Technological advances during this time (as for many ‘revolutions’ in warfare) tend to be characterised as the driver for change. Geoffrey Parker places great weight in the role of technology (gunpowder advances and </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">trace italienne</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">) as does Clifford Rogers.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[9] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Although, as Black suggests, technological determinism is limiting and often ignores other elements in order to make an argument.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[10] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> For example, the employment of handheld gunpowder weapons and the benefits of improved artillery were developed and fielded in Europe from the 1350s and were found in other parts of the world to various effect. The Ottomans, a constant threat to Europe at the time, had significant artillery and gunpowder weapons at their disposal, as did much of Asia.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[11] [12] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Technological advances are not without complications of their own. Advanced weapons such as muskets, arquebuses and artillery were costly, and placed significant pressure on logistics, demanding a ‘longer tail’ to manoeuvre and maintain them. Technology in of itself, is not a driver for military change, it is how that technology is adapted by the military in tactics, organisation and systems that determines the value of its military effectiveness.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[13] </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Roberts’s original work focussed the revolutionary nature on the abilities of Maurice of Nassau and then Gustavus Adolphus to adapt army organisation, systems and tactics to the new weapons technology and the increased size of forces.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[14] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> They managed to harness the mass effect of musket/arquebus fire by adopting linear formations that allowed successive lines to reload and were accompanied by pike to protect against cavalry and support close combat.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[15] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Gustavus developed the technique for the offensive by adopting the counter-march technique of lines advancing through the others to fire.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[16] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Accompanying these tactics were new, smaller formations. During the Eighty Years War, Maurice organised battalions of 580 soldiers into ten ranks, Gustavus would reduce this further for his campaigns in the Thirty Year War.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[17] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">  These smaller organisations increased tactical manoeuvre and allowed better control for more complex drills. These were far smaller than the mass of the Swiss columns or Spanish</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> tercio.</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Cavalry, although diminished in its employment, was also reformed and equipped with pistol and sword as a means for shock action. This made far better use of their speed and firepower than the caracole which has them trot to engage with pistol and then retire.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[18] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Under Gustavus, lighter artillery became integrated within the infantry and a coordinated combined arms effect was generated. The success of these adaptations was demonstrated at Breitenfeld in 1631 and the campaign into Germany.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">These changes had potentially greater impacts on the state and the professionalisation of the military. More complex tactics, discipline and coordination demanded training establishments and non-commissioned officers and subalterns to attend them and command the smaller formations in battle. Nobility could not rely on birth to prepare them for modern warfare and required training themselves. Military schools started to appear such as the Military Training Academy in Sedan established by duc de Boullon in 1606 and the Kriegs und Ritterschule was established by Johan of Nassau at Siegen in 1617. </span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[19] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> A permanent force led to a greater professionalisation of the military: year-round training, practice and deployment occupied forces. The new tactics subordinated the role of the individual and inculcated a new identity within the national military. The need for things such as permanent barracks, rules and discipline combined with regular pay and a career model for non-commissioned officers and officers, such as described in the English New Model Army in 1645, sowed the seeds for the modern professional military.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[20] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> The state arguably benefitted from this subordination of the individual and increased association of the military to the Crown as it supported the growing political trend of Absolutism in Europe. Changes in the large armies may be reflected in broader society.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">In Western European society there had been an increasing movement from the lower classes away from serfdom toward maintaining the rights and opportunities granted during the Black Death.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[21] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> The lesser-nobility was subordinated far more to the Crown and did not monopolise military service. The chance of financial gain from service in mercenary group or later in the standing armies and the prospect of a career path was a great opportunity for the lower classes. The cavalry and artillery became more accessible and the need for more forces over long times suited the desire of many European lower classes to serve.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[22] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">  </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Swedes and to a lesser degree the Spanish, generated conscription-based armies and reduced their reliance on mercenaries. This was not welcomed by many of the European powers who were worried of arming the lower classes. Parrott highlighted that most states would employ mercenary groups and private regiments at least at the beginning of the Thirty Year War.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[23] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> However, these mercenaries were more often directly employed by the Crown and not through a middle-person, while still expensive, this created greater reliance and control. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Gustavus conscripted from the landed peasantry, gave regular pay or the promise of land at the completion of service. The emerging soldier was well trained, well equipped and, more importantly had a common tie to fellow soldiers and the nation they fought for.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[24] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> This moral component of fighting power provided the Swedes with a significant edge over mercenary armies and clearly demonstrated this with the campaign into Germany in 1630. These better equipped, trained and permanent forces were also some of the largest armies fielded in history.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Rise of Large, Standing Armies and the State</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The establishment of large standing armies and an increased monopoly on violence by the state (embodied as the Crown) was a key characteristic of warfare during this time. The growth in Armies was dramatic. For example, at the beginning of the Thirty Years War the imperial forces numbered 20 000 and the Protestant enemy at 12 000. By the end the Catholic forces under command were approximately 150 000 and the Swedish army was even larger.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[25] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> The factors that account for this change includes tactical changes in fortifications, changing strategic ambitions, the bureaucracy and economics of war.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Parker attributes much of the growth to the adoption of the </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">trace italienne</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, the complex fortress towns that were a response to the improvements in artillery and infantry tactics.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[26] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> These fortifications towns were too large to bypass without a threat to flanks and rear, instead they required large forces to besiege them and other forces to observe and cut off reinforcements. Similarly, the fortress needed large garrisons and guns to man the defences. Those Western European nations that did adopt the</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> trace italienne</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> found much of their force was locked in various garrison duties rather than manoeuvre.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[27] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> This is not the only cause of the growth of armies. Many nations, small and large could not, or did not, embark on expanded fortress towns due to construction and garrison costs.   </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Tactically the </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">tercios</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> and Swiss columns presented a strong defensive capability, large forces were required to counter these formations through double envelopment or flanking attack.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[28] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">  So tactics and technology influenced the growth of armies, but it was not the sole factor. Another was in the growing strategic ambitions of government and rulers. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Western European major powers entered the period trying to consolidate or expand their sovereign territory by absorbing or removing independent dutches and indigenous aristocracy.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[29] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> As a result, the number of nations in Western Europe was diminishing, but they were populous and had borders with competing powers that required protection. Previously they were dealing with internal security issues or smaller duchies, they now expanded the strategic horizon beyond their borders into Europe at large and the New World. This kind of strategic manoeuvre demanded larger forces and an all year preparedness to deal with the threat. Western European powers were therefore required to raise large, standing forces to meet the other power, therefore mass, and not quality of troops became a valued factor in military success.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[30] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The removal of the feudal contracts enabled the Crown to continue conflict without reference to others and this set conditions for the protracted wars that had to be sustained.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[31] </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Of greater long-term significance was the effect of these large, expensive forces. Although infantry was much cheaper than other forms of troops, the numbers were enormous and artillery and cavalry along with the supporting logistics were expensive total to build and maintain. The State (Crown) was the only entity that could be expected to fund warfare in this period. It demanded the State bureaucratise the military administration and link it inextricably to the economy of a Europe constantly at war.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[32] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> The military was now part of state bureaucracy, first in Spain, then Sweden and France and would spread to other major powers throughout the period.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[33] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> The expansion of the taxation systems to fund wars, rules governing contributions of both homeland and occupied territories. Economics began to dictate strategy.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[34] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Securing territories offset the pressures of supporting an Army within the homeland. The strain on inadequate logistics systems often dictated that manoeuvre was to be to where a force could sustain itself and not necessarily the political objective. Increased taxes and forced contributions also caused internal tensions and by the </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">17</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">th</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> century, the military was required to police their own nations, arguably another driver for larger forces under the Crown.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[35] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> What was clear is that by the end of the </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">17</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">th</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Century the Western European powers had a monopoly on violence and the economy, setting the conditions further for the rise of the Absolutism. This growing demand on the people was reflected in societal changes in parts of Western Europe.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">In a societal sense, the proletarianization of the soldier with expanding opportunities for the lower classes to seek social advancement and wealth, particularly with later reforms in pay made conscription and military career more attractive.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[36] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The pool of potential soldiers had expanded not just through acquisition of territory, but the improved health and wealth of the Europeans.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[37] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The sense of violence and deep division from the reformation and counter-reformation, fuelled the passions of Europeans and sustained a willingness to support war, even with heavy handed taxation and acquisition policy. But changes in land warfare were not the only characteristic of the period. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Emerging Naval Capabilities</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The period also saw a significant change on the conduct of war at sea. Major nations would change ship design to incorporate cannon. Specialised ships of war were built instead of arming or merchant galleys and maritime tactics for battle began to change. Instead of a short exchange of cannon followed by ramming and grappling to allow boarding, ships adopted a line-ahead formation, bringing to bear a broadside gun line to great effect. The line-ahead tactics was used for the first time in European waters in 1639, at the Battle of the Downs, where the Dutch won a major victory over Spain.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[38] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The drivers for this change was the enhanced trade opportunities from the New World and shift in the strategic ambition of states. The advancement in ship building techniques allowed maritime nations to push further into the New World, and exploit this for trade and wealth. By the </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">16</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">th</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> century advanced ship building techniques allowed European strategic horizons to change. Where previously this was about focussed on control the Mediterranean it was now able to apply force across the oceans in order to reap the benefits in trade and wealth from the New World, India and the East Indies. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">This increased competition for trade and the threat violence around the Channel, off the Spanish Main and Indian Ocean, whether from other European navies, the Barbary corsairs or the Ottomans galley fleets.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[39] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> International trade conflicts erupted into war (including at sea) such as the numerous Anglo-Spanish Wars and the three Anglo Dutch wars of the </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">17</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">th</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Century.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[40] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> The secondary effect from economic and strategic opportunity drove the building of specialised warships and adoption of new tactics at sea.  </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Nations started to expand fleets form centralised</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Royal</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Navies due to the cost and the risk to national economy. This was the case with Henry VIII and Philip II. The Spanish under Philip II increased the size of their galley fleet to 146 ships by 1574; a three-fold increase in a dozen years.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[41] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> This reflected the state monopoly on violence and the economy that was occurring on land.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">This period of time was focussed on warfare: changes in the size of forces, employment of new means of fighting; the professionalisation of the military; and growing control of the state, but had the nature of war changed? </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Revolutionary or Evolutionary Warfare</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Do these changes in warfare constitute a ‘military revolution’? This was the term used by Roberts in his thesis and has been reformed and expanded by historians such as Parker.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[42] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> The term, ‘revolution’ is commonly used to classify a number of periods that mark changes in the conduct of war.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[43] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The word ‘revolution’ implies a relatively sudden and fundamental change in the nature of something. Within the concepts of political revolution, it refers to a sharp, violent and fundamental change in the nature of the political system that has immediate ramifications across all aspects of that society.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[44] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> From a military perspective Krepinevich offers a definition,</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-left: 35.99999999999999pt;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> ‘the recognition, over some relatively brief period, that the character of conflict has changed dramatically, requiring equally dramatic - if not radical - changes in military doctrine and organizations’</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[45] </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The temporal aspect of the ‘military revolution’ started with a 100-year window defined by Roberts from 1560 to 1660. This has been expanded by other authors to cover at least two hundred or more years.  This is not a ‘brief period’ and could be interpreted as more an ‘evolutionary’ step. In trying to define an acceptable time frame, Rogers suggests the temporal aspect of ‘revolution’ should be a single generation.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[46] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">  </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The other test is if these events changed the fundamental nature of warfare. Some of the tactical adaptations in tactics by the Dutch and Swedes were based on Roman and Greek tactical formations. The concepts of standing Armies also echo the Roman practice.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[47] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> The evolution of the </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">trace italiaenne,</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> whilst a departure from vertical defences, was the evolutionary response to improved artillery penetration and infantry skills. Other changes were new and impressive; the professionalisation of the military, the size of forces, control by the state and the growth of naval power.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Throughout the period the very nature of war that we took from Clausewitz had not changed, only its character.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[48] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> This character was an important contribution to the development of modern warfare and should not be dismissed, but it should not be considered ‘revolutionary’.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Rogers provides an alternate approach which is both practical and applicable to a series of events in the development of warfare. He borrows the term ‘punctuated equilibrium’ from biology.</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[49] </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> This term describes a steady evolution of a systems with periods of radical acceleration and development. This appears to be a better description of this period and those before and after it.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Conclusion</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">16</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">th</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> and </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">17</span><span style="font-size:6.6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">th</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> century was a period of significant change in the character of war. The drivers accounting for these changes were not all based in military reforms, despite Western Europe being engaged almost continuously in war. While tactical applications is interesting, it was the beginnings of some profound changes in the development of warfare; the professional military, the standing army, scale of warfare and subsequent emergence of the state (Crown) owning the monopoly on violence and the arrival of proper naval forces.  Despite these changes, this was not a true ‘revolution’. It did not change the fundamental nature of war and unfolded over a prolonged period of over 200 years. This was, however, an accelerated change in the character of war, a spike on the punctuated equilibrium of warfare’s ongoing evolution. </span></p> <p> </p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[1] Peter G Tsouras, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Warriors Words. A Quotation Book, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Cassell, London, 1992, p62</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[2] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-9cc239fd-7fff-0e94-85f5-e5228a3086ef" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Michael Roberts, lecture delivered before The Queen's University of Belfast on 21 January 1955</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[3] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-713dcb74-7fff-5703-a05b-fa27f6c41f3e" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Geoffrey Parker, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Military Revolution, Military innovation and the rise of the West 1500-1800, Cambridge Press</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, 1996</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[4] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-545adbeb-7fff-aa0f-8e85-44dc52471fa7" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Jeremy Black, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">European Warfare in a Global Context 1660-1815</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">. Routledge Taylor &amp; Francis Group, 2006</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">p 7</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[5] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-6695ca00-7fff-bb6e-77db-101f83d80dcb" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Carl von Clausewitz, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">On War</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds), Princeton University press, New Jersey, 1989, pp 75-87</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[6] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-c74659af-7fff-f8bf-5d14-ff1af239a607" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">bid, p 89.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[7] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-d6f06cc3-7fff-4b41-4328-0ac123860d66" style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Jan Angstrom, Introduction, in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (eds), </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Rethinking the Nature of War</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, Frank Cass, 2004, p 2.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[8] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-a1d0b51c-7fff-b591-7d0e-4b8b40f8306b" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Ibid.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" id="docs-internal-guid-b6dbe349-7fff-cca6-5263-3b6bae0d2a68" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[9] </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Geoffrey Parker, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Military Revolution, Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, Cambridge Press, 1996, pp 6-24.</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> </span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">C. J. Rogers, The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years' War. </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Journal of Military History</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, 57(2), (1993). 241. Retrieved from</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#555555;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> </span><a href="https://search-proquest-com.wwwproxy1.library.unsw.edu.au/docview/1296634056?accountid=12763" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">https://search-proquest-com.wwwproxy1.library.unsw.edu.au/docview/1296634056?accountid=12763</span></a><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#555555;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">p 244-45</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#555555;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">. </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Rogers highlights that he sees the preceding period the infantry and artillery revolutions from 1300-1500 as the key period technological advancement in gunpowder weapons.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[10] </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Jeremy Black, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">War - Past Present &amp; Future</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, Sutton Publishing, London, 2000, p 94-95.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[11] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-aa01a3cf-7fff-dbe6-605e-8b6237076fbb" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Gabor Ágoston, "Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution, 1450-1800.", </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Journal of World History</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> 25, no. 1 (2014), </span><a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/43286061" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">http://www.jstor.org/stable/43286061</span></a><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, pp 93-98. Of note, despite the well-equipped Janissary and large artillery formations, the Turks did not adopt tactics that supported use very well and were divided by cultural groupings that prevented true modernisation.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[12] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-db0d1fcd-7fff-3069-fb18-37f3efeb14de" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Black, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">War - Past Present &amp; Future</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, Sutton, pp 96-99.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[13] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-d8d236e0-7fff-aa79-72ec-279540848dee" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions." </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The National Interest</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, no. 37 (1994): 30-42. </span><a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/42896863" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">http://www.jstor.org/stable/42896863</span></a><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, p 36.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[14] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-6b96b2aa-7fff-0c8f-6adb-92c3d89207fd" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Michael Roberts, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Essays in Swedish History</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#3a3a3a;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Weidenfeld &amp; Nicolson, London,</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> 1967, pp 195-197</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[15] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-acc445f5-7fff-64d6-fc5d-4d30e5e6b0e4" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The pike remained a relevant weapon for this period, but the first bayonets started to appear by the mid-</span><span id="docs-internal-guid-acc445f5-7fff-64d6-fc5d-4d30e5e6b0e4" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">17</span><span style="font-size:6pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">th</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> century and would be the weapon to eventually replace the pike.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[16] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-a4acdb9f-7fff-fcc6-1dab-a8c9c539f443" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Roberts, Michael. </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Essays in Swedish History</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#3a3a3a;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Weidenfeld &amp; Nicolson, London,</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> 1967, p 196</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[17] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-7f3323bd-7fff-5d36-e940-8d6f8a57a4ae" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">John Childs, ‘The Military Revolution I, The Transition to Modern Warfare’, in Townshend, Charles (ed). </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern War</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, p 24.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[18] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-e4d772b3-7fff-ca22-e0b1-218c427a6355" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Ibid.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[19] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-17d0aba9-7fff-2258-fa7b-1f466c287ece" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> John Childs, ‘The Military Revolution I, The Transition to Modern Warfare’, Chap 2 in Townshend, Charles (ed). </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern War</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, p 32-33.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[20] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-d223e47f-7fff-6ebc-b9ef-24aeaeea18ae" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Ibid,</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">p 32.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[21] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-e4e81832-7fff-eecd-384c-4c8364768b81" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Brian M. Downing, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Military Revolution and Political Change, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1992, p 65.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[22] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-cf9fb50c-7fff-4446-4488-696b870130f5" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Roberts, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Essays in Swedish History</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, pp 209-211.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[23] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-149f1018-7fff-986b-bca4-940b9a6d5c45" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> David A Parrott, ‘Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years’ War: The ‘Military Revolution’ in</span><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:'Helvetica Neue',sans-serif;color:#555555;background-color:#ffffff;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Rogers, Clifford J (ed). </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Military Revolution Debate: Readings On The Military Transformation Of Early Modern Europe</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. Accessed October 23, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, p 81.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[24] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-8f530f6f-7fff-def3-4858-712dfa41f000" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">John Keegan and Andrew Wheatcroft, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Who’s Who in Military History from 1453</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, Hong Kong, 1987, p 143.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[25] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-31e7cc88-7fff-345b-9cdc-a7c51c010a66" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Downing, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Military Revolution and Political Change, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">p 68.</span></p> <p><span id="docs-internal-guid-edf1e024-7fff-6f7e-af4d-ce005bfd8a10" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[26] Parker, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Military Revolution, Military innovation and the rise of the West 1500-1800</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, p 24.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[27] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-34ab5fb9-7fff-ca63-f719-d92e2dd90a2b" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Geoffrey Parker, ‘In Defense of the Military Revolution’, in Clifford J Rogers (ed). </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Military Revolution Debate: Readings On The Military Transformation Of Early Modern Europe</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. Accessed October 23, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, pp 1561-1562.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[28] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-a9501792-7fff-13bf-ea5c-faabfbba2957" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Downing, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Military Revolution and Political Change</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, p 68.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[29] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-d9d3854b-7fff-6a37-1d45-da9ac7a8fdeb" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Ibid, p 65.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[30] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-17467d48-7fff-6c27-2d93-d16616b1354c" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Ibid, p 68. </span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[31] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-9c0534e0-7fff-cbb9-6e72-83705e6eb6b5" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Ibid, p 69.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[32] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-e38d8d16-7fff-1739-5d47-f1c90e305f67" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Childs, The Military Revolution I, p 30.</span></p> <p><span id="docs-internal-guid-b5b967c9-7fff-449c-6fce-b343f5363422" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[33] Ibid, pp 31-32.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[34] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-083bd2ad-7fff-9bd4-31ff-f54afae04a48" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Ibid, p 21.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[35] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-0bdb766c-7fff-f3b2-5c18-9774ea310641" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Ibid, p 31.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[36] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-1dca9404-7fff-30db-23ed-09cec042775a" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Ibid, p 21.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[37] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-b24102e4-7fff-7372-70f5-2c6896f0f0f1" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Ibid.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[38] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-ae243a60-7fff-c34f-db39-3bb79208e63e" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Black, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">European Warfare in a Global Context 1660-1815</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, p 7.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[39] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-05860476-7fff-2b29-1040-3129944e95c1" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Paul Kennedy, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, Fontana Press, London, 1989, p 57.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[40] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-49aeb86a-7fff-debe-5f26-21e845baae0f" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Downing, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Military Revolution and Political Change,</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> p 65.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[41] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-f71c42e0-7fff-33ba-c852-3ef549458354" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Kennedy, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, p 58.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[42] </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Roberts, Michael. "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660." In </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, Taylor and Francis, 2018. </span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Parker, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Military Revolution, Military innovation and the rise of the West 1500-1800</span></p> <p><span id="docs-internal-guid-eb50dc4c-7fff-e98b-c51a-b5f4b0c0609a" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[43] For example </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-95339dc3-7fff-d4d7-1947-e5d4381e3dd8" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">– ‘the infantry revolution’, ‘the artillery revolution’, ‘the revolution in military affairs’</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[44] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-962ae7d3-7fff-2933-69d5-38f5c0ecaf02" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Examples are the French, Russian, Cuban and Chinese revolutions. While the pre-conditions for revolution brew for some time the act of revolution itself is short and fundamental changes across all aspects of society start to occur almost immediately. </span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[45] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-c68e2649-7fff-a61f-6648-b751edd03c70" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Andrew F Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions." </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The National Interest</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, no. 37 (1994): 30-42. </span><a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/42896863" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">http://www.jstor.org/stable/42896863</span></a><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, p 30.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[46] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-e3c3aa6f-7fff-e639-d6ee-ffde82df7571" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">C. J. Rogers, ‘The military revolutions of the hundred years' war.</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> The Journal of Military History, 57</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">(2), (1993). 241. Retrieved from </span><a href="https://search-proquest-com.wwwproxy1.library.unsw.edu.au/docview/1296634056?accountid=12763" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">https://search-proquest-com.wwwproxy1.library.unsw.edu.au/docview/1296634056?accountid=12763</span></a><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, p 276.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[47] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-b62d8dc4-7fff-255f-e97a-13656fa3ef72" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Downing, </span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Military Revolution and Political Change,</span><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> pp 73-74. </span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[48] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-fc904a4c-7fff-6269-9251-c11b1138157c" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">There is currently a debate within some professional military professionals and academics that the coming of autonomous systems, robotics and artificial intelligence is the first credible military revolution. In that these adapted systems may remove the human from within the nature of war, the passions of hatred, danger, fear and courage. Effectively nullifying a part of the trinity. Without these passions there is a credible chance that the theoretical unlimited of violence through war may be sought.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">[49] </span><span id="docs-internal-guid-6e478f67-7fff-9d13-5382-55652a72987d" style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Rogers, ‘The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years' War’, p 277.</span></p> <p> </p> <p dir="ltr" id="docs-internal-guid-4ed19910-7fff-3833-7e78-a8a2dc06d60f" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:8pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Bibliography – Major Essay</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Ágoston, Gabor. "Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution, 1450-1800." </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Journal of World History</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> 25, no. 1 (2014): 85-124. </span><a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/43286061" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">http://www.jstor.org/stable/43286061</span></a><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Black, Jeremy. </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">War - Past Present &amp; Future</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">. Sutton Publishing. London. 2000. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Black, Jeremy. </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">European Warfare in a Global Context 1660-1815</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#333333;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">. Routledge Taylor &amp; Francis Group. 2006.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Childs, John. ‘The Military Revolution I, The Transition to Modern Warfare’. Chapter 2 in Townshend, Charles (ed). </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern War</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">. Oxford University Press. New York. 1997.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Clausewitz, Carl von. </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">On War</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds). 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"The Military Revolution, 1560-1660." In </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Military Revolution Debate: Readings </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, Taylor and Francis, 2018.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Rogers, C. J. The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years' War. </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Journal of Military History</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">. 57(2). 1993. Retrieved from</span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#555555;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> </span><a href="https://search-proquest-com.wwwproxy1.library.unsw.edu.au/docview/1296634056?accountid=12763" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">https://search-proquest-com.wwwproxy1.library.unsw.edu.au/docview/1296634056?accountid=12763</span></a></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.295;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Tsouras, Peter G. </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Warriors Words: A Quotation Book. </span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Cassell. London. 1992.</span></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>[i]</p> </div> <div class="topic-wrapper"> <h2 class="field-label-above">Topics</h2> <a href="/core-study-areas/command-leadership-and-ethics" hreflang="en">Command Leadership and Ethics</a> <a href="/core-study-areas/applied-military-history" hreflang="en">Applied Military history</a> </div> <div><div class="share-wrapper"> <p class="text-upper letter-spacing">Share</p> <div class="share-links"><a class="close share-link"><i class="fal fa-times"></i></a><a href="https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/changes-warfare-16th-and-17th-centuries-military-revolution" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-facebook-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Facebook</span></a> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&amp;url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/changes-warfare-16th-and-17th-centuries-military-revolution" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-linkedin"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to LinkedIn</span></a> <a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/changes-warfare-16th-and-17th-centuries-military-revolution" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-twitter-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Twitter</span></a> <a href="mailto:?subject=Changes in warfare in the 16th and 17th centuries - a ‘military revolution’?;body=Read this article on https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/changes-warfare-16th-and-17th-centuries-military-revolution" class="share-link"><i class="fas fa-envelope-open-text"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post via email</span></i></a></div> </div></div> </div> Mon, 22 Jul 2019 10:26:42 +0000 mark.lynch@defence.gov.au 246 at https://theforge.defence.gov.au Balancing the Science and Art of Warfare https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/balancing-science-and-art-warfare <div class="contextual-region node node--type-publication node--view-mode-rss ds-1col clearfix"> <div data-contextual-id="node:node=241:changed=1559776223&amp;ds_bundle=publication&amp;ds_view_mode=default&amp;langcode=en" data-contextual-token="LaWGrjKoBv7FXbjHO0jG1J1VsEWCPyNZKdJPYQ6mv9Q"></div> <div class="author-wrapper"> <div class="field-label-inline">Author:</div> CDRE Peter Leavy </div> <hr> <div><p>This is an updated version of an article first published online by the US Naval Institute in March 2018.  See <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/march/get-balance-between-art-and-science-maritime-warfare-right">https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/march/get-balance-between-art-and-science-maritime-warfare-right</a>)  Reprinted from Proceedings with permission; Copyright © (2018)<br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> During 2017 the US Navy suffered two fatal ship collisions which prompted discussion on how the US Navy trains and prepares its Surface Warfare Officers.  While the US Navy’s review was focused on ship maintenance practices along with the mariner skills and experience levels of their people (the “how” they prepare) it is just as important to review “what” and “why” when looking at how warfare officers are trained, educated and prepared to deal with the contemporary environment. While this article focuses on the Navy, the fundamental basics that must underpin how Navy’s Warfare Officers need to be prepared are just as important for the Army and RAAF.</p> <p>Navy’s Warfare Officers need the ability to both <em>operate</em> at sea (mariner skills) and to <em>fight</em> at sea (warfare skills).  Operating at sea is difficult and dangerous, part art and part science, and is unlikely be distilled into a formula or fully automated any time soon. It takes training, experience, and practice in foundation skills such as shiphandling, terrestrial and astro navigation, blind pilotage, collision avoidance, damage control, emergency procedures, and a working knowledge of the ship’s engineering plant to be a successful mariner. Technology certainly makes life at sea easier and safer than ever before, but there is an art to seafaring that can only be learned through experience and mentorship.</p> <p>For any navy, however, operating ships at sea is only a means to an end. Navies exist to fight and win at sea, and Warfare Officers need to fight their ship while simultaneously navigating them; warfare skills and mariner skills respectively.  Both these skillsets have always had elements of science (the navy is a technical service) and art (because warfare is a human endeavour) which naval professionals have had to master.  My argument is that contemporary developments are making the art of warfare more diverse and challenging while the science of warfare is enabling greater automation of weapons and sensor employment.  Consequently, warfare officers need a greater focus on the art of warfare, while not losing their ability to understand the technology that underpins the science.</p> <p>As the US led, western dominance at sea and in the air is challenged for the first time since the Cold War, a shift in focus is necessary, both to be successful in any fight and, just as importantly, to be a credible deterrent. The realities of today’s environment mean navies need to do much more than just prepare for high-end combat operations against a peer competitor. Sea control always has been the <em>raison d’être</em> for navies but the <em>way</em> to achieve it today has been fundamentally altered by the nature of our competitors and by technology.</p> <p>Threats to national security during previous great power struggles were primarily state based, using traditional military capabilities and were waged against clearly defined enemies across the maritime, land, and air domains. Today is markedly different, with a multitude of both state and non-state actors using a variety of tools to challenge national interests in myriad ways. National security threats now are ubiquitous across the electromagnetic, space, cyberspace, social media, and information domains, in addition to the physical environments. They are propagated by a variety of actors—sometimes coordinated and sometimes not—who operate below the threshold that would invite a traditional military response, and are ever-present. In short, grey-zone operations are the new normal.</p> <p>The South China Sea provides a great example.  China has successfully managed to expand its maritime influence through island building and militarization despite international legal rulings against its behaviour.  China’s creeping influence has been insidious and gradual, using the People's Liberation Army - Navy (PLAN), coast guard, fishing fleets, information warfare, and diplomatic pressure to achieve its aim. This is the nature of grey-zone operations; operate below the radar and push the envelope to the point where there starts to be push-back and then they ease off – for a while.</p> <p>In a sense, the challenges of grey-zone maritime activities are similar to those that armies have long faced in counterinsurgency operations, where the opposition is a mix of military and civilians intermingled, blending with normal, daily activities making it difficult to maintain situational awareness and to know whose activities are legitimate and whose are not. In short, the three-block war has gone to sea and is here to stay.</p> <p>As a consequence, the fundamental skill contemporary Warfare Officers need is to understand the totality of the environment they are operating in (physically, politically, and militarily) and the ability to make decisions —not the mechanical execution of a weapon engagement. Once a decision is made to engage, the mechanics of conducting the engagement is increasingly becoming automated. Computers are good at firing and controlling weapons—that is science. But warfare is a human activity that is as much art as science and the decision making (who to engage and when) is a much more subjective, difficult and dynamic problem than executing the mechanical weapon engagement process once that decision is made. I am not suggesting our Warfare teams don’t need to be technologically literate; they certainly must understand the technology they are using, but that is only a subset of the skills they need.</p> <p>In the future, ships, aircraft, and submarines will operate in a continual grey-zone environment where maintaining situational awareness (SA) will be <em>the</em> task our to which warfare teams must be devoted.  Operations Room teams must be building SA through operating organic sensors, fusing information from other network sensors, and incorporating their own knowledge and understanding along with intelligence products. In addition to what is happening in real time, our warfare teams also must be well schooled in the culture and mindset of all potential adversaries to better provide context to what they are seeing. This can only be achieved by reading, studying, and debating all aspects of the geopolitical environment and by operating in the likely operating areas to build our collective experience base. We need exercises that create decision making dilemmas to practice our warfare teams in building SA and producing a holistic understanding of the threats they face.</p> <p>Consequently, we need to review the balance between the art and science of maritime warfare. My Principle Warfare Officer training (undertaken in 1993), for example, was heavily focused on threat parameters, weapon engagements and standard operating procedures, on the assumption that the enemy would be clear and once the ROE threshold was met we would be able to engage.  Our training was heavily focused on executing that engagement.  That is not a criticism – it was appropriate for the state of technology and the likely threats at the time.<br /><br />  <br /><br /> Today, however, we need to practice decision making in difficult, ambiguous, and confusing circumstances, and take independent action when needed. Of course, ambiguity and confusion have always been elements of warfare, but the scope and complexity that today’s warfare teams face is different to previous eras where it was primarily at the tactical level.  Today’s military activities have immediate operational and strategic impacts that previous generations didn’t due to the rapid flow of information and in many situations the tactical confusion that previous generations faced has reduced thanks to technology.  In the words of Geoffrey Till, maritime warfare is moving from being akin to poker, where the opponent’s cards are not known, to chess, where all pieces are visible to all players.  In short, tactical ambiguity and confusion has been replaced with the much more consequential operational and strategic ambiguity and confusion.</p> <p>Standard operating procedures and repetitive drills can only do so much. It is important that Warfare Officers develop that “sixth sense” or “feeling in the water” that only comes from the right mix of training, education and experience.  In addition to understanding the technology they are using, they must be culturally astute, be across geopolitical developments and current affairs (which are extremely dynamic) and have a solid understanding of Australia’s strategic and national interests. This is the only way warfare teams will be able to distil what they see, what they know, and what they are told into an accurate understanding of the totality of what they face and be able to react accordingly in this period of continual grey-zone operations.</p> <p>While the consequences from the US Navy’s fatal accidents in 2017 are being used to improve the mariner skills focus within the US Navy, mariner skills are only a means (albeit a vital one) to an end. The end is to be able to fight and win at sea. The nature of the fight has changed markedly over the last three decades and we must understand exactly what we want our contemporary and future warfare professionals to be able to do. Historically navies have (quite righty) focused on the tactical skills of weapons and sensor operation, SOPs and tactics.  While these skills remain vital, technology is increasingly doing much of the ‘science’ of weapons and sensor employment, allowing the human greater scope to concentrate on the human (art) aspects of warfare.  We must ensure we capitalise on this opportunity to best prepare our warfare teams for the reality they face.</p> <p> <br /><br /> Commodore Leavy is currently the Commandant of the Australian Defence Force Academy.  He is a Principle Warfare Officer who undertook his PWO course in 1993.  He has commanded HMAS <em>Stuart</em> and HMAS <em>Sydney</em> and spent three years as Commodore Warfare at Fleet Headquarters.</p> <p> </p> </div> <div class="topic-wrapper"> <h2 class="field-label-above">Topics</h2> <a href="/core-study-areas/operational-logistics" hreflang="en">Operational Logistics</a> </div> <div><div class="share-wrapper"> <p class="text-upper letter-spacing">Share</p> <div class="share-links"><a class="close share-link"><i class="fal fa-times"></i></a><a href="https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/balancing-science-and-art-warfare" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-facebook-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Facebook</span></a> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&amp;url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/balancing-science-and-art-warfare" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-linkedin"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to LinkedIn</span></a> <a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/balancing-science-and-art-warfare" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-twitter-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Twitter</span></a> <a href="mailto:?subject=Balancing the Science and Art of Warfare;body=Read this article on https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/balancing-science-and-art-warfare" class="share-link"><i class="fas fa-envelope-open-text"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post via email</span></i></a></div> </div></div> </div> Wed, 05 Jun 2019 23:10:23 +0000 mark.lynch@defence.gov.au 241 at https://theforge.defence.gov.au Mobilisation in the Information Technology Era https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/mobilisation-information-technology-era <div class="contextual-region node node--type-publication node--view-mode-rss ds-1col clearfix"> <div data-contextual-id="node:node=240:changed=1559567534&amp;ds_bundle=publication&amp;ds_view_mode=default&amp;langcode=en" data-contextual-token="nui9mHFDgQyiviYpyzI4deVg2LU97aYmxlgdcg0dEiM"></div> <div class="author-wrapper"> <div class="field-label-inline">Author:</div> Peter Layton </div> <hr> <div><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Artificial intelligence, big data, virtual reality, robotics, cloud computing.  The information technology (IT) revolution rolls on, progressively changing the world.  The revolution is most obvious to us professionally in areas like the digital battlespace and fifth generation warfare concepts but also individually in our smart phones, chat rooms and social media accounts.  There is however, an overlooked area where these aspects intersect and that is mobilization. It’s a dry term albeit fundamental. Mobilization involves “being ready to execute a specific operation”. It’s at the core of everything the ADF does.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Mention mobilisation and people instantly think of world wars, gigantic factories churning out military hardware on a vast scale and society wide conscription. In reality, any ADF operation were more personnel, money or material is required than the normal peacetime rate of effort involves some </span><a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADDP/ADDP_00_2_preparedness_and_mobilisation.pdf" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">form of mobilisation</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">: selective, partial, within government or national. It’s simply the process of moving from preparedness to being able to undertake and complete a particular operation.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The IT revolution has now reached a stage where it could potentially markedly change how the ADF thinks of, prepares for and undertakes mobilisation. That’s the good news. Worryingly there is also a dark side where hostile states or non-state actors could now use mobilisation as a weapon against us.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The upside is embodied in the </span><a href="http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/PDF-Files/Contemporary%20AirPower/AP36-Prototype-Warfare-and-the-Fourth-Industrial-Age-Peter-Layton.pdf" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">emerging fourth industrial revolution</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> (4IR).  With the 4IR cluster of hyper-connected IT technologies, ADF personnel could directly design or request one-of-a-kind items on the internet, electronically pass this to an advanced manufacturing plant, negotiate schedules, arrange delivery and manage on-going maintenance and sustainment. This is the exciting world of three-D printing where production batch sizes can be small or on-demand without impacting production efficiency. </span><a href="https://3dprint.com/210788/marines-3dp-replacement-parts/" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">F-35 stealth fighter parts</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> and </span><a href="https://3dprint.com/86114/israelis-3d-printers-robots/" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">drones</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> are being produced this way while the US Naval Air Systems Command has already approved </span><a href="https://3dprintingindustry.com/news/u-s-navy-will-rely-1000-3d-printed-parts-end-2018-131910/" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">some 1000 printed parts</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> for fleet use. With the fourth industrial revolution, units in </span><a href="https://defensesystems.com/articles/2017/05/08/marinecorpprint.aspx" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">the field</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, at </span><a href="https://www.southampton.ac.uk/news/2016/04/sulsa-uav-royal-navy-antartica.page" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">sea</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> or when deployed to distant bases could print their own spares, becoming semi-independent of the logistics supply chain. Maintenance spares resupply might become a connectivity issue, not a transportation one.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The </span><a href="https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/prototype-warfare-fourth-industrial-age" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">concept of prototype warfare</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> extends these notions into being able to optimise the equipment being manufactured on an almost continuous basis. The time lag between new challenges arising and technological responses to these could drop dramatically. Intriguingly, this might not just be mobilising for strategic challenges but </span><a href="https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-path-to-prototype-warfare/" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">also tactical ones</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">: “consider the implications if a commander had the ability to select from a catalogue of weapon systems while planning for a mission and they were manufactured based on her specifications.” </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">However, there are issues. 4IR involves extensive networking and close integration between all participants including across national boundaries, company and bureaucratic hierarchies and life-cycle phases. Such collaboration requires using common standards but there is no agreement on these. The outlook is for several 4IR ‘islands’ across the globe each with different standards that will not necessarily interconnect seamlessly. The ADF’s mix of US, European and Australian defence equipment may create some real 4IR interface problems. These might be best addressed early on in the acquisition and initial logistic support phases of bringing new equipment into service.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Moreover, printing equipment and parts to order may be technically feasible but will the original equipment manufacturers allow their intellectual property to be used in such a way? They may prefer the ADF wait several months – or even years- to allow them to supply required spares. Support contracts would need reconceptualising to take full advantage of the 4IR mobilisation possibilities. The converse probably also holds: the equipment acquired will need to be designed and built under 4IR to provide the optimum mobilisation potential. Mobilisation demands might drive our future force structure. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Thinking more broadly, the issue with intellectual property is that companies don’t want their competitors to learn their trade secrets. The ADF though is not a business competitor.  Companies might agree to license the ADF to hold and use 4IR digital data on all the spares able to be rapidly replicated to </span><a href="https://3dprintingindustry.com/news/navy-requests-23m-funding-for-3d-printing-in-fy2020-152306/" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">the appropriate certified standard</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> using advanced manufacturing techniques. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Importantly, holding such data in Australia would help overcome worries about timely global connectivity – including from cyber attack - in times of conflict. Its’ use though might be problematic as items from a very large number of companies might need manufacturing. To sufficiently reassure all the various companies about IP protection, the ADF might need to build and operate its own advanced manufacturing facility: a back to the future vision of reinvented national arsenals? </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">On the negative side of the IT revolution is that external powers can use the new technologies to prevent Australian governments’ mobilising the public to support ADF military operations. Worse, these powers could try to mobilise the Australian people against the government or the ADF. Both could be achieved by meddling in Australian society through accessing our personal devices and social media pages. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">There seem three broad types of strategy an attacker might use with simplest being inducing chaos. The </span><a href="https://apo.org.au/node/211311" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Russian approach</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> is to amplify divisive social issues by employing a wide-ranging disinformation attack across a nation’s political spectrum. Whether any particular groups are supportive of Russian policies is irrelevant, the aim is instead to drive them to being </span><a href="https://apo.org.au/node/211296" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">more confrontational</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> towards others.</span><span style="font-size:7.199999999999998pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> </span><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">  </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The second strategy is supporting some useful domestic group albeit technically harder.  Now however, </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/01/cambridge-analytica-big-data-facebook-trump-voters" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">big data</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, artificial intelligence and social media is making </span><a href="https://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">large-scale manipulation</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> of sizeable interest groups feasible. This is all quantitatively quite different to the small-scale targeting of susceptible individuals by ISIS using human-intensive techniques. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The third and most difficult strategy is changing people’s minds. This strategy includes </span><a href="https://home.gwu.edu/~finnemor/articles/1998_norms_io.pdf" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">acting top-down</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> through ideational leaders and here big data, data mining, micro-targeting and </span><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-27/fake-news-part-one/10308638" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">deep fakes</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> offer new technological solutions to locating and influencing key individuals. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The Russians have always thought deeply about military affairs and how to exploit technological developments and changes in the character of war. Now they are focussing on mobilising the people against their governments. Drawing on perceived lessons from the Arab Spring and the colour revolutions, </span><a href="https://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Russian thinkers contend</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> countries can now be readily destabilised, almost on command. In early March Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov </span><a href="http://redstar.ru/vektory-razvitiya-voennoj-strategii/?attempt=2#content" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">declared that</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">: “The information sphere…provides opportunities for remote, covert influence...on the population of the country, directly affecting the state’s national security. That is why the study of issues of preparation and conduct of informational actions is the most important task of [contemporary] military science.”(Google Translate)</span><span style="font-size:7.199999999999998pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:super;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Talking about social mobilisation may seem arcane.  However, with external social disruption operations seemingly likely for the foreseeable future, thought needs to be given to responses. Greater efforts to build legitimacy and craft persuasive strategic narratives may be needed. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Our fundamental ideas about mobilisation are being challenged under the impact of the IT revolution. Impacting all of us, this is an area deserving our close attention.</span></p> <p> </p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Dr Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University and a RAAF Reserve Group Captain. He has extensive aviation and defence experience and, for his work at the Pentagon on force structure matters was awarded the US Secretary of Defense’s Exceptional Public Service Medal. He has a doctorate from the University of New South Wales on grand strategy and has taught on the topic at the Eisenhower College, US National Defence University. For his academic work, he was awarded a Fellowship to the European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy. He is the author of the book </span><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Grand-Strategy-Peter-Layton/dp/0648279308" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#0000ff;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Grand Strategy</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">.</span><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">  </span></p> <p><br /><br />  </p> </div> <div class="topic-wrapper"> <h2 class="field-label-above">Topics</h2> <a href="/core-study-areas/application-technology-operations" hreflang="en">Application of Technology for Operations</a> </div> <div><div class="share-wrapper"> <p class="text-upper letter-spacing">Share</p> <div class="share-links"><a class="close share-link"><i class="fal fa-times"></i></a><a href="https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/mobilisation-information-technology-era" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-facebook-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Facebook</span></a> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&amp;url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/mobilisation-information-technology-era" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-linkedin"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to LinkedIn</span></a> <a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/mobilisation-information-technology-era" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-twitter-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Twitter</span></a> <a href="mailto:?subject=Mobilisation in the Information Technology Era;body=Read this article on https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/mobilisation-information-technology-era" class="share-link"><i class="fas fa-envelope-open-text"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post via email</span></i></a></div> </div></div> </div> Mon, 03 Jun 2019 13:12:14 +0000 mark.lynch@defence.gov.au 240 at https://theforge.defence.gov.au Autonomous Systems, Auftragstaktik, and Governance. https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/autonomous-systems-auftragstaktik-and-governance <div class="contextual-region node node--type-publication node--view-mode-rss ds-1col clearfix"> <div data-contextual-id="node:node=239:changed=1559209477&amp;ds_bundle=publication&amp;ds_view_mode=default&amp;langcode=en" data-contextual-token="-l8cb7rHHVfxCRAbyupAgu-dadYNiUEu2erxKCe8RCo"></div> <div class="author-wrapper"> <div class="field-label-inline">Author:</div> GPCAPT Mark A. McCallum </div> <hr> <div><p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The opportunities and risks associated with the emerging application of artificial intelligence and autonomous systems technologies have been subject to much hype, hope and hysteria. Major powers such as the</span><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#1155cc;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> United States</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> and </span><a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/the-pursuit-of-ai-is-more-than-an-arms-race" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#1155cc;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">China</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> have made explicit statements regarding the importance of these technologies to their future security and prosperity. Regarding artificial intelligence, even </span><a href="https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/4/16251226/russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#1155cc;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Vladimir Putin</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> went so far as to state that, “Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” Consequently, all these nations are investing heavily in associated areas of research. Conversely, special </span><a href="https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#1155cc;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">interest groups</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> and </span><a href="https://futureoflife.org/2018/04/30/lethal-autonomous-weapons-an-update-from-the-united-nations/?cn-reloaded=1" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#1155cc;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">some nations</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> are calling for a ban on the weaponisation of these technologies. How, and to what degree, should the Australian Defence Force leverage the opportunities these technologies might offer in a way that is consistent with the Australian way of war and the expectations of the public it protects. A good place to start might be to replicate the current governance mechanisms that are the foundation of the success of the ADF and most modern militaries. As we will discover, behind our mission successes and capability superiorities are frameworks of accountability and associated governance mechanisms that underpin and ensure the performance of almost every aspect of a modern military.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">What are ‘autonomous systems’?</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Despite the conceptual enthusiasm for autonomous systems, or maybe because of it, the definition of terms, and language used to describe these systems has been quite loose. Unmanned systems are often described as robots, and automatic systems often are described as autonomous. If we are to understand, debate, or effectively employ autonomous systems, we must first be more precise in our use of language when discussing these systems. As </span><a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-319-64816-3" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0563c1;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Devitt describes</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">, an autonomous system can be: a robot – being an AI embedded within a system that acts in the physical world, or an artificial intelligence computer application or program manipulating information without human control. An autonomous system can also be a sub-system within a more extensive system contributing to the function and actions of the broader system, where the more extensive system may even be predominately a human system. Even in these circumstances, by definition, an autonomous system operates without human control. Additionally, we need to define what we mean by autonomy. The definition offered by </span><a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4867784/" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0563c1;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Abbass et al.</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0563c1;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">,</span><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> being; ‘Autonomy is the freedom to make decisions subject to, and sometimes in spite of, environmental constraints according to the internal laws and values that govern the autonomous agent,’ is useful for our considerations.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Overview of </span><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:italic;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Auftragstaktik</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">In response to being defeated by Napoleon, the Prussians developed the concept of </span><a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&amp;lr=&amp;id=HrZvCwAAQBAJ&amp;oi=fnd&amp;pg=PT4&amp;dq=history+of+Auftragstaktik&amp;ots=wMP-LN1RwV&amp;sig=WFplhccrmBWEU1VL9MAmMRx0Myc#v=onepage&amp;q=history%20of%20Auftragstaktik&amp;f=false" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0563c1;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Auftragstaktik</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0563c1;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">,</span><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> or mission command. The concept subsequently, and famously, brought success to the Germans during the Blitzkrieg of World War II. Through the decentralisation of military command, Auftragstaktik allowed German forces to conduct a rapid manoeuvre warfare that led to tactical victory. Mission command allows for independent actions to deliver coordinated, cooperative and cumulative effects in the battlespace that are consistent with an overall mission objective. Consequently, mission command has become the hallmark of modern warfare and is the command concept of choice for successful modern militaries including the Australian Defence Force. Until this operational concept is supplanted autonomous systems will also need to integrate with this way of war. Though, if we are to develop autonomous systems that can integrate with mission command based operations we must first understand what allows us to successfully implement the mission command concept with human centric systems. The </span><a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADDP/ADDP_00_1_Command_and_Control.pdf" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0563c1;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Australian Defence Force’s command and control doctrine</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> states:</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;text-indent: -36pt;padding:0pt 0pt 0pt 36pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Mission command requires a high level of mutual trust at all levels of command which can only be achieved through intensive, realistic training. Subordinates are trusted by being allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions, and commanders should keep control to a minimum so as not to constrain their subordinates’ freedom of action.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The publication goes on to highlight; ‘The key to this is mutual trust and confidence amongst commanders, one of the pre-requisites of mission command.’ I doubt anyone would argue against the criticality of mutual trust to the success of a military force. Trust theoreticians </span><a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0149206312439327" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0563c1;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> Fulmer and Gelfand</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> consider trust to have two components, ‘…positive expectations of trust-worthiness, which generally refers to perceptions, beliefs, or expectations about the trustee’s intention and being able to rely on the trustee, and willingness to accept vulnerability, which generally refers to a suspension of uncertainty.’ Therefore, to successfully integrate autonomous systems into ADF operations we must generate positive expectations of trustworthiness and reliability in these systems, and the willingness to accept the consequences of their use. These trust effects will need to be established at all levels, from the operators in the field fighting alongside of the autonomous systems through to command at the highest levels. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Governance, mission command, and autonomous systems</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">If we are to ever effectively utilise an autonomous system, the willingness to accept of the associated vulnerability is the crux of the issue at hand. Can we expect those who will rely on the autonomous system for their combat success or survival to fully trust an autonomous system? Additionally, how will those who delegate their authority to an autonomous system, and be held to account for the outcome, establish a level of trust in the system sufficient to do so?</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">The most productive, and likely most successful, path to building human trust levels in fielded autonomous systems will be to replicate the way we currently build trust in each other. Unless we intend to only field fully autonomous forces with like systems, and without humans, we will need to replicate a level of trust in those systems that is consistent with the consequences of the autonomous systems failure in their mission. Humans and machines already exist in trust relationships. It is currently one sided, in the humans trust the machine. We trust our technology to perform in the way it was designed to. This trust is largely based on centuries of engineering developments and generations of experience with the products that result from these engineering practices. Given its recent emergence as an novel application of existing technologies, humans will be comfortable trusting some aspects of the machine such as mechanical reliability. However, where we are choosing to replace human attributes with machine processes, it will be harder to establish trust.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">With humans, achieving the level of trust required for mission command is the consequence of systems of governance that assure, ensure, validate and verify the performance of every element of the capability systems, including the human elements. These systems of governance ensure it is reasonable to expect a certain behaviours and level of performance, as identified by Fulmer and Gelfand, required to establish trust. Thus, to integrate autonomous systems into existing capability systems, without undermining the performance of our current systems, will require appropriate systems of governance.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">So, how does governance enable mission command, and therefore, how should we govern autonomous systems? Governance has three elements, compliance, conformance, and performance. Compliance ensures that documented processes and procedures are consistent with higher instructions. Conformance ensures that the behaviour of the elements within a system conforms to the documented processes and procedures. And Performance ensures that the system is delivering the effects that it is supposed to. Commitment to establishing and maintaining these elements of governance arises from the accountability that goes with the authority for the systems that are governed, and an understanding of the value delivered by systems of governance to a capability system. It is only possible for senior leadership to accept the exposure to personal liability for outcomes they were not directly involved in as they have confidence and trust in the systems of governance that assure and ensure the safe and effective conduct of operations.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">For a model that could deliver these effects to the governance of autonomous systems, we could do worse than looking to those systems employed for the </span><a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/DASP/" style="text-decoration:none;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#0563c1;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:underline;-webkit-text-decoration-skip:none;text-decoration-skip-ink:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">governance of military aviation</span></a><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;"> within the Australian Defence Force. Like a modern aircraft, an autonomous system is a highly technical and complicated machine, made up of hardware and software, where its operation could impact the safety of personnel. Military aviation has deep institutional knowledge about the governance of systems made up of both hardware, software, and human components. From a technical perspective, there already exists standards of design, build, and maintenance that could be applied to autonomous systems.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Like most military functions the operational or human side of aviation is also highly governed. Like the technical elements of the system, the human components have analogous standards of design, build, and maintenance captured in recruiting and training standards, career temporal discipline models that continue to improve qualifications and competency of aircrew, and testing regimes that ensure ongoing currency and competency. In an aviation system, the technical and operational elements are mostly separate, the engineering world looks after technical governance, and the operational world looks after human operational governance. However, an autonomous system may rely on machine learning techniques and it may continue to learn while being employed. Thus, the use of machine learning techniques to build autonomous systems creates an overlap between the technical and operational governance responsibilities. This overlap highlights a functional gap in the suitability of current governance systems if applied to autonomous systems.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">As autonomous systems are also trained, they will need systems of governance analogous to human training systems. To establish systems that can fill this governance gap will require entirely new functions and authorities within Defence. These new functions and authorities will need to design and approve training, testing, and validation data sets used for machine learning. Like their human counterparts, autonomous systems might also need qualification and categorisation schemes and regular testing to ensure they continue to perform to the required standard for the missions or tasks they are about to undertake as they continue to learn or the context they leant within have changed. </span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">There are significant tasks ahead if we are to employ truly autonomous systems alongside humans operationally. A common refrain from senior leadership is their faith that millennials and digital natives will embrace the application of artificial intelligence and autonomous systems. The assumption being that they grew up with this technology so they will happily rely on it in future operations. Though whenever I am told about how much the world is changing, I look for ways that it isn’t. One of the constants in the world is us and our biology. Even with the rapid advance of technology and our sophisticated ideas, we are still just highly evolved great apes that share the same physical and cognitive shortcomings, emotional responses to stress and social imperatives as those who came generations before. Current generations may trust artificial intelligence to recommend a movie or order an Uber to deliver a pizza. However, when they’re personally liable for an outcome or their life is on the line, they might prefer to turn to established social bonds of trust and shared consequence, rather than confidence in the coding and technology of a system whose behaviour is determined by different and likely alien motivations. Only time will tell if we can develop governance systems robust enough to overcome millennia of evolution and social conditioning to trust life and limb and personal liability to the choices of a machine.</span></p> <p dir="ltr" style="line-height:1.2;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:12pt;"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre;white-space:pre-wrap;">Although for some, the term governance is uttered with distain, governance, and its consequential effects underpins and enables mission command. Governance is as responsible for the effectiveness and successes of modern militaries as is superior firepower or the brilliant manoeuvres and creative genius of their commanders. It is the cornerstone of achieving and maintaining a capability superiority. On battlefields of the future, where autonomous systems fight alongside humans, victory might not go to the side who can build the most sophisticated artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, but those who can best govern them.</span></p> </div> <div class="topic-wrapper"> <h2 class="field-label-above">Topics</h2> <a href="/core-study-areas/application-technology-operations" hreflang="en">Application of Technology for Operations</a> </div> <div><div class="share-wrapper"> <p class="text-upper letter-spacing">Share</p> <div class="share-links"><a class="close share-link"><i class="fal fa-times"></i></a><a href="https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/autonomous-systems-auftragstaktik-and-governance" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-facebook-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Facebook</span></a> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&amp;url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/autonomous-systems-auftragstaktik-and-governance" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-linkedin"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to LinkedIn</span></a> <a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/autonomous-systems-auftragstaktik-and-governance" class="share-link"><i class="fab fa-twitter-square"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post to Twitter</span></a> <a href="mailto:?subject=Autonomous Systems, Auftragstaktik, and Governance.;body=Read this article on https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/autonomous-systems-auftragstaktik-and-governance" class="share-link"><i class="fas fa-envelope-open-text"></i><span class="sr-only">share this post via email</span></i></a></div> </div></div> </div> Thu, 30 May 2019 06:00:21 +0000 mark.lynch@defence.gov.au 239 at https://theforge.defence.gov.au