AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

Command

Edition 1

ADF PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE

Command

0 Series | Command

Edition 1

Australian Defence Force – Philosophical – 0 *Command*, Edition 1 is issued for use by the Australian Defence Force and is effective forthwith. This publication supersedes ADF-P-0 *Command and Control*, Edition 2.

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Preface

1.   Military doctrine describes fundamental principles that guide actions by armed forces to achieve their objectives. While authoritative, doctrine requires judgement in application.

2.   Australian Defence Force (ADF) doctrine describes principles that guide the employment and operational effectiveness of a joint force. ADF doctrine publications are designed to concisely describe these principles, and so promote coordinated actions in support of missions and the commander's intent. ADF doctrine publications are written at several levels—capstone, philosophical, integration and application.

3.   The content of this publication has been derived from general principles and doctrine contained in other relevant publications, Defence manuals, and allied publications and agreements. Every opportunity should be taken by users of this publication to examine its content for applicability and currency. The Doctrine Directorate invites assistance from you, the reader, to improve this publication. Please report any deficiencies, errors or potential amendments.

4.   **Aim.** ADF-P-0 *Command* codifies the ADF thinking on command. It provides a foundation for understanding command and the related subject of control. It should be used as a guide for the training and development of ADF commanders.

5.   **Audience.** While this publication is for use by ADF members regardless of rank or appointment, the primary audience are the O4 and O5 ranks. It is the principal text for those charged with instruction and training in command.

6.   **Scope.** This is the first edition of this publication. It replaces, in part, ADF-P-0 *Command and Control*, Edition 2. This publication provides philosophical-level guidance on command. While it includes some practical advice, its primary focus is on how to think about command. Significantly, it marks a change for the ADF, moving away from the unitary concept of mission command towards the concept of command on a spectrum. It includes discussion on command accountability which addresses a shortcoming in doctrine identified

by the Afghanistan Inquiry. It addresses the theory of control and the relationship between command and control. This publication is not intended to be the sole source of information on command, or control, but rather it provides a foundation to encourage further study and discussion.

Amendments

Proposals to amend ADF-P-0 *Command* may be sent to:

Deputy Director Doctrine
Doctrine Directorate
Joint Warfare Development Branch
Russell Offices
PO Box 7909 | Canberra BC | ACT 2610

[Doctrine Directorate](#)

Amendment number	Chapter(s)	Amendment	Effected date

Doctrine publication hierarchy

The hierarchy of ADF doctrine, and the latest electronic versions of all ADF doctrine publications, are available on:

> *Defence Protected Network [Defence Doctrine Library](http://drnet/vcdf/ADF-Doctrine/Pages/ADF-Doctrine-Library.aspx)*
> *(http://drnet/vcdf/ADF-Doctrine/Pages/ADF-Doctrine-Library.aspx)*

> and

> *Defence Secret Network [Defence Doctrine Library](http://collab.defence.gov.au/vcdf/org/FDD-FID-MSCD/CITEB/doctrine/SitePages/home.aspx)*
> *(http://collab.defence.gov.au/vcdf/org/FDD-FID-MSCD/CITEB/doctrine/SitePages/home.aspx).*

Contents

List of figures

List of tables

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Chapter 1 –
Introduction

Know this

1.1   Let us be clear, there is no more challenging role in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) than to command in war.

1.2   War transports us into the blackest corner of human activity. Unspeakable things happen. As a member of the ADF, you will plan and direct operations that may result in the death and maiming of your own forces, those of your opponent, and of innocent civilians—all of which are counted and reported on.

1.3   The moral dilemmas are confronting and often incommunicable. Once involved in the killing of other humans, your soul will be affected to its core. Yet you have a responsibility to set, and will be held accountable for, the moral standards of your command.

1.4   Your problems are complex and the information and the resources to solve them easily are rarely available. You are deprived of sleep and exhaustion becomes a familiar companion.

1.5   You will be challenged physically, intellectually and morally.

1.6   To be successful you will need to strain every sinew of your competence, flex every muscle of your courage, and draw on every drop of your humanity.

1.7   To be successful is what your command needs and what the ADF and your country expect. This publication is intended to help you command successfully.

What is command?

> **Command**
>
> The authority which a commander in the military lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.[1]

1.8   At its fundamental level, to command is to direct with authority. It is to think and to make judgements. It is to decide what those commanded will and will not do.

1.9   To command is to assume responsibility for taking and saving human lives. It is to direct how human beings will conduct themselves towards each other. It demands moral standards be set and obeyed. Whether commanding during times of war or in peacetime—in Safety of Life at Sea activities or disaster response, for example—you will draw upon the same skills and training.

1.10   To command, therefore, is to think and decide, to feel and moralise, to act and to exercise power.[2]

1.11   Command is informed by science but its practice is an art. It requires judgement and depends on actions only human beings can perform, despite the advance of technology. The art of command comprises the creative and skilful exercise of authority through timely decision-making and leadership.

1.12   Commanders use judgement gained from experience and training to make decisions, delegate authority, determine the appropriate degree of control, and allocate resources. Proficiency in the art of command stems from years of education, self-development, reflection, and operational and training experiences. It also requires a deep understanding of the science of war.

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[1]   The terms command (legal authority), leadership (art of influence) and management (science of risk/resource decision-making), are interrelated but distinct; commanders exercise all three. See ADF-P-0 *ADF Leadership*, for more detailed discussion.

[2]   Nye, R 2002, *The challenge of command*, Perigree, New York.

1.13   Command is personal. The authority to command is given to an individual, not an institution or group. The level of responsibility given to, and the accountability expected of, the commander is greater than any other individual under command. The commander is responsible, and accountable, for what their command, ship or unit does or fails to do.

1.14   Command can be lonely. Loneliness lies in the deliberate, measured decisions that commanders must make without the support of superiors or subordinates. The commander alone carries the weight of their decisions.

1.15   The basic techniques of command do not change with more senior and larger commands. However, direct leadership within a command decreases as the level of command increases. Commanders prepare for higher command by developing and exercising their skills when commanding at lower levels.

Chapter 2 –
The nature of command

Introduction

2.1   There are five elements that constitute the nature of command. These are responsibility, authority, decision-making, leadership and accountability. Three of these elements are what the commander has: responsibility, authority and accountability. The remaining two are the essence of what a commander does: makes decisions and leads.

What the commander has

2.2   To perform their duty, commanders are given responsibility and authority. In return, they are held accountable for the outcomes of their actions and the manner in which those outcomes were achieved.

2.3   The concepts of responsibility, authority and accountability are inextricably associated with one another. It is difficult to speak of one without reference to the other two. Responsibility means an individual is expected to perform their duty in a satisfactory manner based upon commonly accepted standards.

2.4   The most common evidence that such an expectation exists is the anticipation that the responsible individual is answerable—that is, accountable—for the outcome. A necessary precondition is that the responsible individual has the power and ability to do what is expected on the basis of some recognised authority. In the absence of authority and accountability, it is difficult to see how responsibility can exist.

Responsibility

2.5   Commanders are legally and ethically responsible for both the decisions they make and the decisions they do not make. They are also ethically—and can be legally—responsible, for the actions, accomplishments and failures of the force under their command.

Commanders may delegate some or all of the responsibility for the tasks necessary to accomplish their mission, but overall responsibility remains with the commander.

2.6   Command responsibilities include: mission accomplishment; the health, welfare, safety, morale and discipline of subordinates; the use and maintenance of resources; and the conduct of operations in a lawful and ethical manner. In most cases, these responsibilities do not conflict. However, the responsibility for mission accomplishment sometimes conflicts with the responsibility for subordinates or the stewardship of resources.

2.7   The importance of the mission will inform you of how much risk to personnel and equipment you should be prepared to accept. In training, and when there is conflict between the three, personnel generally come before concerns for resources, and concerns for resources generally come before mission accomplishment. On operations, when there is conflict between the three, mission accomplishment generally comes before personnel, and personnel come before concerns for resources. You should work to keep such conflicts to a minimum.

Authority

2.8   Authority is the right and power to judge, act or command. Legal authority to direct, coordinate and control assigned military forces is a key aspect of command and distinguishes military commanders from all other Australian Defence Force (ADF) appointments.

2.9   The *Defence Act 1903* (Section 9) gives authority for the exercise of command of the ADF to the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF). CDF assigns command authority to other commanders, as required, to assist in the exercise of that responsibility. This is enacted through Charter Letters to Service and Joint Chiefs, who are then variously authorised to recommend, select, certify and appoint commanding officers and commanders within their chain of command.

2.10   The *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982* underwrites the chain of command and assigns important procedural roles to senior commanders. The legal and regulatory authorities vested in

commanders are often further enhanced by specific powers granted under the authority of higher commanders. Including, but not limited to, the authority to initiate and impose administrative sanctions.

2.11   Commanders may delegate authority to subordinates to accomplish a mission or assist in fulfilling their duties. When working in a higher headquarters, this includes delegating authority to members of their staffs. Delegation allows subordinates to decide and act for you, or in your name, in specified areas. When delegating authority, you remain accountable for mission accomplishment, for the lives and care of your subordinates, and for effectively using assigned resources. You should, therefore, exercise considered judgement in determining how much authority to delegate.

2.12   Beyond legal authority, commanders also understand that operations affect and are affected by human interactions. So you also need to establish personal authority. Your personal authority will reinforce your legal authority. Personal authority is derived from the trust and confidence generated by your actions as a commander. You can build personal authority by upholding laws, being ethical in your conduct and decisions, applying leadership principles and demonstrating professional mastery.

Accountability

2.13   Accountability is the acceptance of the outcomes of action or inaction. Commanders are both recognised and accountable for what happens on their watch, regardless of their personal knowledge, contribution or fault. The performance of a military organisation is a reflection of the performance of the commander.

2.14   There is a tendency to assume accountability is about punishment. Sometimes it is but mostly it is not. Most errors do not arise from malice or unambiguous negligence. Misunderstood expectations or a gap between capability and expectations are the more usual causes. These cannot be fixed by punishment or micromanagement, in fact both of those responses will be harmful to your command. They are best addressed by clarifying understanding and developing and aligning capability with expectations.

2.15   Accountability is not limited to commanders; it extends to all members of the ADF. As in all law, ADF personnel may be responsible

for crimes they commit, whether in Australia or while serving overseas. However, military commanders are also accountable for the action or inaction of the forces under their command. Given the unique role of command in war, both the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and the Commonwealth *Criminal Code Act 1995* have provisions for military command accountability.

2.16   Commanders may be criminally responsible for the actions of their subordinates if they fail to exercise control properly over those subordinates. Under the Commonwealth *Criminal Code Act 1995*, the commander will be responsible where they knew, or owing to the circumstances at the time were reckless as to whether, the subordinate was committing or about to commit a breach of LOAC; and failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to either prevent or repress the commission of a breach of LOAC or report the matter to an appropriate investigative authority.

2.17   There is a nexus between unaddressed misconduct among military personnel and the subsequent commission of war crimes. The maintenance of good order and discipline is essential to upholding the ideals entrenched in the LOAC. Negligent supervision and failure to punish wrongs, both in training and on operations, can have a spiralling effect on lawlessness and inhumane behaviour. By failing to address early—sometimes minor—misconduct, a commander contributes to the degradation of the rule of law, which commonly lies at the root of most criminal acts or human rights violations committed in war, and undermines the commander's personal and moral authority.

2.18   But the ADF requires more than compliance with the law. It requires all members of the ADF to display the discipline, judgement and training that their duties require and the nation expects. Accountability is critical to the good order and discipline of the force. Failure to enforce it will undermine the morale and effectiveness of a command and weaken the trust between the ADF and the Australian people.

2.19   In exercising responsible command, your duty as a commander is to display, uphold and enforce accountability. If you have set clear expectations and they are not being met then you need to do something. When there is a clear transgression of the law, unethical behaviour or professional negligence, then you should not

hesitate to use the resources available to you as commander, including the *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982*, to hold the transgressor accountable.

2.20   Excessive enforcement, however, can create a culture of fear of failure and stifle initiative. This is as problematic as doing nothing. Getting the balance between insufficient action and too much action is necessary—and part of the art of command.

2.21   Perhaps your most important duty to accountability is to hold yourself accountable. If something goes wrong in your command, the responsibility lies with you. You should put up your hand and take ownership of the problem. Even if your action, or inaction, was not a direct contributing factor you must accept command accountability for the problem and its correction.

2.22   Here is how the Commander of United States Central Command (CENTCOM) held himself accountable for a failure in his command.

A raid conducted by US forces in Yemen in 2017 against Al Qaeda resulted in the death of a serviceman, the loss of an aircraft, and civilian casualties. With no obvious benefit from the mission and criticism of its clarity of purpose, the raid came to be seen as an unnecessary failure.

In the wake of building criticism and in public testimony the Commander said:

'First and foremost, I am responsible for this mission. I am the CENTCOM commander and I am responsible for what's done in my region and what's not done in my region. So I accept the responsibility for this. We lost a lot on this operation. We lost a valued operator. We had people wounded. We caused civilian casualties, we lost an expensive aircraft. We have made a determination based on our best information available that we did

cause casualties, somewhere between four and 12 casualties, that I accept responsibility for.'[3]

2.23   Accepting personal accountability can be difficult to do, and it is easy to rationalise that the blame lies elsewhere. But accepting accountability is a step commanders need to take. If you do not accept accountability for failure, you risk losing your moral authority to command. Subordinates, rightly, expect their leaders to demonstrate moral courage in the face of disappointment, error or failure. If you fail this expectation of courage, you will lose the respect and trust of those you lead.

2.24   Without trust, subordinates become less transparent, collaborative, honest and ultimately less engaged. They can begin to doubt the sincerity of our values—which you are meant to exemplify—and may even begin to question the basis on which they serve their country.

2.25   Fear is often the reason why leaders shy away from accountability; fear of failure, fear of seeming incompetent, fear of the judgement or consequences that might follow. Each time you take counsel of those fears and fail to accept accountability, your credibility as a commander diminishes. Each time you overcome those fears, accept accountability and work to fix the problem, your credibility as a commander grows.

2.26   Those who accept personal accountability are judged not so much for the initial failure, unless it was demonstrable negligence, but rather for their strength of character in owning it. Those who do not accept accountability are judged both for the initial failure and for a shortcoming in their character.

2.27   Command accountability is an onerous standard. The commander is held accountable for almost everything that occurs under their command. The sanctions for accountable failure can be significant. They include removal from command, court martial,

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[3]   Transcript from the testimony of General Joseph Votel, Commander United States Central Command, to the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 March 2017, Washington DC.

dismissal from the ADF, even being put on trial in an Australian or international court.

2.28   Such accountability can appear cruel when applied to good and well-intentioned commanders. Nevertheless, the acceptance of personal accountability is what instils confidence and trust in our commanders. Our sailors, soldiers and aviators will not keep trust in leaders who feel themselves beyond accountability. Neither will the Australian people.

What the commander does

Makes decisions

2.29   Your decisions as a commander ultimately guide the actions of your force, unit or ship. The success, or otherwise, of these actions will depend on the decisions you make.

2.30   Decision-making involves applying both the science and the art of war. Many aspects of military operations—ammunition usage, movement rates, fuel consumption, weapons effects—can be reduced to numbers, calculations and tables. They belong to the science of war and are important to understanding what is possible with the resources available. Other aspects—such as the impact of leadership, the complexity of operations, and uncertainty about an adversary—belong to the art of war. To be effective, you must be good at both the science and the art. That said, the better you are at the art of war, the more likely you are to be a successful commander.

2.31   Decision-making is about selecting a course of action that is most likely to lead to mission success. Decision-making can be deliberate, using formal planning processes with the staff, or done quickly by the commander alone.

2.32   Decision-making requires knowing if, when and what to decide as well as understanding the consequences of that decision. Critical to decision-making is your ability to make decisions without perfect information, knowing when you have sufficient information to make a decision, and your willingness to act on imperfect information. Striking the balance between acting now with imperfect information and acting later with better information is essential to

the art of command. Whatever balance you settle on, your decision-making needs to move at the speed of relevance.

Makes decisions: builds an understanding

2.33   Before commencing the decision-making process, you will need to build an understanding of the situation you are facing. And you should strive to maintain situational understanding throughout an operation. You achieve this understanding by applying analysis and judgement to available and relevant information. It allows you to make effective decisions and regulate the actions of your force with plans appropriate for the situation. It enables you to assess operations accurately.

2.34   As a situation evolves, maintaining situational understanding and working through periods of reduced understanding will help sustain operational tempo. Uncertainty is normal, and its absence is rare. You will need to train both yourself and your team to function in uncertain environments.

2.35   An ongoing task is to transform data, which can be overwhelming in its quantity, into relevant information that in turn creates understanding. The process of turning data into understanding is examined in Chapter 4.

2.36   Understanding is knowing enough about the situation to change it by taking action. Judgement is based on experience, expertise, and intuition. Ideally, true understanding should be the basis for decisions. However, uncertainty and timeliness will usually preclude arriving at a complete understanding before it is necessary to decide and act.

2.37   Managing information will be a key challenge for you as a commander. It is not the amount of information that matters. What matters is having the right information available at the right time and in the right place. Your guidance and your commander's critical information requirements will focus the staff and resources to achieve that, and support decision-making. It is the commander's business to take charge of information management.

Makes decisions: engages in analytic and intuitive decision-making

2.38   The defining features of decision-making for you as a commander are uncertainty and timeliness. They exert significant influence. All decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty. Theoretically you can reduce uncertainty by getting more information, but the effort to decrease uncertainty occurs at the expense of time, energy and sometimes morale.

2.39   There are two basic theories on how people make decisions. The traditional view is decision-making is an analytical process based on generating several different options, comparing all the options according to some set of criteria, and identifying the best option. The basic idea is that comparing multiple options concurrently will produce the optimal solution. As a result, analytical decision-making tends to be methodical and time consuming. Theoretically, experience is not necessary for effective analytical decision-making, because the power of reasoning is enough.

2.40   The other basic approach, intuitive decision-making, rejects the computational approach of the analytical method and instead relies on the intuitive ability of an experienced commander (and their staff) to recognise the key elements of a particular problem and arrive at a reasonable decision. Intuitive decision-making thus replaces methodical analysis with an intuitive skill for pattern recognition based on experience and judgement.

2.41   The intuitive approach focuses on situation assessment instead of on the comparison of multiple options. Intuitive decision-making aims to satisfy—finding the first solution which will satisfactorily solve the problem—rather than optimising the solution as the analytical approach attempts to do.

2.42   The intuitive approach is based on the belief that as the conduct of operations is more of an art than a science, there is no absolutely right answer to any problem. Intuitive decision-making is also founded on the belief that because the judgement of the commander has been honed by experience, training and reflection, they will generate a workable first solution, making the generation of a range of other possible courses unnecessary.

2.43   Intuitive decision-making is faster than analytical decision-making because it does not involve comparing a variety of options. If time permits, the commander may further evaluate their decision. If the first decision proves defective, the commander can move to the next reasonable solution.

2.44   Each approach has different strengths and weaknesses. Determining which approach is better in a given situation depends on the nature of the situation, particularly on the availability of time and information.

2.45   The analytical approach may be appropriate for pre-deployment decisions or contingency planning, when time is not a limiting factor and extensive information can be gathered. It may be useful in situations in which it is necessary to document or justify a decision or in decisions requiring complicated computations which simply cannot be done intuitively—such as in making decisions about supply rates. It may be appropriate when choosing from several existing alternatives—such as in equipment acquisition.

2.46   An analytical approach has merit in situations in which commanders are inexperienced or in which they face problems they have not experienced previously. It may also have merit in activities where time may not be critical. However, the intuitive approach is generally more appropriate for the majority of typical tactical or operational decisions—decisions made in the fluid, rapidly changing conditions of war when time and uncertainty are critical factors and creativity is a desirable trait.

2.47   We associate intuitive decision-making with rapid, time-sensitive planning and analytical decision-making with deliberate planning. This is often, but not always, the case. For example, a thorough, deliberate planning effort in advance of a crisis can provide the situational understanding that allows a commander to exercise effective intuitive decision-making.

2.48   Whether done rapidly or deliberately, effective planning requires a sensitive awareness and judicious use of time. If enough time is available, there can be little excuse for not planning adequately. A joint task force commander, who has several days to prepare for an amphibious landing yet hastily develops an ill-conceived ship-to-shore plan is no better than the army combat

team commander who spends an hour deliberately developing a detailed plan in the heat of battle when seconds matter. Just because time may be available does not mean that we should use it to develop lengthy, detailed directives. Elaborateness and details are not generally measures of effective plans. Directives should convey the minimum amount of instruction necessary for execution. They should be as clear, simple and concise as each situation requires and permits.

2.49   Conversely, the analytical approach of developing and selecting from several courses of action may be done rapidly. The point is that the planning model or process you choose, and the decision-making approach that supports it, should be based upon the situation, the time available, and the knowledge and situational understanding of your force.

2.50   While the two approaches to decision-making are conceptually distinct, they are rarely mutually exclusive in practice. When time is not critical, you should use an analytical approach or incorporate analysis into your intuitive decisions. In situations requiring immediate decisions, such as in the heat of battle, your intuitive judgement will be required. More usually, even though time may be short, there will be opportunity to blend some analysis into an intuitive approach. Combining both approaches best accounts for the many factors that affect decisions.

2.51   It is usually best to seek as much analysis as possible within the time available. Your judgement about where risk lies should be used to guide where you should place analytical effort in the time you have available.

Makes decisions: deals with risk

2.52   Risk is part of every military endeavour. It cannot be avoided. Risk is the probability of harm to someone or something valued. You should identify and analyse risk—including ethical and legal risks—in collaboration with your staff, subordinate commanders and other partners. Consideration of risk begins with your decision or planning process.

2.53   As you consider your options, you should contemplate the risks against the perceived benefits, and assess their likelihood and potential impact.

2.54   How exposed is your command to a particular risk? What is the potential cost of a risk becoming a reality? Risks can be divided into 'high, medium, or low' depending on their likelihood and consequence to disrupt. The categorisation method is less important than the recognition that some risks present a more pressing threat than others.

2.55   Then apply your judgement regarding the importance of an objective, the time available and any anticipated costs. You will need to decide how much risk to accept and whether to tolerate, treat or transfer risk, or terminate the mission.

2.56   In applying judgement, ask yourself: who holds, or owns, the risk? If it is not yours, then do not take the decision to accept or reject it. Pass it down, or up, to the commander who should own it.

2.57   If it should be owned at lower levels and you do not pass it down, then the message you are sending is that you do not trust them. They will, as a consequence, be unsure about what risk they should accept and may become risk averse. This will limit the potential of your force.

2.58   If it should be owned further up the chain and you do not pass it up, then you may create unexpected problems for your commander. This might limit your potential!

2.59   You can reduce risk with foresight and planning. You should regularly re-examine assumptions associated with planning or other risk-related decisions.

2.60   You need to be alert to the possibility that risk can accumulate over time as operations progress, both at your own level as well as that of your subordinates. Changes in the nature of an operation, the number and types of tasks assigned, available forces, or changes in the threat may all change the level of risk subordinates are facing.

2.61   A series of discrete decisions about seemingly unrelated issues can, over time, change the level of risk in ways not readily

apparent to a commander. However, this cumulative risk may be understood by one or more subordinates directly impacted by changing conditions or new decisions. It is therefore critical that commanders, and their subordinates, clearly communicate risk concerns to both higher and lower levels to ensure shared understanding and informed decision-making.

2.62   Assumptions initially made during planning may change or compound over time, raising the level of risk. Risks that were acceptable in one context and based on one set of assumptions may be untenable when the context of the operation changes. In some instances, the situation may change to the point that a commander needs to take action to adjust the level of risk subordinate commanders are required to take, especially when the perceived benefit no longer outweighs the likely cost.

2.63   For example, an organisation performing a low-priority mission may be directed to detach some of its elements to support other efforts to the point where it can no longer effectively accomplish its mission. The higher level commander is unlikely to have sufficient situational understanding to know precisely when the threshold of acceptable risk for mission accomplishment has been crossed. Without a continuous dialogue with that subordinate commander, the commander will not understand that the risk may have evolved to an unacceptable level.

2.64   It is as much the responsibility of the subordinate to keep their commander informed as it is the responsibility of the commander to seek the risk assessment from the subordinate. Risk is explored further in Chapter 3.

Leads

2.65   All members of the ADF are expected to be able to lead. But there is no other appointment in the ADF where leadership is more central than command.

2.66   The ADF doctrine on leadership is ADF-P-0 *ADF Leadership*. It should be read in conjunction with this publication.

2.67   There is no other appointment in the ADF where character is more important than in commanders.

2.68   The ADF doctrine on character is ADF-P-0 *Character in the Profession of Arms*. It should be read in conjunction with this publication.

2.69   All members of the ADF are expected to act ethically and legally. Our commanders are our role models.

2.70   The ADF doctrine on ethics is ADF-P-0 *Military Ethics*. The ADF doctrine on LOAC is ADF-I-0 *Law of Armed Conflict*. Both should also be read in conjunction with this publication.

2.71   The fundamentals of leadership covered in ADF-P-0 *ADF Leadership* will not be repeated here. But there are some aspects of leadership, specific to command appointments, which will be reinforced.

2.72   Professional competence, character and your will as the commander represent a significant part of your organisation's combat power. While leadership requirements differ with organisation size and type, you must demonstrate character and ethical standards. You must know and understand your subordinates. You must act with courage and conviction in battle. You must build trust and teamwork. During operations you must know where to be to make decisions and to influence the operation by your personal presence.

2.73   Military operations take a toll on the moral, physical and mental stamina of the people under your command. Experience, interpersonal relationships and the environment all influence the way people respond to operations. You need to account for these factors when motivating your team to accomplish tasks in the face of danger and hardship. Setting a good personal example is critical to effective leadership.

2.74   Commanders are both leaders and followers. Being a responsible subordinate is part of being a good leader. Responsible subordinates support the chain of command and ensure their command supports the larger organisation and its purpose. Successful commanders recognise the responsibilities they and their subordinates have to the next higher commander and the larger force overall.

2.75   Commanders tackle their missions with purpose and determination. Resolution is a key quality in successful commanders. They accept risks and will push their forces to the limits of their endurance to retain the operational initiative. They act to exploit fleeting opportunities. Effective commanders recognise when to push to the limits, and when to let their people—and themselves—rest to prevent individual and collective collapse. Even the most successful combat actions can render forces to exhaustion and thereby incapable of further operations.

2.76   In order for you to do your job, you need to take care of yourself. In combat, or on extended operations, you will always be concerned with the balance between mission requirements and the wellbeing of subordinates. But neglect of your own needs, particularly rest, can harm others and the mission—sometimes disastrously.

2.77   No act of will, no degree of training, will preserve your ability to coherently make decisions, to discriminate friend from foe or a militarily useful target from a distraction, after 96 hours of sleep deprivation.

2.78   Endeavouring to be superhuman is dangerous. Insufficient self-care can lead to operational failure and physical and psychological harm to your command. You need to avoid handing your adversary such an unearned and dangerous advantage. It is your duty to take care of yourself and to expect your subordinates to do the same.

Leads: command presence

2.79   Command presence is the effect you have on those around you through your demeanour, appearance, and conduct. To establish it requires connection with others, either in person or through communication systems.

2.80   Those with effective command presence have a keen understanding of how they are perceived by others. This understanding is important. As you become more senior and your span of command expands you become increasingly reliant on others for your effectiveness. At more junior levels, it is necessary to build your understanding of how others perceive you.

2.81   Your command presence, whatever your personal style, should aim to instil confidence in your ability to lead. Your subordinates need to know that you can lead them in the most difficult of times. Your command presence plays a key role in their judgement of your ability to do that.

2.82   Do not be tempted to display excessive confidence; you will lose credibility. As you will if you provide simplistic answers to difficult problems in your endeavour to ease concerns and build confidence. Do not make the mistake of believing that being frantically busy gives a sense that you are working hard to address the challenges at hand. It does not; it just says you are frantically busy and probably unable to cope with any more problems. A calm, composed presence can set the conditions to get a force through challenging times.

2.83   Do not misunderstand your unique role in a military organisation. Your people need a commander. Earn their respect, do not pander for their friendship. Command can be lonely; understand and learn how to cope with this timeless reality.

2.84   Command presence is a powerful tool if well developed. Your command presence establishes the background climate that influences the development of plans and the way in which they are executed.

2.85   You can establish an effective command presence in a variety of ways, including:

a.   being seen and heard

b.   sharing risk and hardship

c.   being disciplined with your communication

d.   staying calm in crisis.

Leads: location of the commander

2.86   One of the fundamental dilemmas facing commanders is where to position themselves during operations. When commanding at sea or overseeing cyber operations the options are limited but when commanding joint, land or air elements there can be more to

consider. As far as conditions allow, you should be where you can be seen and heard to best influence the decisive operation or main effort.

2.87   Importantly, the location you choose should be the one from which you can best command without losing the ability to maintain situational understanding and respond to changing situations.

2.88   This may be at or near the point of contact. It may also be in an operations room, in an aircraft flying over an area of operations, on the bridge at sea, or at a critical point along the route of march.

2.89   If the critical view in a particular moment is the overall picture, you may want to be in your headquarters, piecing together the various reports from far-flung sources, or even at a higher headquarters, learning about the larger picture. Generally, it is better for you to go forward, than for your subordinates to come rearward to exchange information. And for that matter, if you are trying to get inside the mind of an adversary, who has made a bold and unexpected move that has blurred situational understanding, the best place may be sequestered from distractions, alone in your cabin with a chart, or sitting against a tree with a map.

2.90   You might start in your headquarters to piece together an overall image and supervise the development of the plan, but you should then consider moving forward to supervise execution at the critical spot, returning to headquarters only long enough to regenerate an understanding of the developing situation. The important point is that you must not feel tied to the headquarters, unable to leave it for fear of missing a valuable report. Your communications systems will help to mitigate the risk of losing access to the information and analysis of the staff.

2.91   When you leave the headquarters, it is imperative that you empower the staff to act on your behalf. They must be able to act with initiative in your absence and therefore they must understand your estimate of the situation, overall intent, and design.

2.92   When you are physically present with subordinates, you are able to assess a much broader range of indicators of your force's condition. You will sense the human aspects of conflict, particularly when fear and fatigue reduce effectiveness. You will experience the

conditions directly which might not be clearly explained by maps or weather reports.

2.93   Do not let the perceived advantages of improved information technology compromise your obligation to personally lead by example. Your presence with subordinates demonstrates a willingness to share their realities, their danger and their hardship. Be in no doubt that your physical presence, as the commander, has an impact on the morale of those you lead.

2.94   You will not, of course, always be able to be where the critical action is occurring. This reinforces the need to train your staff and subordinates to operate using mission command (discussed in Chapter 3). You can then rely on them to restore or exploit the situation without your presence or personal intervention.

2.95   Some of the factors that influence your decision on where to be include:

a.   the need to understand the situation

b.   the need to make decisions

c.   the need to communicate

d.   the need to motivate subordinates.

Chapter 3 –
The theory of command

Command exists on a spectrum

3.1   There is one clear certainty in war—there will be uncertainty. There are two basic responses to this challenge: pursue certainty as the basis for effective command; or accept uncertainty will be constant and learn to be effective in spite of it. The two responses represent the opposite ends of the spectrum of command with prescriptive command at one end and mission command at the other.

3.2   At one end of the spectrum, the command response to uncertainty is to try to minimise it by processing large amounts of information, producing detailed plans and coordination arrangements, all intended to minimise unknowns. The result is a prescriptive approach to command—known as prescriptive command. Prescriptive command is based on the belief that if we impose order and certainty on the disorder and uncertainty of war, then we are more likely to be successful.

3.3   In prescriptive command, the commander holds a tight rein, commanding by personal direction and detailed instructions. Command tends to be centralised and formal. Orders and plans are detailed and explicit. Their successful execution requires strict compliance with their details and minimises subordinate decision-making and freedom to exercise initiative. Prescriptive command emphasises hierarchical and linear information flow—generally, information flows up the chain of command and orders flow down. Discipline and coordination are imposed from above to ensure compliance with the plan.

3.4   In a system based on prescription, the command process tends to move slowly: information is fed up to the top of the chain where decision-making authority resides, and orders filter to the bottom to be executed. Such a system does not generally react well to rapidly changing situations. Nor does it function well when the flow of information is disrupted. While distrust is not an inherent

feature of prescriptive command, organisations that are characterised by distrust tend towards it.

3.5   Prescriptive command represents an attempt to overcome the uncertainty of war. Yet history has shown us that achieving precise, detailed direction that remains relevant throughout operations is not the norm. When events move quickly, as they often do on operations, prescriptive command risks losing relevance and opportunity as subordinates wait for adjusted direction. The question is whether prescriptive command can get close enough, in any given circumstance, to the desired result and achieve overall success.

3.6   At the opposite end of the command spectrum, an alternative response accepts the turbulence and uncertainty of war. Rather than chasing the level of certainty we desire, we adopt an approach that reduces the degree of certainty we need. We know that as an operation unfolds, uncertainties diminish the value of initial detailed instructions. Subordinates are not guided by unnecessarily prescriptive instructions, but by their knowledge of the mission and its purpose. Because this approach focuses on the mission, it is called mission command.[4]

3.7   In this approach, subordinates are allowed significant freedom of action, requiring them to act with disciplined initiative to achieve mission success. Discipline imposed from above is reinforced with self-discipline throughout the force. Because mission command decentralises decision-making authority, and grants subordinates significant freedom of action, it demands more of commanders at all levels and requires extensive training and education.

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[4]   The term 'mission command' is a translation of the German *auftragstaktik*. *Auftragstaktik* was a philosophical approach to command developed by the Prussian Army after studying the success of the French Army under Napoleon Bonaparte, particularly the battles of Austerlitz in 1805 and Jena in 1806.

The command spectrum

Prescriptive command			Mission command

Leadership:	Leadership:
▶ Authoritarian	▶ Persuasive
▶ Telling	▶ Delegating

Seeks:	Accepts:
▶ Certainty	▶ Uncertainty
▶ Order	▶ Unpredictability

Tends to:	Tends to:
▶ Centralisation	▶ Decentralisation
▶ Detailed orders	▶ Concise orders
▶ Slower decision and response times	▶ Faster decision and response times

Appropriate to:	Appropriate to:
▶ Science of war	▶ Art of war
▶ Technical or procedural tasks	▶ High-tempo or remote operations
▶ Low-tempo high-risk operations	

Figure 3.1: The command spectrum

3.8   Mission command tends to be decentralised and flexible. Orders and plans are as brief and concise as possible. By decentralising decision-making authority, mission command seeks to harness the initiative of as much of the force as is possible, improve the timeliness of decisions, and enhance the ability to deal with fluid and disorderly situations.

3.9   These two approaches, mission and prescriptive command, mark the theoretical extremes of a spectrum of command. In practice, no commander relies entirely on either purely prescriptive or purely mission methods. Exactly what approach you take in a particular situation will depend on a variety of factors, such as the nature of the mission, the nature and capabilities of the adversary, and perhaps most of all the qualities of our people.

Case study – First World War

In mid-1918, the Commander of the 1st Australian Corps, Lieutenant General John Monash, held a series of meetings with his staff and subordinate commanders to develop a plan to capture the village of Hamel in northern France.

Monash determined that the formations of the Corps would operate with tanks, infantry, artillery and air in a synchronised attack—a new approach. Tanks would be employed in direct support of the infantry and carrier tanks would bring supplies forward as the battle progressed. Aircraft were tasked to identify enemy dispositions, contribute to security by reporting on breaches of camouflage, attack possible German reserves, cover the noise of preparations and conduct ammunition resupply. Deception was to be employed to make the Germans believe there was no build-up on that part of the front. Smoke, fired by artillery, would be used to blind German defenders. This was to be followed by a creeping artillery barrage to cover the assaulting infantry-tank force and inhibit counterattacks during consolidation.

The plan and its execution led to a stunning success. Within 93 minutes, the 1st Corps overcame the prepared German positions and captured the hills and woods around the village of Hamel. Significantly, the casualties suffered in the attack were moderate by World War I standards. Monash's command was an outstanding feature of this battle.

There are some lessons for commanders from his approach. During planning, Monash had expressed a preference to commence the attack with tanks, followed by artillery and then infantry. However, his subordinates preferred a rolling artillery barrage and an infantry-led offensive with tanks supporting. Monash believed that both approaches were capable of achieving the mission. He chose to defer to his subordinates because he knew that by empowering them in this way he would improve the chance of success. After all, it was now their plan. This demonstrates his use of mission command.

Monash also knew that this combined arms approach was new and recognised that detailed planning and coordination were essential if it was going to work. He had experienced the confusion of fighting in Flanders in 1917, when tanks and infantry were present

together but not properly coordinated. His emphasis on details was intended to reduce confusion. When planning was complete and orders despatched, he made personal visits, three command levels down, to battalion commanders, ensuring they understood their roles. Once the enemy was engaged, he insisted there was but one plan and set of orders, and they had to be adhered to. This demonstrates his use of prescriptive command.

Monash recognised the conditions for what they were. He empowered when he could and was prescriptive when necessary.

3.10   There are circumstances in which prescriptive command is both appropriate and necessary. Such as when conducting operations in the context of heightened strategic competition where miscalculation could be calamitous. A prescriptive approach may also be necessary when conducting short-notice humanitarian support in an area with significantly different cultural norms. The complexity and risks associated with prosecuting offensive cyber operations also usually requires a more prescriptive approach.

3.11   Prescriptive command, however, is usually less effective when the environment is characterised by uncertainty and fleeting opportunities, and when judgement, creativity, and initiative are required. Furthermore, if used unnecessarily, a prescriptive approach can erode the trust that is essential to effective command. Figure 3.2 illustrates factors that should be considered when determining the best approach to take.

3.12   Militaries have frequently favoured prescriptive command but the lessons of history point to the advantages of mission command. While the commander will need to make a choice depending on the circumstances at the time, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) bias is towards mission command. It is to a more detailed explanation of mission command that we now turn.

Figure 3.2: Factors to consider when determining a mission or prescriptive command approach

Mission command

> *There will be neither time nor opportunity to do more than prescribe the several tasks of the several subordinates …. [I]f they are reluctant (afraid) to act because they are accustomed to detailed orders … if they are not habituated to think, to judge, to decide and to act for themselves … we shall be in a sorry case when the time of 'active operations' arrives.*
>
> **Admiral Ernest J. King[5]**

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[5] Letter from Admiral Ernest J King, Chief of Naval Operations, to subordinate commanders, 'Exercise of Command Excess of Detail in Orders and Instructions', dated 21 January 1941.

3.13   Mission command promotes flexibility by encouraging initiative, ingenuity, innovation, resourcefulness and devolution of authority to achieve the commander's intent.

3.14   At its foundation, the idea of mission command recognises that things will change once operations move from planning to execution. It recognises that decision-making will be slower if commanders require subordinates to keep coming back for advice each time the situation changes. Assuming they can even do so! And it recognises that speed of decision-making can be the difference between mission success and mission failure.

3.15   It acknowledges that, usually, the person best placed to make a timely decision is the one doing the job. Commanders at different levels, by virtue of their context, perspective and knowledge, will see opportunity that others at other levels may not. Mission command enables commanders—at every level—to see and exploit often fleeting opportunities as they arise. But it is not unrestricted freedom.

3.16   It is empowerment in accordance with intent, direction and the mission assigned. It only works when subordinate commanders align the freedom of action they are given with an unwavering focus on their commander's intent.

3.17   A primary responsibility of the commander is to communicate and inform subordinates. There is a need to engage, talk and listen to build a common understanding of the context, the mission and the many variables inevitably involved. Regularly keeping subordinates informed is essential to the successful application of mission command in action.

3.18   Mission command also requires subordinate commanders to backbrief the commander with clarity and regularity to verify mutual understanding. If a subordinate fails to satisfy their backbrief responsibilities, a disconnect between what the commander thinks is going on and the subordinate's experience on the ground can arise. Then two battles will be fought. The first is the mythical one the commander thinks the subordinate is fighting. The second is the real one they are confronting. As a result, the subordinate may come to see the commander as a hindrance, and the subordinate will have contributed to that circumstance.

The principles of mission command

3.19   The philosophy of mission command is underpinned by the following principles:

a.   competence

b.   mutual trust

c.   shared understanding

d.   commander's intent

e.   mission-style orders

f.   disciplined initiative

g.   risk acceptance

h.   verification.

Competence

3.20   The basis of effective mission command is tactically and technically competent commanders, subordinates and teams. An organisation's ability to operate using mission command relates directly to the competence of its people. Commanders and subordinates achieve the level of competence to perform assigned tasks to standard through training, education, experience and professional development.

3.21   As a commander, you need to continually assess the competence of your subordinates and your organisation. Your assessment informs the degree of trust you have in your subordinates' ability to execute mission orders in a decentralised fashion at acceptable levels of risk.

3.22   Training and education provide our people the experiences that allow them to achieve professional competence. Repetitive, realistic and challenging training creates common experiences that develop the teamwork, trust and shared understanding that is needed to exercise mission command and achieve unity of effort.

3.23   You need to supplement institutional and organisational training and education with continuous self-development. Self-

development is particularly important for the skills that rely on the art of command, which is further developed by studying the art of war.

Mutual trust

3.24   Mutual trust is the result of shared confidence across an organisation. It is based on the confidence that the group has in each member's reliability and their competence to perform assigned tasks. It underpins all elements of mission command.

3.25   Subordinates will only exercise the initiative a commander wants them to when they believe the commander will accept and support the consequences of their actions. They need to know that their commander will view an erroneous decision, made in good faith, as a learning opportunity—not a cause for castigation. The *quid pro quo* for the commander is an assurance subordinates were guided by ethical principles and acted in good faith.

3.26   When building a new team, where trust is not yet firmly established, setting the ethical tone of the organisation in both word and deed provides the foundation on which trust can grow. Extending trust is a crucial part of leading. It means understanding and accepting personal risk and embracing responsibility for the actions and decisions of subordinates. A commander can only be expected to do this with confidence if there is a mutual understanding of right and wrong.

3.27   Extending trust does not abrogate a commander's responsibility to oversee the execution and progress of their subordinate's mission. Commanders need to check on the progress of subordinate missions. The regularity and nature of those checks will depend on the experience of the team, the importance of the mission and the fluidity of the operational context.

3.28   Inexperienced teams and complex missions will require greater supervision than experienced teams and straightforward missions. No matter the experience level of the team, trust and verify, and expect subordinate commanders to do the same.

3.29   As a subordinate commander, you will earn trust by keeping your commander informed and aligning your initiative with their intent. You are obliged to think through your place in the mission and actively seek clarity around the parameters under which you and

your force will operate. You are also obliged to align your actions with the ethical principles of the ADF and your own good conscience.

3.30 There are no shortcuts to gaining people's trust. It is built over time—hours, days, weeks, months and years. And yet it can be lost in minutes.

Shared understanding

3.31 Commanders need to ensure everyone in their organisation has a shared understanding of the problem, of the operating environment, of the purpose and the risks of the task. Shared understanding enhances subordinates' abilities to exercise their initiative in pursuit of the commander's intent.

3.32 To reach shared understanding requires deliberate and ongoing effort by the commander. You need to create an environment where people can speak up if they do not understand, have doubts or concerns. This enables a frank two-way dialogue to ensure a plan is understood and potential roadblocks are addressed.

Commander's intent

3.33 Without an expressed commander's intent, it is not possible to exercise mission command. The commander's intent is a clear and concise expression of the operation's purpose, method and end state. It should also, when necessary, identify the resources available and relevant constraints.

3.34 A commander's intent enables the force to pursue the desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as originally planned. It provides them with the confidence to apply their judgement in ambiguous situations because they know the mission's purpose and desired end state. It becomes the guiding light through the chaos of operations.

3.35 Commanders convey their intent in a format they determine most suitable to the situation. It may include the operation's purpose, the method to achieve it, and conditions that define the end state.

3.36 When describing the purpose of the operation, the commander's intent does not restate the 'why' of the mission statement, which is tied to the specifics of the envisaged mission.

Rather, it describes the broader purpose of the force's operation in relation to the higher commander's intent and concept of operations. Doing this allows subordinates to gain insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply, what possible threats and opportunities may arise and, most importantly, why the mission is being conducted.

3.37   The method will usually include a concise description of how the commander intends to achieve the end state, and the significant activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve it. The method is not a summary of the concept of the operation. Its purpose is to focus subordinates on what has to be accomplished in order to achieve success rather than how it is to be achieved, even when the plan and concept of operations no longer apply. The method gives discipline to their efforts towards the end state. If it is longer than a paragraph, it is probably too long.

3.38   The end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends. A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort among the force and with partners.

3.39   The commander's intent becomes the basis on which staff and subordinate commanders develop plans and orders. A well-crafted commander's intent conveys a clear image of an operation's purpose and desired end state. The commander's intent provides a focus for subordinates to coordinate their separate efforts. Even though you can be helped by your staff, you should personally prepare your own intent. Whenever possible, deliver it in person. Face-to-face delivery ensures shared understanding of what you want by allowing immediate clarification of specific points. Individuals can then exercise initiative within the overarching guidance provided in the commander's intent.

3.40   A clear and succinct commander's intent that subordinates can remember and understand, even without an order, is key to maintaining unity of effort. Commander's intent and mission command share a requirement for precise and carefully crafted language. If your intent statement is longer than a few brief paragraphs, it is probably too long. Subordinates who understand and remember your intent are far more likely to exercise disciplined initiative in unexpected situations.

3.41   It is not easy to achieve a concise and compelling statement of intent. It takes time, thought and energy, and is easier the more it is practised.

Mission-style orders

3.42   There are a variety of formats for orders in the ADF. Most of them provide guidance, assign tasks, allocate resources and delegate authority.

3.43   Orders that support the mission command approach emphasise achievable results—not how results are achieved. Orders should be neither so detailed that they stifle initiative nor so general that they provide insufficient direction. They should not trespass on the province of your subordinates. Orders should contain everything your subordinates must know to carry out their mission, and nothing more.

3.44   Central to mission command is an understanding that the mission has primacy over all other directed tasks. The core component of any mission is its purpose—which lays out what is to be achieved and why. Clear articulation of the purpose and the mission enables subordinates to adapt and respond to changing circumstances and uncertain environments.

3.45   While applying the concept of 'what not how', you will need to adjust the level of detail in your orders for different teams and circumstances. A less experienced team will need more detail than an experienced one. A team with low trust will need tighter control than one with high trust.

3.46   When determining the amount of detail to include in your orders, and the level of control you direct, you will also need to consider the following factors:

a.   the nature of the mission

b.   the complexity of its execution

c.   the freedom of action appropriate to the professional competence of the force

d.   the risks you are prepared to accept.

Disciplined initiative

3.47   Disciplined initiative is the duty to exercise initiative to achieve the desired end state within the constraints of the commander's intent. It requires commanders, and their subordinates, to adhere to the plan until it is no longer applicable to the situation in which they find themselves. At this point, they need to exercise their initiative in accordance with the mission's purpose.

3.48   Those who exercise disciplined initiative create opportunity by taking action to develop a situation without asking for further guidance. Commanders rely on subordinates to act in order to meet their intent, not simply adhere to a plan that is no longer working. A subordinate's action to exploit an unexpected opportunity may be the starting point for seizing, or retaining, the initiative for your command.

3.49   When the situation changes, subordinates are expected to take action to adjust to the new reality, and continue to achieve the commander's intent by exercising initiative. Everyone from the senior commander to the most junior subordinate should know that inaction and neglect of an opportunity should warrant more severe censure than an error of judgement in the action taken, assuming the judgement was ethically sound and made in good faith.

3.50   Subordinates are required—not just permitted—to exercise disciplined initiative in the absence of orders, when current orders no longer apply, or when an opportunity or threat to the commander's intent presents itself. The collective effect of subordinate commanders exercising disciplined initiative over time sets the conditions for friendly forces to seize the operational initiative in chaotic and ambiguous situations.

3.51   When exercising initiative, neither commanders nor subordinates are independent actors. Subordinates consider at least two factors when deciding when to exercise initiative:

a.   whether the benefits of the action outweigh the risk of desynchronising the overall operation

b.   whether the action will further the higher commander's intent.

3.52   The main consideration in exercising initiative is the urgency of the situation. If time permits, subordinates should communicate their new situation and recommended courses of action to their commander. When subordinates communicate their intentions to their commander, their commander can assess the implications for the overall force, and for other operations, and set in motion supporting actions. However, subordinates are expected to depart from the plan, if necessary, when they are unable to contact their commander or when there is limited time to seize a fleeting opportunity. Subordinates should then communicate their action to their commander at the earliest opportunity. If doubt exists about whether to contact their commander or depart from the plan in order to seize a fleeting opportunity, subordinates should act if they can do so within their commander's intent.

3.53   Good commanders foster a command climate that encourages initiative. To do this, commanders need to accept risk and underwrite the good faith mistakes of subordinates in training. By setting the conditions for subordinates to learn, gain experience and develop a culture of responsibility, commanders also set the best conditions for independent action. Subordinates need to learn they have the authority and responsibility to act thoughtfully, knowing their commander will support their decisions.

3.54   The exercise of effective disciplined initiative requires lawful action, mutual trust, shared understanding and a clear commander's intent.

3.55   Missions and tasks are assigned with a set of parameters that shape, guide, constrain and restrict action. One enduring example is the requirement to operate within the law of armed conflict. A wide range of other requirements, priorities, restrictions and constraints may be applied that must be factored into how subordinates may proceed. Careful consideration of the mission parameters is the responsibility of commanders at every level and should be the subject of frank, open and ongoing dialogue as a mission unfolds and develops.

Risk acceptance

3.56   Mission command requires commanders, staff and subordinate commanders to manage accepted risk, exercise initiative

and act decisively. For mission command to be successful, commanders need to be comfortable letting go. Sometimes things will go wrong. You will need to fight the urge to over-control in a well-meaning attempt to minimise failure.

3.57   Inculcating risk acceptance goes hand in hand with creating an environment where subordinates are not only encouraged to take risks, but also one where mistakes are tolerated. Commanders realise that subordinates may not accomplish all tasks initially and that errors may occur. Commanders train subordinates to act within the commander's intent in uncertain situations and then give them the latitude to make mistakes and learn from them.

3.58   During training, commanders might allow subordinates to execute an excessively risky tactical decision—keeping the safety of personnel, platforms and equipment in mind—as a learning opportunity. They then discuss with subordinates how to determine an appropriate level of tactical risk. This sort of coaching helps commanders gain trust in their subordinates' judgement and initiative. It also builds subordinates' trust in their commander. During operations, commanders may need to intervene when a subordinate accepts tactical risk that exceed the benefits expected.

3.59   In training, at home and when deployed, take every opportunity to practise, encourage and stretch mission command. Give subordinates room to fail—they will learn more from a failure they reflect upon than a success they take for granted. It will build their resilience. Set the conditions for the successful use of mission command on operations.

3.60   At all times, doing the right thing remains paramount. Failure due to negligence or unethical action should neither be accepted nor overlooked.

Verification

3.61   Responsibility and accountability for the outcome of a mission rests with the commander who issues it. This means you need to check and verify your subordinates' planning and execution of the mission. You as the commander must know, track and understand the situation and context in which your subordinates are operating. You should be continually and appropriately curious.

3.62   Done with forethought and care, this can reinforce trust and avoid micromanagement. The art of mission command requires commanders to focus their checks at the right time, in the right place and on the right issue. It is a fundamental error to think of mission command as 'set and forget'. Rather, it is 'set, follow, check, support and adapt'.

Conclusion

3.63   The first three chapters have focused on the nature and theory of command in a personal sense of the commander and their subordinates. Before leaving these considerations and turning to a commander's control of a military force, the subject of the next chapter, some concluding comments are necessary.

3.64   Good morale and a sense of unity in a command cannot be improvised—they must be thoroughly planned and systematically promoted. They are born of the following: just and fair treatment; a constant concern for subordinates' welfare; thorough training in basic skills; camaraderie; and pride in self, organisation and country. Both the establishment and maintenance of good morale are incumbent upon every commander and are marks of good leadership.

3.65   The role of commanders is to direct and lead from the beginning of planning throughout execution, and to continually assess and adjust operations to achieve their intent. Commanders drive the planning and the operations process. They understand, describe, direct, lead and assess operations.

3.66   Commanders encourage disciplined initiative through mission orders and a climate of mutual trust and shared understanding. Guided by their experience, knowledge, education, intelligence and intuition, commanders apply leadership to translate decisions into action.

3.67   Ultimately, command reflects everything a commander understands about the nature of war, warfighting doctrine, training, leadership, organisations, materiel and personnel. It is how commanders organise their forces, structure operations and direct their forces towards their end state.

3.68   Command is built on training and shared understanding by all members within a command about how it operates. It is the

expression of the commander's professional competence and leadership style, and the translation of the commander's vision to the command. However, command alone is not sufficient to translate that vision and to assure mission accomplishment. Commanders also need to establish, develop and oversee appropriate mechanisms of control in order to orchestrate the conduct of operational actions.

Chapter 4 –
The theory of control

What is control?

> **Control**
>
> The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses their responsibility for implementing orders or directives.

4.1   A commander is also responsible and accountable for establishing an effective control function. This is usually through a headquarters staff, appropriate to the mission, resources and operational circumstances, in order to assist them to manage assigned military forces and achieve specified military objectives.

4.2   Control relies on objectivity, empirical methods and analysis—it is more of a science than an art. In order to exercise effective control commanders and their staff must have oversight of those aspects of operations open to analysis and review. This includes the physical capabilities and limitations of friendly and adversary forces and systems.

4.3   Control also requires a realistic appreciation of time and distance factors, including the time required to initiate and complete certain actions. Forces under control are constrained by factors such as movement rates, supply consumption and weapons effects, and are bound by ethical and legal considerations.

4.4   The staff of a command element or headquarters help the commander to exercise control by providing the right information at the right time. They do this by supporting the commander's decision-making, assisting subordinate commanders, staff and organisations, and keeping forces and organisations outside the headquarters informed. The staff also have a responsibility to help interpret the

superior commander's intent and to assist subordinate organisations to do the same given their specific context and role.

How is control achieved?

4.5   Even though control is a principal means by which command is exercised, it is not a one-way activity in which commanders direct while subordinates comply. In application, control is multidirectional, with feedback and influence passing between subordinates and superiors, laterally as well as outside the chain of command. It includes the reciprocal flow of information between commanders, staff, subordinate forces and other external organisations as they seek a shared understanding to achieve objectives.

4.6   In practice, there are often layers of control that vary in terms of duration. For example, on deployment, operational and tactical control will generally be more enduring than authorities for the execution of a specific task or mission. These layers can exist concurrently and, by necessity, will report to different commanders. Flexibility in the application of control is an important means of delivering effects and optimising the use of resources. Relationships and communications across commands are therefore essential to ensuring clarity between layers of control.

4.7   Although control is more of a science, its application requires some degree of art. You need to exercise your judgement with regard to the abilities of your subordinates, the extent to which friction will be part of your operations, and with an understanding that too much control inhibits agility yet too little contributes to confusion.

4.8   The key elements of control are:

a.   direction

b.   feedback

c.   information

d.   communication.

Direction

4.9   Direction is the initiating element of control. To direct means to communicate a decision that initiates and governs the actions of your force.

4.10   Commanders provide direction, usually in the form of plans and orders, that assign tasks to subordinate forces and instruct them in how to cooperate within a broader concept of operations. In the process, commanders receive feedback from subordinates and supporting forces enabling them to update their understanding and modify plans. This creates a reciprocal flow of information that leads to a shared understanding among all participants.

4.11   While plans and orders may be the primary means for communicating direction, there are a range of other tools available. These include execution matrices, decision support templates, and control measures.

4.12   Direction, like feedback, may be regular, or necessarily infrequent, depending on the operational circumstances and environment. The regularity can vary considerably with different force elements and areas of operations. Submarine operations for example, will normally use infrequent direction and feedback whereas an amphibious lodgement, executed in contact, will require constant communications.

Feedback

4.13   Feedback is the information commanders receive from the activity they are directing. Commanders, and staff, use feedback to compare the actual situation with the plan and then decide if the plan requires any changes or adjustments. Feedback takes many forms—data, information, knowledge, advice. Feedback also comes from many sources—your adversary, subordinates, higher headquarters, as well as adjacent, supporting and supported forces. You will also be operating in a media-rich information environment of full scrutiny and public commentary. Feedback arrives continuously—before, during and after operations. It helps commanders and subordinates maintain shared understanding as an operation unfolds.

4.14   For feedback to be effective, it should identify differences between the desired end state and the current situation. New

information that conflicts with expectations established during the planning phase requires the commander and their staff to validate those expectations and, when necessary, revise them to reflect reality. This contributes to an accurate understanding that allows commanders to exploit fleeting opportunities, respond to developing situations, modify plans or reallocate resources.

4.15   Feedback should not flow only from lower to higher headquarters, it should also flow from higher to lower headquarters. Normally, information from higher to lower headquarters consists of adjustments to subordinates' resources, plans or missions. But the ongoing, broader dialogue is essential in building shared understanding across the force.

4.16   In order to gain the most accurate understanding of the operational space, you as the commander need feedback from subordinates who are comfortable providing both positive and negative reports. If you create a command climate in which subordinates are reluctant to share bad news then you are likely to be poorly informed, operating with faulty assumptions, and will be putting your operational success at risk.

Information

4.17   We use the term information generically but it is important to recognise there are four levels of information: data, information, knowledge and understanding. At the lowest level, processing transforms data into information. Analysis then refines information into knowledge. Commanders and staff then apply judgement to transform knowledge into understanding (see Figure 4.1).

4.18   Data is an aggregation of observations detected by a collector of any kind (human, mechanical or electronic). It can be quantified, checked for accuracy, and stored—but it only becomes useful when processed into information.

4.19   Information is data that has been organised and processed in order to provide context for further analysis.

4.20   Knowledge is information that has been analysed and evaluated for its operational implications. It requires comprehension gained through study, experience, practise and human interaction,

and provides the basis for expertise and skilled judgement. Improving and sharing knowledge is a measure of an effective team.

4.21   Knowledge resides in an individual's mind. It is the purview of people, not technology which can help but not replace the human role in knowledge creation. Everyone has a personal store of knowledge gained from training and experience. This knowledge includes an appreciation for nuances, subtleties and solutions. Intuition, mental agility, effective responses to crises, and the ability to adapt, are all forms of knowledge.

4.22   Understanding is judgement applied to knowledge in the context of a particular situation. Understanding is knowing enough about the situation to change it by applying appropriate action.

Data	Process	Information	Analysis	Knowledge	Judgement	Understanding
	Process the data to put it in an understandable form.		Analyse the information to give it meaning.		Apply judgement to give the knowledge meaning in the current context.	

Figure 4.1: The process of converting data to understanding

4.23   Clear, relevant and timely information is central to providing direction and receiving feedback. The amount of information available makes managing information and turning it into effective decisions and actions both extremely challenging and critical to success during operations.

4.24   Information is susceptible to innocent distortion and often sources are imperfect. More significantly, adversaries will allocate substantial resources and effort to seed disinformation, deceive and manipulate perceptions. Commanders and staff must assess the quality of information carefully. The following criteria, listed in order of relative importance, help to define the relative value of information:

a.   **Relevance.** Information that applies to the mission, task or situation at hand.

b. **Accuracy.** Information that conveys the true situation.

c. **Timeliness.** Information that is available in time to make decisions.

d. **Usability.** Information that is presented in common, easily understood formats.

e. **Completeness.** All necessary information is available to the decision-maker.

f. **Precision.** Information that has the required level of detail or granularity.

4.25   In order to be useful, information must be relevant and accurate. As a second priority, information must be timely and presented in a usable form. Finally, information must be as complete and precise as possible. The following rules of thumb apply:

a. incomplete or imprecise information is better than no information at all

b. untimely or unusable information is the same as no information at all

c. irrelevant or inaccurate information is worse than no information at all.

4.26   Operations produce large amounts of information. While much of this information may have some importance for the staff or the conduct of operations, it may not be relevant information for the commander. Information management must prioritise critical information requirements for the commander. This demands your attention as the commander and understanding on the part of your subordinates to identify and recognise the most critical needs.

Communication

4.27   You must not take communication for granted. You should assume that communications will be disrupted and denied during operations. Your intent and orders need to be conveyed in a way that enables the achieving of objectives when communication is intermittent and situational awareness is problematic. The use of

mission-style orders mitigates the need for continuous communication.

4.28   Communication is more than mere transmission of information. It is an activity that allows commanders, subordinates and partners to create shared understanding that supports action. It is also a vital means to exercising control over forces. Communication links information to decisions and decisions to action. Communication among all elements of a command enables their coordinated action.

4.29   You will need to use a variety of means, times and places to communicate and build shared understanding across your command. Use face-to-face talks, written and verbal orders, directives and plans, published instructions and other methods of communication appropriate for particular situations. You must also anticipate those times when communication is likely to be intermittent, and adjust your level of control accordingly.

4.30   Not every decision requires the direct involvement of a senior commander. Lateral communication between subordinate commanders can transfer information and lead to decision-making without the senior commander becoming involved, other than to affirm (either positively or through silence) the decisions or agreements of subordinates. However, lateral communication will not occur as a matter of routine unless you train and encourage your subordinates to communicate laterally, by developing networks, exchanging information, creating shared understanding, making and implementing decisions and responding with agility.

4.31   Humans communicate verbally by what they say and in their manner of speaking. They also communicate nonverbally with gestures and body language. You should pay attention to verbal and nonverbal feedback to ascertain the effectiveness of your communication and the manner in which it is received.

4.32   Because of the important role of non-verbal communication in developing a deeper understanding, face-to-face communication should be conducted as regularly as practical. This should not be seen to imply that records of communication or follow-up written documentation are unnecessary—this is rarely the case. While written records are important to affirm understanding and for later study—

especially given that memory can distort or even omit elements of the information required or passed—physical presence conveys meaning and a deeper sense of purpose.

4.33   Some commanders are tempted to prioritise written communication over face-to-face interactions. While email, written papers, briefs and directives convey information, relying on them is to presume they will be read and understood as intended. They rarely are. Moreover, written communications rarely have the same impact as oral orders, consultations and briefings. While the staff may possess the capacity to produce substantial quantities of written material, just because the capability exists does not mean it should be used. Quality, not quantity, of communication is what is required.

4.34   **Channels.** Information moves throughout a force along various transmission paths or channels. Commanders and staff should transfer information horizontally as well as vertically. Structure, in the form of command and support relationships, establishes channels that streamline the dissemination of information by ensuring the right information passes promptly to the right people. Commanders and staff communicate through three channels—command, staff and technical:

a.   **Command channels.** Command channels are direct chain-of-command transmission paths. Commanders and authorised staff officers use command channels for command-related activities.

b.   **Staff channels.** Staff channels are staff-to-staff transmission paths between headquarters and are used for control-related activities. Staff channels transmit planning information, status reports, controlling instructions and other information to support mission command. The intelligence and supply networks are examples of staff channels.

c.   **Technical channels.** Technical channels are the transmission paths between two technically similar force elements or staff sections that perform a technical function requiring special expertise or control the performance of technical functions. Technical channels are not used for conducting operations or supporting another organisation's mission. One example is network operations. The activities for the operation,

management, and control of communications transport is routinely performed by network operations control centres.

Control measures

4.35   Commanders use control measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate fire and manoeuvre, and control operations. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. Control measures provide control without requiring detailed explanations. Control measures help commanders to direct actions by establishing responsibilities and limits that prevent subordinate force actions from impeding one another. They foster coordination and cooperation between forces without unduly restricting freedom of action.

4.36   Control measures may be detailed (such as an operation order) or simple (such as a checkpoint). Control measures include, but are not limited to:

a.   orders and authorisations

b.   laws and regulations

c.   standard operating procedures.

4.37   Some control measures are graphic. A graphic control measure is a symbol used on a chart, map or display to regulate forces and warfighting functions. They include symbols for boundaries, fire support coordination measures, some airspace control measures, air defence areas and minefields. Commanders establish them to regulate manoeuvre, movement, airspace use, fires and other aspects of operations. In general, all graphic control measures should relate to easily identifiable natural or human-made features.

4.38   Control measures are established under a commander's authority. Nonetheless, commanders may authorise staff officers and subordinate leaders to establish them. Commanders may use control measures for several purposes: to assign responsibilities, impose synchronisation between forces, impose restrictions or establish guidelines to regulate freedom of action. Certain control measures belong to the commander and should not be delegated. These

include the commander's intent, mission statement, planning guidance and commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).

4.39   A word on CCIRs. These are the business of commanders and you should give particular and personal attention to them. Your direct involvement in determining the CCIRs will ensure that the focus of collection, analysis and information flow will be on those things that matter most to you and your design for the current operation as well as what might be next. CCIRs not only direct effort, they also give your command a sense of what you see as the opportunities and key risks to your operations. CCIRs are not a process, they are an expression of what really matters to you. They are something the staff can help you with, but not do for you.

Chapter 5 –
The command and control system

Case study – Second World War

Command and control in the Battle of Britain, 1940

In July 1940, Germany began an air campaign against Britain, targeting its industrial capabilities and cities in order to force Britain into a negotiated peace. The Royal Air Force (RAF) fought the German Luftwaffe in the skies above Britain to prevent them from succeeding. Although the Luftwaffe had superiority in numbers and technology, the RAF's Fighter Command, under the command of Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, had the superior command and control system.

Early in the war, the British developed a series of air defence radars, but it was not British radar technology that made their command and control superior to the Luftwaffe's. In fact, the German radars, the Freya and the Würzburg, were more capable than those of the British. Rather, it was the British organisation for information processing and dissemination—the system that linked radars, observers, and pilots to the operations rooms—that gave them the upper hand. In the words of fighter pilot Peter Townsend, "The Germans knew about British radar, but never dreamed that what the radar 'saw' was being passed to the fighter pilot in the air through such a highly elaborate communications system."

Information gleaned from radars and observers came together in the 'big picture' assembled by the operations staff. Initial radar reports were passed through a filter room, where conflicts were resolved. The operations staff took the filtered information from the radars and combined it with reports from observers and data on friendly forces. At this point, the 'bogies' (unidentified aircraft) or 'bandits' (enemy aircraft) were assigned to sector controllers who would then guide assigned aircraft to meet them. The 'big picture' became the basis for deciding which fighters to send where. Fighter Command used the unprecedented capabilities of

its command and control system to anticipate the Luftwaffe's attacks and move all available fighters to critical points where its pilots surprised and attacked the enemy. In so doing, Fighter Command defeated the German attempt to gain control of the skies over Britain.

While many were involved, it was Air Chief Marshal Dowding as the commander of RAF's Fighter Command who was responsible and accountable for the command and control system he led.

The Command and Control system defined

5.1   Commanders cannot exercise command alone. Even at the lowest levels, commanders need support to exercise command. Even though there is variability in the means, at every level effective commanders use command and control systems to support the exercise of command.


Figure 5.1: Components of a command and control system

5.2   The command and control system exists to:

a.   support commanders in their decision-making

b.   support commanders to control the conduct of operations

c.   collect, create and maintain relevant information and prepare products to support the commander's and the force's understanding

d.   prepare and communicate orders and directions.

5.3   To achieve these overlapping functions of command and control, commanders must locate, design and organise the four components of the command and control system: people, processes, networks (specifically electronic or machine based networks) and headquarters (see Figure 5.1).

People

> *Human experience shows that people, not organizations or management systems, get things done.*
>
> **Admiral Hyman Rickover,**
> **'Father of the Nuclear Navy'[6]**

5.4   The most important component of the command and control system is people. These people, collectively known as the staff, assist commanders and exercise control on their behalf. An effective command and control system accounts for the characteristics and limitations of human nature while drawing on and enhancing uniquely human skills.

5.5   It is important to keep in mind that the command and control system's sole purpose is to assist people, with all their strengths and flaws, to recognise what needs to be done and to take appropriate action. As people are the driving element behind command and control, the components of the system, both together and alone, must be user-friendly. That is, they must always be designed with people in mind.

The staff

5.6   Effective staff bring coherence to the efforts of the various components of the force, allowing the sum total of the collective effort to exceed the sum of individual components. As was done by

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[6]   Speech delivered by Admiral Hyman Rickover at Columbia University in 1982, at https://govleaders.org/rickover.htm.

the Royal Air Force commanders and staff in the Battle of Britain in the case study above.

5.7   Competent commanders can do much of the work of a headquarters staff, very slowly. With staff, more can be done, and more quickly. Effective staff enable decision advantage.

5.8   To do this, staff support commanders in making and implementing decisions and in integrating and synchronising combat power. They provide timely and relevant information and analysis, make recommendations, prepare plans and orders, assist in controlling operations, and assess the progress of operations for the commander.

5.9   The primary responsibilities of the staff are to:

a.   support the commander

b.   assist subordinate commanders, staffs and organisations

c.   inform organisations outside the headquarters.

Support the commander

5.10   Staff support commanders in understanding and describing the operational environment; making and articulating decisions; and directing, leading and assessing operations. Staff make recommendations and prepare plans and orders for their commander. Staff prepare and disseminate information to subordinates for execution to assist commanders in controlling operations.

5.11   While commanders should personally communicate their commander's intent and planning guidance, they rely on their staff to communicate the majority of their guidance in the form of plans and orders. Staff must faithfully communicate their commander's decisions, and the intentions behind them, efficiently and effectively throughout the force.

5.12   Staff support and advise their commander within their area of expertise. While commanders make key decisions, they are not the only decision-makers. Trained and trusted staff members—with decision-making authority based on the commander's intent—free

commanders from routine decisions. This enables commanders to focus on key aspects of operations.

Assist subordinate commanders, staff and organisations

5.13   Effective staff establish and maintain coordination and cooperation with the staff of higher, lower, supporting, supported and adjacent organisations. Staff help subordinate headquarters understand the larger context of operations. They do this by first understanding their higher headquarters' operations and commander's intent, and nesting their own operations within their higher headquarters. They then actively collaborate with subordinate commanders and staff to facilitate a shared understanding of the operational environment. Staff to staff meetings and staff visits are a means to achieve this.

Inform organisations outside the headquarters

5.14   Staff keep subordinate organisations well informed. They also keep adjacent, coalition, allied and civilian organisations informed by communicating relevant information. The key here is relevance, not volume. To keep the flow of information moving at an optimum pace, the staff must establish effective working relationships with organisations outside their own headquarters.

5.15   Sending incomplete information sooner is better than sending complete information too late. Though the gaps associated with the incomplete information should also be conveyed.

5.16   Common, distributed databases can accelerate the flow of information, however, they cannot replace the personal contact that adds perspective.

Characteristics of the staff

5.17   Any staff work eventually affects the sailors, soldiers and aviators who execute the staff recommendations approved by the commander. Good staff members never forget that inside those lines they draw on digital displays, sailors, soldiers and aviators will fight valiantly, and some may die.

5.18   Good staff also communicate effectively with their commander. They discern what information is vital to their

commander's ability to command. They seek a shared understanding of the operational environment with their commander and with the commanders of both higher and subordinate headquarters. Vitally, this includes a shared understanding of the commander's intent.

5.19   Good staff members:

a.   **Are competent.** They are experts in doctrine and the processes and procedures associated with their functional area, as well as the operations process. They understand the duties of other staff members enough to accomplish coordination across the headquarters.

b.   **Bring clarity.** They are able to clearly articulate and effectively present information orally, in writing and visually. They explain the meaning of information and not simply provide raw data. They help simplify the complex.

c.   **Exercise candour.** They tell the commander what they believe to be true, not what the commander wants to hear. They deliver both the good and the bad news in a way that demonstrates they and the commander are on the same team. They work with the commander as well as work for the commander.

d.   **Exercise initiative.** They anticipate requirements rather than wait for instructions. They anticipate what the commander needs to accomplish the mission and prepare answers to potential questions before they are asked.

e.   **Apply critical and creative thinking.** As critical thinkers, staff members discern truth in situations where direct observation is insufficient, impossible or impractical. They determine whether adequate justification exists to accept conclusions as true, based on a given inference or argument. They use proven approaches when it is right to do so, but can also apply imagination and consider novel options to solve problems when needed.

f.   **Are adaptive.** They recognise and adjust to changing conditions in the operational environment with appropriate, flexible and timely actions. They continuously assess plans, tactics, techniques and procedures and adjust as necessary.

g. **Are flexible.** They are not overwhelmed or frustrated by changing requirements and priorities. They remain flexible and ready to adjust to changes as they occur. They set priorities when there are more tasks to accomplish than time allows. They learn to manage commitments simultaneously.

h. **Possess discipline and self-confidence.** They understand that all staff work serves the commander, even if the commander rejects the resulting recommendation. Alternative and possibly unpopular ideas or points of view assist commanders in making the best possible decisions.

i. **Are team players.** They cooperate with other staff within and outside their headquarters. This practice contributes to effective collaboration and coordination.

Staff relationships

5.20   Staff effectiveness depends in part on the relationships of the staff with commanders and other staffs. Collaboration aids in developing shared understanding and perspective among staff at different levels. Staff act on behalf of, and derive their authority from, their commander. Although commanders are the principal decision-makers, individual staff members make decisions within their authority based on broad guidance and standard operating procedures.

5.21   Good commanders insist on frank collaboration between themselves and their staff. A staff member is expected to give honest, independent opinions and recommendations, so commanders can make the best possible decisions. Once their commander makes a decision, staff support and implement the commander's decision even if the decision differs from their recommendations.

5.22   Central to the successful working of a headquarters is the relationship between the staff and the commander. While the commander must critically appraise information provided by their staff, it is vital the commander inspires a sense of trust and collegiality between themselves and their staff. Nothing undermines the effective working of a headquarters more quickly than the sense the commander has no confidence in their staff.

5.23   Teamwork within staff and between other staffs produces the staff integration essential to synchronised operations. Staff work efficiently when there is complete cooperation across all staff sections. A force operates effectively when there is cooperation with all headquarters. Commanders and staff must foster this positive climate during training and sustain it during operations. This synchronisation of understanding and respectful interaction of staff between levels of headquarters can be easily lost in the stress of battle and requires considered attention by commanders at each level of command to set the tone, and constant reinforcement by respective Chiefs of Staff.

Liaison officers

5.24   Liaison is contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces, or other agencies, that ensures mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Liaison enables continuous, direct, physical communications between commands and other partners. Liaison provides commanders with relevant information and answers to operational questions that contribute to the commander's situational understanding.

5.25   Liaison activities ensure:

a.   cooperation and understanding among commanders and staff of different headquarters

b.   coordination on tactical matters to achieve unity of effort

c.   synchronisation of lethal and nonlethal effects

d.   understanding of coordination measures to achieve synchronised results.

5.26   A liaison officer represents a commander. Liaison officers transmit information directly, bypassing headquarters and staff layers. A trained, competent, trusted and informed liaison officer is the key to effective liaison. Liaison officers must have the commander's full confidence and sufficient experience for their duties.

5.27   Depending on the situation, commanders may receive or request liaison elements (both individuals and teams) to assist them with their command.

Procedures

5.28   Procedures govern actions within the command and control system to make it more effective and efficient. They allow for complex actions to take place without detailed guidance every time the procedure is initiated. Ease and familiarity with procedures such as standard operating procedures, joint military appreciation processes, courses of action, operation orders, is core knowledge for commanders and their staff.

5.29   Procedures are used to share relevant information in standardised, easy-to-understand formats. They also facilitate the continuity of operations when commanders or members of the staff are unable to perform their duties. In this case, subordinates can step in and use procedures to continue to operate.

5.30   Used properly, procedures can be a source of organisational competence by improving staff efficiency, and increasing planning and operational tempo. Procedures can be especially useful to improve the coordination among several people working together to complete repetitive tasks, such as the internal functioning of a combat operations centre.

5.31   Used improperly, procedures can have the opposite effect. If applied blindly to the wrong types of tasks or in the wrong situation, they can lead to ineffective, even dysfunctional, performance.

5.32   Commanders and staff must recognise that procedures should only be used for rote or mechanical tasks. They are not acts of judgement, nor do they replace the need for judgement. The purpose of procedures is not to restrict human analysis, but to free it for the tasks only it can perform. Procedures are merely tools to be used, modified or discarded as the situation requires. They are not rules to be followed blindly.

5.33   Importantly, command and control procedures should be designed for simplicity and speed. They should be simple enough to be learned easily, and performed quickly and smoothly under stress.

5.34   Procedures should be designed for speed to generate tempo. Streamlined staff planning sequences, for example, are preferable to deliberate, elaborate ones. The standard should be simple models

that can expand if time and circumstances permit, rather than inherently complicated models that have to be compressed when time is short—which is likely to be most of the time.

Networks

5.35   Networks are an integral part of any command and control support structure—but they are only one component. There are two competing challenges in the management of command and control networks: the first is an over-reliance on technology, and the second is not maximising the proper use and value of technology.

5.36   The aim is to strike a balance that gets the most out of our networks by appropriately integrating them with other components of the system. The object of network technology is not to reduce the role of people in the command and control process, but to enhance their performance. While technology might allow us to decrease the number of people involved in a particular process, this is not the value of technology. The value of technology is to make information available that we might otherwise not have had.

5.37   Network systems should minimise the burden placed on people. The input of information into networks should be as automated as possible. Moreover, networks should be focused on presenting information in a way that is most useful to humans—for example, in the form of meaningful visual images rather than lists of data.

5.38   During operations, adversaries, environmental or technical factors can degrade command and control networks. This means it is important to develop methods and measures to mitigate the impact of degraded networks, and to train with them. Mitigation may involve exploiting other technological platforms, or may be achieved through the shared understanding inherent in a commander's use of mission orders and mission command.

5.39   While command and control technology helps improve the flow and value of information within the system, networks should be consistent with our overall approach to command. Networks that exist to facilitate, or encourage, the micromanagement of subordinate organisations are inconsistent with our command philosophy. Moreover, such network capability tends to focus the

seniors' attention to a level of detail. Commanders and staff who focus on lower level detail—whether because the network technology tempts them or not—risk losing sight of the larger picture that they should be focused on.

5.40   With rapid advances in artificial intelligence it is conceivable that machines will replace some human functions within networked systems. However, it would be a mistake to replace a person who is capable of intuitive and creative judgements with a system that is not capable of such judgements. Moreover, while technology can automate a range of functions, networked systems are vulnerable to direct attack and other forms of disruption. For these reasons, networked systems can never fully replace human input. Procedures will always need to exist to avoid automation bias, detect machine errors and compensate when networked alternatives are unavailable.

5.41   Networks have improved our ability to monitor what is happening in an area of operations and have increased the temptation (as well as providing the means) to try and direct what is happening. Network capability brings with it a need for increased understanding between, and discipline on the part of, commanders and staff.

Headquarters

5.42   Headquarters are the fourth component of the command and control system. They encompass the commander, the commander's staff, the systems, and the physical location or locations they occupy to achieve command and control.

5.43   The principal objective of a headquarters is to enhance the ability of the commander to make and execute decisions and to control operations.

5.44   When necessary, and possible, commanders will continue to control operations from locations away from their headquarters. In all cases, the commander alone exercises command—whether in the headquarters or elsewhere.

5.45   Commanders can adjust the organisation of their headquarters to suit the particular situation they confront. Even so, it is best to use standard staff groupings—such as intelligence, plans

and operations, and doctrinal processes (eg the joint military appreciation process)— and to only deviate from these when there is a demonstrable need to do so. By using standard arrangements and procedures, the headquarters staff share a common language and understanding and will therefore be able to operate more efficiently more quickly.

5.46   With more senior command—particularly from joint task force, formation or group level and above—headquarters become larger and more complex. On operations they are also often multinational. The direction, integration and synchronisation of staff effort requires constant attention. This is the responsibility of a chief of staff (COS). Where there is no establishment position for a COS, the commander should appoint a staff member to undertake COS functions.

5.47   In the absence of a COS or equivalent, one of two things typically occur: the headquarters will lack coherence and fall short of what it is capable of, or the commander will end up in the COS role at the expense of their responsibility to the broader force. The key purpose of the COS is to free the commander to focus on commanding.

5.48   The size of headquarters staff needs careful consideration. The larger the staff and the more staff functional groupings there are, the more information is required for them to function. This increasing need for information in turn requires more staff, and the result is a spiralling increase in size. The larger the command and control organisation is, the longer it generally takes for it to perform its functions. A large staff implies division of responsibilities, slowness of action and indecision, whereas a small staff implies speed of action and decision, and concentration of purpose.

5.49   Furthermore, a large staff takes up more space, emits a larger electromagnetic signature, and is more vulnerable to detection and attack than a small staff. A large staff, with numerous specialists, may be more capable of detailed analysis and planning than a small one. However, on operations, speed and agility are usually more likely to lead to success than a methodical approach that seeks certainty. Despite the many benefits of staff, on the whole it is better to keep the size of the staff to a minimum.

Organising for command and control

5.50   How commanders organise a command and control system can complicate or simplify execution. Organisational decisions establish the chain of command (command and support relationships) and task organisation. They can influence where commanders obtain information, whom they rely on for advice, and how they supervise execution of their decisions. Organisational decisions affect the structure of the flow of recommendations to commanders. In large part, the organisation establishes formal communication channels and determines how commanders distribute information throughout their forces.

5.51   When organising for command and control, commanders consider:

a.   the chain of command

b.   span of command

c.   organisational integrity

d.   degraded environments.

The chain of command

5.52   The chain of command is the succession of commanders from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. The commander at each level responds to orders from a higher commander and, in turn, issues orders to subordinates. In this way, the chain of command fixes responsibility and sources of authority at each level while, at the same time, distributing them broadly throughout the force.

5.53   Each commander has designated authority and responsibility in a given area of operations or area of responsibility. Command and support relationships specify the type and degree of authority one commander has over another, and the type and degree of support one commander provides to another.

5.54   Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organising for operations. These relationships prescribe the responsibilities and authorities among subordinate and

supporting forces. The range and definition of each of these relationships are included in the Annex.

5.55   Commanders designate command and support relationships within their authority to give greater weight to the decisive operation and support the overall concept of operations. The designation of relationships also helps subordinate and supporting commanders understand their roles in the operation and it contributes to achieving the commander's intent.

Span of command

5.56   Span of command refers to the number of subordinates or activities under a single commander. The span of command should not exceed a commander's capability to command effectively. The ideal number of subordinates is situation dependent.

5.57   The more fluid and dynamic a situation is, the fewer subordinate elements that a commander can continuously keep track of. Likewise, commanders exercising a prescriptive command approach, paying close attention to the operations of each subordinate element, generally have a narrower effective span of command than commanders who use mission command.

5.58   Although a reasonable span of command varies with the situation, as a rule of thumb an individual can effectively command at least three, and as many as seven, subordinate organisations. Within this situation-dependent range, a greater number means greater flexibility. For example, three supported organisations allow for more options and combinations than two.

5.59   However, as the number increases, at some point, we lose the ability to effectively consider each subordinate element individually and begin to think of them as a single, inflexible mass. At this point, the only way to reintroduce flexibility is to group elements together into a smaller number of subordinate organisations, thereby creating the need for another layer of command.

5.60   Narrowing the span of command—that is, lessening the number of immediate subordinates—deepens the organisation by adding layers of command. The more layers of command in an organisation, the longer it takes for information to move up or down the organisation. Consequently, the organisation may become slower

and less responsive. Conversely, an effort to increase tempo by eliminating echelons of command or flattening an organisation necessitates widening the span of command. Commanders have to balance width and depth, so that the command and control organisation fits the situation.

5.61　An effective organisation enables the commander and subordinate commanders to command without information overload. The commander establishes their span of command and organises the command and control system so as to be able to exercise command under all circumstances, including degraded environments.

Organisational integrity

5.62　Effective commanders are flexible, including in their approach to the organisation of their command. They task-organise forces to suit the situation. This can include creating nonstandard, temporary teams or task forces. It is necessary, however, to reconcile the need for organisational flexibility with the requirement to create shared understanding and mutual trust. These characteristics result from familiarity and stable working relationships which are unlikely in *ad hoc* teams established for a specific purpose.

5.63　When weighing up whether to task-organise or retain existing organisational integrity you will need to consider the impact on your ability, and that of your subordinates, to effectively adopt a mission command approach. One way to balance these demands is to retain the organisational integrity of subordinate elements when organising for command and control.

5.64　Whenever possible, a commander should task-organise based on standing headquarters and habitually associated force elements. When this is not feasible, and organisations are formed from a wide variety of elements, the commander must allow time for training and establishing functional working relationships and procedures. Building trust and connection between members of an *ad hoc* team is as important as providing logistics or planning, it also requires greater involvement by the commander who might have to personally inspire a sense of unified effort.

5.65　Once a force is task-organised and committed, commanders should not change the task-organisation during operations unless

the benefits clearly outweigh the disadvantages. Reorganisations cost time, momentum, effort and tempo. Commanders also need to consider logistical factors, as the time required to change task organisation may counter any organisational advantages.

Degraded environments

5.66   Communications and network technologies are essential to our way of warfighting but they are also fragile. Adversaries will actively and consistently try to degrade and disrupt them. Such technologies will be also be degraded by routine technical challenges and, occasionally, by other events such as adverse weather. When organising for command and control, commanders must consider the system's fragility and the likely impact of the system being degraded.

5.67   In order to mitigate this risk and successfully conduct operations in degraded environments, commanders cannot become over-reliant on technological capabilities. Commanders must ensure their personnel are trained on analog and manual command and control processes and that they are comfortable operating in degraded environments.

5.68   Understanding the functions performed by automated systems is critical to understanding what functions will need to be performed in an analog environment. Commanders should ensure that standard operating procedures are in place to help the command and control system maintain its ability to function when networks are unavailable or unreliable.

5.69   One way to deal with degraded communications is through primary, alternate, contingency and emergency (PACE) communication planning. A PACE plan establishes these methods of communications, typically from higher levels to lower levels. Establishing a PACE plan requires care that an alternate or contingency method of communications does not solely rely on primary communications. Most organisations will have two PACE plans: one for communications to higher level headquarters; and one for communications to subordinate elements. A PACE plan for a higher headquarters will likely be established by that headquarters.

5.70   Ultimately, the doctrinal solution to operating in degraded environments is mission command. Even under severely degraded

conditions, where reliable communications are not possible, the application of mission command allows forces to continue to make decisions and operate towards mission accomplishment.

Conclusion

5.71   Commanders do not exercise command alone. At each level of command, commanders have a command and control system to provide support. That system is more than just equipment— it consists of all the resources available to commanders to help them exercise authority and direction. How commanders organise, locate and design their command and control systems directly affects their ability to conduct operations.

5.72   Be in no doubt that your adversary will actively and persistently seek to destroy your command and control system, as you will theirs. Mission command, signature management, deception and dispersal, and system resilience and redundancy are necessary components of a functional command and control system in war.

5.73   You, the commander, will create that system and, if done well, it will significantly contribute to your force's operational success.

Chapter 6 –
Guides to effective command and control

Create a positive command climate

6.1   Commanders create their organisation's tone—the characteristic atmosphere in which people work. We refer to it as the command climate. It sets the values, defines what matters and tells people how to fit in. It can either enhance or impede an organisation's ability to perform at its maximum potential.

6.2   Command climate is easier to sense than to describe. But make no mistake, it does not take long for most people to take its measure. A positive command climate is characterised by the visible commitment of all members to established standards. The essence of this commitment lives in an atmosphere of mutual respect and human dignity, which is observable throughout the organisation.

6.3   No matter the size, commanders shape their organisation's climate with their personal values, leadership style and actions. The key to a positive command climate is your credibility as a commander—established through competence, trust, loyalty, communication and confidence.

6.4   Indicators of a positive command climate include:

a.   pervasive sense of purpose

b.   common agreement on priorities

c.   clear standards and adherence to them

d.   competence is prized and appreciated

e.   willingness to share information

f.   sense of fair play

g.   belief in teamwork

h.   quick and convenient ways to attack nonsense and fix aberrations in the system

i.   sense of rationality and trust

j.   subordinates feel free to speak up.

6.5   The terms culture and climate are often used interchangeably. While both describe the environment created and influenced by commanders, the terms are distinct. Strategic leaders shape an organisation's culture while tactical commanders shape the climate. It is important for commanders to understand this distinction so they know what they have influence over and what they do not. Figure 6.1 illustrates some of the key differences between culture and climate.

Climate:
- Day-to-day perceptions and feelings
- Affects motivation and trust of members
- Can change quickly with change in key people
- Shaped by tactical commanders

Culture:
- Deeply embedded beliefs and customs
- Long-lasting and hard to change
- Shaped by ADF senior leadership

**Figure 6.1:** Difference between command climate and culture

6.6   Climate is how members think and feel about their organisation. It is derived from their shared perceptions and attitudes about the organisation's daily functioning. It affects their motivation and the trust they have in their team and their commander. Climate is generally a short-term experience because it is dependent on the

network of personalities within an organisation that changes as people come and go. It is therefore easier to change climate than it is to change culture.

6.7   A positive command climate instils a sense of trust within organisations. It facilitates a strong sense of discipline, comradeship, self-respect and morale. It helps sailors, soldiers and aviators develop a desire to do their best.

6.8   In a positive command climate, members are true to the Australian Defence Force's values and ethical behaviour is espoused, supported, practised and respected. In such an environment, people feel a sense of higher purpose which in turn inspires courage and a willingness to accept the shared hardships of service life.

6.9   As a member of a military team, an individual achieves maximum proficiency only when the team works together. When every member of the team feels motivated to put in maximum effort, team cohesion becomes a force greater than the individual sum of its parts. Organisational culture and climate play a pivotal role in defining the sense of purpose that leads to team cohesion. This is why leadership is so integral to success. Leaders create the atmosphere in which cohesive teams can develop.

Create unity of effort

6.10   Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation towards common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organisation. Unity of effort is the product of shared understanding and purpose. Establishing a culture of collaboration will help you to achieve, and enhance, unity of effort.

6.11   The commander's intent provides the unifying idea that allows decentralised decision-making and execution within an overarching framework. Understanding the commander's intent two levels up enhances unity of effort by ensuring those on the ground have an understanding of the bigger picture as it applies to them.

6.12   Unity of command is the preferred method for achieving unity of effort. You should adhere to unity of command when task-organising forces. Under unity of command, every mission falls within the authority and responsibility of a single commander. Unity of

command requires that two commanders do not exercise the same command relationship over the same force at any one time.

6.13   Unity of command of military forces may not always be possible. In the absence of unity of command, you must strive to achieve unity of effort through cooperation and coordination. Building trust among all elements of the force that are not part of the same command structure will make it easier to achieve that unity.

Make timely decisions and act

6.14   Timely decisions and actions are essential for effective command. Commanders who demonstrate the agility to consistently make appropriate decisions faster than their opponents have a significant advantage. By the time the slower commander decides and acts, the faster one has already changed the situation, rendering the slower commander's actions immaterial. With such an advantage, the faster commander can dictate the tempo and maintain the operational initiative.

6.15   A mission command approach makes it easier for commanders to make timely decisions that exploit opportunities because they spend less time focused on subordinates' tasks. It also means the subordinate commander can exploit a situation as it unfolds, rather than waiting for direction from a superior headquarters.

6.16   Effective commanders:

a.   take the adversary situation, capabilities and reaction times into account when making decisions.

b.   consider the impact of their decisions—both cause and effect

c.   make decisions quickly—even with incomplete information

d.   conduct rapid analysis and have arrangements for the results to be quickly integrated into amending a plan, control measures, processes or procedures

e.   adopt a satisfactory course of action with acceptable risk as quickly as possible

f.   delegate decision-making responsibility to the lowest level possible to improve speed of decisions during operations

g.   support decentralised execution by maintaining shared understanding with subordinates and frequently with adjacent commanders.

6.17   As a commander, you should combine intuitive and analytical decision-making techniques as the situation requires. Because uncertainty and the tempo of large-scale combat operations drive most decisions, an emphasis on intuitive decision-making will provide a competitive advantage. For this to succeed, subordinates need to be comfortable with this approach and not dependent on a more procedural method. When time is available, however, using a standard decision-making process will enhance the overall understanding of the situation and provide insights that might not be apparent in the heat of the moment. Both approaches have merit and are complementary to each other.

6.18   In time-constrained circumstances, it may be necessary to alter plans rapidly without the benefit of deep analysis. When time is limited, streamlined processes permit commanders and staff to shorten the time needed to issue orders as the situation changes. To an outsider, it may appear that experienced commanders and staff have omitted key steps. In reality, they are using existing products or have performed the steps intuitively. To be expert in doing this, your staff must be well trained and have a thorough understanding of doctrinal decision-making support processes. While intuition is fundamentally based on experience, recognising and addressing the risks of bias requires significant training.

Train subordinates in command and control

6.19   Errors in the classroom are recorded on paper. Errors on operations are recorded in stone.

6.20   Time spent on training, education and problem-solving prior to operations saves lives, saves time and simplifies command and control during operations. Commanders cannot expect subordinates to respond effectively to a particular approach (such as the inclusion of a new AI system) once operations commence if they have not facilitated its use among subordinates beforehand.

6.21   You have an obligation to ensure that your subordinates are capable of performing their functions under a variety of circumstances. You will need to provide more direction, guidance and control until you are satisfied that subordinates understand tasks, conditions and standards, and can operate within your intent. Increased confidence in the ability of subordinates eventually leads to more latitude in how they go about completing their assigned missions.

6.22   Providing guidance on the purpose of a mission saves time during execution for both commanders and subordinates because it maximises flexibility should conditions change or communication become intermittent. It also reduces the risk that subordinates will waste time and resources on tasks no longer relevant to the purpose of the operation. The effort put into developing a broader operational understanding among subordinate leaders and their teams saves critical time in combat and allows commanders to assume more risk when the situation is unclear and communication is intermittent.

6.23   Effective mission command, in particular, requires well-developed subordinates capable of decentralised execution of missions and tasks. Training must create common, recurring, shared experiences that build trust and allow commands to acquire competence in shared understanding. Trained teams are able to communicate explicitly and implicitly, conduct decentralised operations, and achieve unity of effort in uncertain situations.

6.24   Senior non-commissioned officers are key enablers of mission command. It is important to ensure they are also trained in mission command principles to effectively support their commander and lead their subordinates. They will be required to exercise initiative in making decisions and taking actions to further their commander's intent. Consequently, they must also actively work to understand the commander's intent two levels up. Training must be focused on developing mutual trust and shared understanding with their commanders as well as their peers.

6.25   As part of training subordinates in command and control, commanders must prepare their subordinates for positions of increased responsibility—including their own. This serves to prepare

subordinates for future command and contributes to organisational resilience in the event the commander becomes incapacitated.

Allow subordinates maximum freedom of decision and action

6.26   Effective commanders impose minimum constraints on subordinates to enable freedom of action while meeting the overall intent. To enable this freedom within a framework, you will need to exercise the control necessary to effect coordination and synchronisation among your subordinate and supporting forces. Then monitor this coordination, allocating available resources or shifting priorities to support the actions of the subordinate commanders.

6.27   In most instances, lower level commanders have the clearest understanding of their own situations. They are generally better suited than higher level commanders to develop and respond to those situations. Two or more subordinate commanders working together may solve a problem better and faster than the higher level commander. This type of coordination, involving direct communication among subordinate commanders, is critical for effective decentralised execution. You should emphasise the importance of this type of lateral coordination at every opportunity.

6.28   You should limit information requests to subordinate commanders to information that is critical to decision-making. Excessive requests for information become an unhelpful distraction to subordinates with reporting requirements reducing the amount of time they have to execute their tasks. They can also negatively affect the requesting headquarters because it must then process the responses.

6.29   One cause of excessive requests is the search for perfect situational understanding. Another stems from poor information management. No-one can predict all information requirements before operations begin. Nonetheless, commanders and staff must balance new information requirements against the impact that finding and providing that information will have on subordinates' operations. Excessive or redundant reporting can create unnecessary stress or fatigue for subordinate forces. This may result in subordinates failing to respond to important requests and depriving you of critical information needed to make decisions.

6.30   To achieve the right balance between control and subordinate freedom of action, ask yourself the following questions when exercising control:

a.   Have I limited control measures to those necessary for essential coordination?

b.   Have I limited my information requirements to the minimum necessary to achieve effective command and control?

c.   Have I given my subordinates as much leeway for initiative as possible?

Create, maintain and disseminate a common operational picture

6.31   The common operational picture (COP) is key to achieving and maintaining situational understanding. It is a display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest tailored to the user's requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command. Although the COP is ideally a single display, it may include more than one display and information in other forms, such as graphical representations or written reports.

6.32   The COP facilitates collaborative planning and helps commanders at all levels achieve shared situational understanding. Shared situational understanding allows commanders to realise and consider the effects of their decisions on other elements of the force and the overall operation.

6.33   Relevant information provides the basis for constructing the COP, and primarily consists of information which the staff provides through analysis and evaluation. Data and information from all elements and shared among users create the COP. Some sources of this information include reports, running estimates, and information provided by liaison officers.

6.34   Maintaining an accurate COP is difficult for many reasons: delayed or inaccurate friendly and intelligence reporting; geospatial data availability; and a constantly changing operational environment that change circumstances, often in unforeseen ways. The fog and friction of war often degrade the accuracy of the COP, or render all or part of it incorrect due to latency, adversary deception plans, or incorrect reporting. Staff, based on guidance from the commander,

must work to rapidly and accurately portray the meaning and the necessary level of information which helps the commander maintain situational understanding.

6.35   Staff should only display information that is relevant to the commander's decision-making, and avoid overloading their commander with unnecessary details. Similarly, commanders should resist the urge to delve into details that do not directly improve the quality of their decision-making. COPs which show unnecessary individual force elements—or worse still, unnecessary feeds from sensors—provide both distraction and distortion.

6.36   By collaborating and sharing relevant information and tailoring it to their needs, different forces can create their own COPs that show what their commander needs to know as the situation requires.

6.37   All elements that contribute to the COP should continually update and refine it during operations. Crucial decisions are made on the back of what is displayed in the COP.

Use common doctrinal procedures, graphics and terms

6.38   Language used when communicating should be simple, clear and easily understood. An understanding of common doctrinal procedures, graphics and terms contributes to the simplicity and clarity essential to mutual understanding, and shortens the amount of explicit communication needed to convey or explain an order or plan.

6.39   Doctrinal terms and graphics enable shared understanding by communicating in a commonly understood way. However, there are circumstances where you or your staff may need to create non-doctrinal graphics, or modify existing ones, to portray the environment, an adaptive opponent or other elements not covered by doctrine. You should do this only when standard graphics are unsuitable, and you must ensure that subordinates and adjacent forces understand non-doctrinal terms and graphics.

6.40   Doctrine clearly distinguishes between descriptive and prescriptive information. Most doctrine is descriptive; it should be applied with judgement in the context of a particular situation. Unthinking adherence to every aspect of doctrine in inappropriate

situations is incongruent with our command philosophy. Even so, there are some occasions when doctrine should be applied prescriptively:

a.   to ensure a common understanding use terms, symbols and the language of the profession precisely

b.   adhere to control measures to ensure coordination and prevent fratricide

c.   use standard report, message and orders formats to ensure information is reported rapidly, accurately, and in a commonly understood manner.

Encourage flexibility and adaptability

6.41   Flexibility and adaptability are attitudes. By all means be firm on principles but be flexible on method. Be firm on what you are required to achieve but, as circumstances dictate, adapt your approach to achieving it.

6.42   Control supports flexibility and adaptability in two ways. First, it identifies the need to change the plan. It does this through anticipating or forecasting possible opponent actions and by identifying unexpected variances—including opportunities or threats—from the plan. This occurs throughout the operations process.

6.43   Second, control also allows organisations to respond to change, whether caused by threat or friendly actions, or environmental conditions. The mission command approach provides flexibility and adaptability, allowing subordinates to recognise and respond effectively to emerging conditions and to correct for the effects of fog and friction.

6.44   Control informed by a mission command approach provides information that allows commanders to base their decisions and actions on the results of friendly and opponent actions, rather than rigid adherence to the plan. You should build flexibility and adaptability into your plans.

6.45   Flexibility and adaptability provided by the appropriate level of control reduces an opposing force's available options while

maintaining or expanding friendly options. Effective control provides for timely action before opposing forces can accomplish their objectives, allowing for the modification of plans as the situation changes.

6.46   Instead of rigidly adhering to the plan, control focuses on information about emerging conditions. The mission command approach to control provides flexibility by:

a.   allowing friendly forces to rapidly change their tasks, their task organisation or their plan in response to changing circumstances

b.   producing information about options to respond to changing conditions

c.   communicating the commander's decisions quickly and accurately

d.   providing for rapid reframing when the plan changes during execution

e.   allowing collaborative planning and execution to respond to the progress of operations.

Chapter 7 – Conclusion

> *I believe that the more control a senior places on a subordinate the less command capability they have. And the more a commander is capable of commanding, the less control they require.*
>
> **Lieutenant General Ernest C Cheatham,**
> **US Marine Corps, 1994**[7]

7.1   The command and control system will not, by itself, drive home a single attack against an adversary force, nor destroy a single target nor treat a badly wounded combatant. But without an effective command and control system, none of these essential warfighting activities, nor any others, are possible: campaigns flounder, battles lack coherence and military forces can degenerate into mobs.

7.2   Command provides the purpose and direction for achieving success. Control organises the countless activities a military force must perform. Done well, command and control adds to our strength. Done poorly, it invites disaster, even against a weaker opponent. An effective command and control system enables commanders to make the most of what they have—people, information, materiel and time. The commander's duty is to ensure it does so.

7.3   History shows us that every military operation is different and that none is exactly what the commander, or those who try to forecast the nature of future military operations, expects. We recognise and accept that war is a complex, uncertain, disorderly and time-competitive violent clash of wills.

7.4   So we rely on a spectrum of command to provide the flexibility and appropriate control to deal with uncertainty and to

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[7]   Naval Doctrine Publication 6, *Naval Command and Control*, Department of the Navy, Washington DC, 1995.

generate the tempo which we recognise is a key element of success in war.

7.5   Although command, and the systems to support it, have evolved throughout history, its fundamental nature is timeless. Noteworthy improvements in technology, organisation and procedures have not eased the demands on command, and probably never will.

7.6   We recognise the importance of technology to command. It has helped the Australian Defence Force keep pace with the increasing complexity of operations and, on occasion, has given us an edge. Yet we also know that technology is just a tool—it is neither responsible nor accountable for its outputs.

7.7   We know that whatever the technology, the key to effective command will come down to people dealing with the fundamental problems of risk, uncertainty, time and human will.

7.8   It will come down to people using information to decide and act wisely.

7.9   And it will come down to this unchanging standard— commanders of exemplary character and professionalism, held accountable for their personal performance and that of their command, in pursuit of Australia's national interest in the most demanding of circumstances.

Annex – Command and administrative authorities

Introduction

1.　　Commanders delegate authority so that subordinate commanders can carry out their operational and administrative responsibilities. Command authorities provide a simple and consistent framework to communicate the extent of authority that a commander is delegating. Assigning a particular command authority specifies the subordinate commanders' ability to assign forces, missions and tasks. It also conveys limitations on further delegation of authority.

2.　　Various administrative authorities support the command of assigned forces. Administrative authorities define an officer's ability to give direction regarding the provision of support or administration within a defined locality or task. This may include authority over force elements or personnel that are not within the officer's chain of command.

3.　　In the Australian Defence Force (ADF), there are two types of command authorities: standing and operational.

4.　　Standing authorities are enduring and continue to exist in part even when a commander's subordinates have been assigned to another operational commander. An instrument of appointment, or similar document, will specify a commander's standing command authority.

5.　　Operational authorities apply only for the duration of a specified operation or activity. A commander will promulgate these authorities in the directive or operational order applicable to the operation or exercise. Operational planners must be cognisant of the requirement to be clear about command authorities and relationships in operational documents.

Levels of military command

6.   Three levels are used to describe the different roles and functions of command: the strategic, operational and tactical levels. In practice, matching command authorities to each level is not straightforward due to their overlapping nature.

7.   Command at the **military strategic level** is concerned with organising and applying military power to achieve national strategic objectives.

8.   Command at the **operational level** is concerned with planning and executing campaigns and operations to support military strategic objectives.

9.   Command at the **tactical level** is concerned with planning and conducting military tasks and actions to achieve operational objectives.

Standing command authorities

10.   Standing command authorities allow the ADF to function on an enduring basis. They provide authority for the necessary activities to raise, train, prepare and sustain a military force or Service for operations, while ensuring accountability for outcomes. These authorities are full command, service command and joint command.

Full command. The statutory authority of the Chief of the Defence Force, under Section 9 of the *Defence Act 1903*, to issue orders to all members of the Australian Defence Force.
Notes:

1.   Full command covers every aspect of military activity, operations and administration.

2.   It includes responsibility to advise the Minister for Defence on matters relating to command of the ADF.

> **Service command.** The enduring authority given by the Chief of the Defence Force to Service Chiefs to command their Services.
> Note: Service command does not include authority to conduct operations.
>
> **Joint command.** The enduring authority given by CDF to ADF joint chiefs to command joint organisations in the ADF.
> Note: Joint command does not include authority to conduct operations.

11. **Full command.** This comprises:

a. Section 9 of the *Defence Act 1903* specifies that CDF has command of the ADF. The Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) assists CDF to exercise command and acts as CDF in circumstances as defined under Section 13 of the *Defence Act 1903*. The Governor-General appoints CDF and VCDF under Section 12 of the *Defence Act 1903*.

b. Full command gives CDF complete operational and administrative authority over the ADF. Responsibilities for resource utilisation, administration, planning and control of the entire ADF are inherent in full command. No other commander has full command over ADF forces.

c. CDF exercises command of the ADF through Service and Joint Chiefs by assigning service command, joint command and theatre command (tcomd) as elements of full command. CDF specifies the division of responsibilities and authorities in a Charter Letter to each Chief. Further assignment of command below Service and Joint Chiefs is detailed in directives, orders or instructions. CDF retains full command of the ADF at all times, regardless of any authorities CDF assigns to subordinate commanders.

d. CDF has the authority to conduct operations when directed by the Minister for Defence (MINDEF) and Cabinet. MINDEF and/or Cabinet will also provide CDF with authority for the use of force where necessary to pursue national objectives.

e. **Cadets.** Officers, instructors and cadets from the ADF Cadets are not members of the ADF and are not 'under command' of

CDF. However, CDF directs and administers cadets. CDF can delegate responsibilities to assist with the direction and administration of cadets to any member of the ADF.

12. **Service command.** Service command gives Service Chiefs authority to train, prepare and sustain the force elements of their Service for operations, and for advising CDF on matters relating to command of force elements within their Service. It also includes authority to direct and administer cadets.

13. **Joint command.** CDF assigns joint command to VCDF, Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) and other Joint Chiefs to exercise command over their respective organisations. These commanders train, prepare and sustain the capabilities within their organisations and advise CDF on the matters relating to their command. Joint command does not include the authority to conduct operations.

14. **Exercise of command.** Service or joint command includes authority over both permanent/regular and reserve personnel. A Service or Joint Chief can delegate any component of their authority or responsibilities to subordinate officers where consistent with higher direction. However, the Service or Joint Chief retains accountability to CDF. Any subordinate commander may likewise further delegate their standing authorities and responsibilities within the chain of command and again remains accountable to the delegating officer and, ultimately, CDF. When delegating authority, the statement of delegation must:

a.   be unambiguous

b.   clearly define the degree of authority

c.   clearly specify the time at which the authority becomes effective.

15.   The Service Chiefs have command of their respective Services and assigned elements. As capability managers, the Service Chiefs train, prepare and sustain their Service to deliver Service capabilities, including combat ready forces.

16.   CJOPS exercises command of Joint Operations Command, and direct command units. When delegated by CDF, CJOPS has tcomd of assigned forces for planning and conducting campaigns,

operations, joint exercises and other activities. CJOPS may appoint commanders and delegate command within assigned forces.

Operational command authorities

17.	Operational command authorities detail command arrangements for a specific operation, operational activity or exercise. They are effective for a specific time, task and/or function. There are six authorities: tcomd, national command (natcomd), operational command (opcomd), tactical command (tacomd), operational control (opcon), and tactical control (tacon).

18.	Use of these authorities is not exclusive to the conduct of operations. Except for tcomd and natcomd, commanders may also apply these authorities to create force groupings, and appoint commanders for train, prepare and sustain activities. Table 1 summarises these authorities.

Table 1: ADF operational command authorities

	tcomd	natcomd	opcomd	tacomd	opcon	tacon
Safeguard Australian national interests	Yes[1]	Yes	Yes[1]	Yes[1]	Yes[1]	Yes[1]
Specify missions	Yes[2]	No	Yes	Yes[3]	No	No
Specify tasks	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Direct forces for specific mission/task	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Deploy force elements	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Allocate separate employment of force elements	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Administrative responsibility	As specified	No	If specified	If specified	If specified	If specified
Further delegate operational authorities	natcomd[4] opcomd tacomd opcon tacon	No	opcomd[5] tacomd opcon tacon	tacomd tacon	opcon tacon	tacon

Notes:

1. In support of the national commander.

2. Aligned to the responsibilities given by CDF.

3. To accord with the mission given by the higher authority.

4. Natcomd cannot be delegated.

5. Can only delegate opcomd where specified by higher commander.

Legend:

CDF	Chief of the Defence Force
tcomd	theatre command
natcomd	national command
opcomd	operational command
tacomd	tactical command
opcon	operational control
tacon	tactical control

Theatre command

19.   Tcomd is the authority delegated by CDF to a subordinate officer to prepare for or conduct campaigns and operations. CDF is the only authority who can assign tcomd and direct Service or Joint Chiefs to assign forces under tcomd.

20.   CDF assigns tcomd in the following circumstances:

a.   in anticipation of government direction to conduct an operation

b.   to conduct an operation

c.   to prepare force elements for joint operations.

21.   CJOPS is the officer to whom CDF will usually delegate tcomd over all ADF forces in a designated operational theatre.

22.   When CDF assigns forces under tcomd, the theatre commander determines the level of administrative responsibility necessary for the effective and efficient conduct of operations. The residual administrative responsibilities remain the responsibility of the Service and Joint Chiefs.

23.   Depending on the size of the operation, tcomd can be a significant and complex responsibility. To alleviate this, the theatre commander usually exercises tcomd through:

a.   national commanders, during multinational operations

b.   joint task force (JTF) commanders

c.   any other commander conducting operations or activities.

24.   When it is necessary to coordinate force elements of two or more Services, other joint force activities, or with another government agency or non-government organisation, a JTF will usually be established.

25.   The authority establishing a JTF, most usually CDF or CJOPS, also appoints a Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) and assigns the mission and subordinate force elements. CJTF is responsible for operations as directed and for making recommendations to the

establishing commander on the proper employment of forces to achieve the mission.

26.   Although the theatre commander can assign and task forces, they cannot delegate tcomd to a subordinate commander. They may delegate opcomd, opcon, tacomd, tacon, and/or natcomd of assigned forces to subordinate commanders. Unless otherwise directed by CDF, tcomd implies the authority to act at as the Australian operational level military point of contact in relationships with other nations' commands.

27.   CDF will usually assign force elements under tcomd of CJOPS for the conduct of specified joint training activities.

National command

28.   Natcomd is an authority, conferred upon an appointed Australian commander, to safeguard Australian national interests during multinational operations. The theatre commander may assign natcomd to any force assigned ADF officer, through provision of a command directive and any associated executive documents.

29.   In most circumstances, the senior Australian commander in the joint force area of operations has natcomd of deployed forces.

30.   Unless specified otherwise, the theatre commander is the conduit of natcomd functions between CDF and the Australian national commander of forces assigned tcomd. For example, forces deployed to the Middle East region in the 2000s and 2010s were under tcomd of CJOPS who delegated natcomd to a deployed commander.

Operational command

31.   Opcomd is the authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate opcon, tacomd and/or tacon as deemed necessary.

32.   Opcomd is the highest degree of operational authority. It provides a commander with the authority to task assets over the range of their capabilities without further approval from a higher commander.

33.   Only one commander exercises opcomd of assigned forces. Opcomd of ADF forces will not normally be assigned to a non-ADF commander. If opcomd of ADF forces is assigned to a non-ADF commander then the ADF theatre or national commander must ensure adequate ADF oversight is in place.

34.   A commander assigned opcomd may:

a.   specify missions and tasks

b.   reassign them

c.   allocate separate employment of force element components

d.   delegate tacomd, opcon or tacon to a subordinate commander

e.   specify the requirements for reception, staging, onward movement and integration of forces moving into their operational area

f.   specify reputation management requirements within their operational area, including the conduct of military public affairs activities.

35.   Opcomd does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics support. However, commanders holding opcomd clearly require, and invariably hold, a level of authority and a level of responsibility for both administration and logistics support. Levels of authority and responsibility vary according to environment, Service and circumstances. A commander assigned forces under opcomd cannot delegate opcomd to a subordinate commander unless specifically authorised to do so. Under opcomd, a commander may delegate lower levels of command, such as tacomd, opcon or tacon to subordinate commanders.

Tactical command

36.   Tacomd is the authority delegated to a commander to specify missions and tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission as specified by their higher authority.

37.   Tacomd is commonly used below opcomd in single-Service environments. Tacomd allows a commander freedom to task forces

and to group and regroup forces as required. A commander assigned tacomd forces may:

a.   specify missions and tasks provided they accord with the mission given by higher authority

b.   allocate separate employment of components of force elements involved

c.   delegate tacomd or tacon to a subordinate commander.

38.   Tacomd is normally the highest operational authority that will be assigned to a non-ADF commander over ADF force elements in multinational operations. If tacomd of ADF forces is assigned to a non-ADF commander then the ADF operational commander must ensure adequate ADF oversight is in place.

Operational control

39.   Opcon is the authority delegated to a commander to:

a.   direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location

b.   deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units.

40.   Opcon is similar to tacomd except that it does not authorise a commander to specify missions and tasks or to group and regroup forces. Multinational commanders may be given opcon of ADF force elements.

41.   A commander assigned opcon of forces may:

a.   direct assigned or attached forces, limited by function time, or location

b.   delegate opcon or tacon to a subordinate commander.

Tactical control

42.   Tacon is the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

43.   Tacon gives a commander the authority to locally direct a force element. Normally tacon is not a pre-designated operational authority assigned at the operational level. Rather, it is intended as a short-term authority, delegated by a local, tactical commander for the immediate conduct of a tactical activity.

44.   A commander delegated tacon may:

a.   direct force elements in manoeuvres to accomplish missions or tasks

b.   delegate tacon to another commander.

45.   A commander assigned tacon of force elements must use those force elements to accomplish the task(s) assigned by a higher commander. A commander cannot assign new missions or tasks to force elements under their tacon.

Administrative authorities

46.   Administrative authorities determine which commander is responsible for addressing the administrative aspects of command. Administrative authorities comprise administrative control and local administration.

47.   **Administrative control.** Administrative control is the authority given to a headquarters to address the administrative needs of subordinate force elements. These needs include personnel management, supply of equipment and other stores, and other administrative matters that are not included in the operational missions of the subordinate force elements. Specific authorities for administrative control will be detailed by the delegating commander in an operation order or other executive document.

Administrative control

Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters, such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.

48.   **Local administration.** Local administration is the authority for a commander to issue directions to force elements within their local area for specified matters not related to the primary operational tasking. The commander delegating local administration may specify these responsibilities in the operational order, pertaining to each operation. Local administration may involve:

a.   discipline and administrative sanctions

b.   provision of services and administration such as accommodation, utilities, fire protection, and maintenance of barracks, bases and camps

c.   allocation of ranges, training areas and recreation facilities

d.   local movement of personnel and materiel

e.   local road traffic control and movement

f.   security including preventative measures

g.   honours and awards

h.   supervision and maintenance of safety

i.   allocation of any local pool of labour and transport

j.   allocation of local duties.

> **Local administration**
>
> Direction or exercise of administration controlled by a local commander and related specifically to the troops or to the operation in the commander's area.

49. **Delegation of administrative authorities.** When assigning force elements under opcomd and tacomd, a delegating commander must clearly specify the level of administrative support required and provided. In some cases, the nature and/or location of the tasking of assigned force elements may preclude the use of established procedures for providing support. In these cases, a commander may concurrently assign force elements to one commander under an opcomd authority, and to another officer under an administrative authority.

Technical advisory control

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Technical advisory control

The provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces.

Notes:

1.   Capability managers exercise technical advisory control (techcon) and will not normally delegate it. Techcon advice is not included in a delegation of theatre command.

2.   Capability managers exercise techcon through advice to the theatre commander for assigned forces.

3.   Techcon advice may not be altered but may be rejected in part, or in total, by a commander in consideration of operational factors and within their span of command.

4.   A commander is accountable for the consequences of rejecting the advice.

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50.   Techcon advice is provided by a designated authority appointed to oversee the efficient use of a capability, often across command boundaries. For an operational commander, techcon advice will relate to the employment of capabilities so that they are used within their operating parameters.

51.   A commander may not modify techcon advice received from a delegated authority. However, the commander may reject this advice in part or in whole, in consideration of operational factors. The commander is to document the reasons for rejecting the advice and is accountable for the consequences of rejecting that advice. Such consequences may include loss of services.

52.   Techcon, like other authorities, must be assigned. A designated authority with techcon can still offer general advice; they are not restricted to offering only techcon advice. Given the important distinction between the two, a designated authority should

clearly state whether the advice they are offering is techcon or general advice.

53. A commander can authorise a delegate to exercise techcon within that commander's authority. If authorised, techcon may be further delegated. Given the potential importance of techcon advice to mission success, delegation of techcon should be taken with great care.

54. The exercising of techcon implies the designated authority has an understanding of the employment of the capability within the commander's environment. The designated authority is likely to rely on reporting returns from within the commander's force elements to develop the comprehensive understanding of which advice can be offered. The designated authority can request reports and returns from force elements not under the designated authority's command authority to help inform the provision of techcon advice.

55. A designated authority may provide techcon advice direct to a commander, or pass it to the staff for forwarding to the commander. The latter allows the commander's staff to relate the advice to the operational situation when they brief the commander. The staff are to make it clear whether the advice is techcon or general advice. In some circumstances, staff may be able to accommodate the techcon advice without having to first brief the commander. This could occur when the advice relates to equipment settings, for which there is no effect on a commander's plan.

Support arrangements

56. Support arrangements allow a commander to receive operational or administrative support from force elements that are not under their operational or administrative authority. The two support arrangements used within the ADF are **direct support** and **in support of**.

57. **Direct support.** Under direct support arrangements, a supporting force element receives support requests directly from the supported force. The supporting element also normally establishes liaison and communications with, and provides advice to, the supported element.

58.   A force element in direct support has no command relationship with the supported force element. Thus while tasked in direct support, the force remains under command of its parent formation and may only withdraw support with the agreement of the supported force or direction from a superior authority. Planning and tasking authority remains with the supporting force's parent command but usually in collaboration with the supported force.

59.   A force element cannot provide the same resource in direct support of more than one supported commander. However, they may be concurrently 'in support of' other force elements. Examples of direct support are:

a.   Gunships from an Army aviation regiment may be in direct support of a brigade for a specific task, such as a river crossing.

b.   A maritime patrol aircraft may be tasked in direct support of a maritime task group for anti-submarine warfare activities.

Direct support

The support provided by a unit not attached to under the command of the supported force commander but required to give priority to the support required by that force commander.

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60.   **In support of.** 'In support of' is the lowest level of control, and does not confer on the supported force element any responsibility or authority for administration or movement of the supporting force element. When in support of multiple force elements, the commander of the supporting force element prioritises support requests to best achieve their higher commander's intent. For example, a joint commander may assign a naval surface combatant in support of an Army force element for naval gunfire support during an assault.

> **In support of**
>
> Assisting another force while remaining under the initial command.

61.   **Supported and supporting commanders.** Prioritisation and coordination of force elements across a variety of tasks is essential. A useful way for a superior commander to do this is by assigning supported or supporting commanders and designating the main effort in each phase of an operation. This is not a command status.

Coordination authorities

62.   Coordination authorities are mechanisms to achieve coordination between countries, organisations, or force elements that do not share a common chain of command. The two coordination authorities are coordinating authority and direct liaison authorised.

> **Coordinating authority**
>
> The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service.
>
> Notes:
>
> 1.   The commander has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved and their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement.
>
> 2.   In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, the commander should attempt to obtain essential agreement through discussion.
>
> 3.   In the event essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter should be referred to the appropriate higher authority.

> **Direct liaison authorised**
>
> That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.
>
> Notes:
>
> 1. Direct liaison authorised is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement to keep the commander granting direct liaison authorised informed.
>
> 2. Direct liaison authorised is a coordination relationship not an authority through which command may be exercised.

Methods of command

63.   The ADF recognises two methods for command and control of joint operations; the direct method and the component method.

64.   **The direct method.** In this method, task groups, units or elements report directly to the CJTF. A CJTF may exercise command authority directly over assigned forces. The direct method is normally used when the knowledge and capacity of the commander and staff are such that they can employ the capabilities of assigned forces effectively, and when the scale and intensity of the operation is limited.

65.   **The component method.** When the scale and intensity of the operation is great, the span of command may become too broad to effectively use the direct method of command. An alternative is to divide the force into components, each with its own commander, who issues orders consistent with the broad direction of the CJTF. This is known as the component method of command. Component commanders are usually, though not always, collocated with the CJTF. Components may be grouped along domain or single-Service lines, or they may comprise functional groupings of formations, units, sub-units, or elements from more than one Service under appropriate states of command.

66.   **Role of component commanders.** A CJTF will usually delegate force elements to a component commander under either tacomd, opcon or tacon arrangements. Component commanders are responsible for the command and control of the forces within their component. This includes issuing orders and providing guidance, consistent with the broad objectives of the CJTF.

67.   **Selection of method of command.** Selection of the most appropriate method of command, including the staff structure, should be guided by the scale and intensity of the campaign or operation and the following factors:

a.   the nature of the mission

b.   the size and composition of the force

c.   the need to maintain flexibility

d.   political and geographic considerations

e.   communications.

68.   Smaller, less complex JTFs can often be commanded without the need to create components. Larger operations, the size of the JTF and the complexity of the mission may dictate the establishment of components.

69.   **Command in multinational operations.** Multinational operations include combined operations (those undertaken alongside formal allies), coalition operations (those undertaken by countries unified by a common mission) and operations that may not have a common mission. There will likely be subtle but important differences in states of command used by multinational partners. Commanders must ensure all parties in a multinational setting understand and adhere to national distinctions in command and control definitions and arrangements.

Acknowledgements and further reading

To further your personal journey, you are encouraged to access the online resources from the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics at the Australian Defence College at the Command Hub of The Forge. These resources guide further professional development, and allow you to engage in ongoing discussions and seek to deepen your understanding of issues covered in this doctrine.

Beyond the specific citations, the Australian Defence Force acknowledges its intellectual debt in preparing this publication to a number of sources and recommends their further reading, including the publications listed.

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Glossary

The source for approved Defence terms, definitions and shortened forms of words is the Australian Defence Glossary (ADG), available on the Defence Protected Network at http://adg.dpe.protected.mil.au/. Note: The ADG is updated periodically and should be consulted to review any amendments to the data in this glossary.

Terms and definitions

accountable

> The officer required or expected to justify actions or decisions and to be answerable for the completion of the task or deliverable via the delegation of work to those responsible.

accountability

> Being held to external oversight and regulation for the delivery of an organisational outcome.

command

> The authority which a commander in the military lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.
> Notes:
> 1. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.
> 2. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

control

> The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.
> Note: All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

leadership

The art of positively influencing others to get the job done.

Shortened forms of words

ADF   Australian Defence Force

CCIR   commander's critical information requirement
CDF   Chief of the Defence Force
CJTF   commander joint task force
COP   common operational picture
COS   chief of staff

LOAC   law of armed conflict

opcomd   operational command
opcon   operational control

PACE   primary, alternate, contingency and emergency

tacomd   tactical command
tacon   tactical control
techcon   technical advisory control