This report aims to highlight to the wider Defence community the challenges faced by Defence Logisticians and the lack of priority that Defence leaders have placed on Logistics in the past. Defence needs to place greater emphasis on the Defence Logistic function if it is to meet the challenges of a more complex and challenging operating environment in the future.
Core Areas of Study
When General Stanley McChrystal started fighting al Qaeda in 2003, information and secrets were the lifeblood of his operations. But as the unconventional battle waged on, he began to think that the culture of keeping important information classified was misguided and actually counterproductive. In a short but powerful talk McChrystal makes the case for actively sharing knowledge.
A series of videos describing how defence officials can better communicate and develop policy with government
The Army has examined the lessons of half a dozen significant conflicts, starting with World War II, has conducted numerous studies over the last 65 years, and has found time and again that an ability to conduct dismounted fire and maneuver is the fundamental squad-level tactic.
In order to avert a disaster from a terrorist chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attack, it is important to study the likelihood of terrorists using CBRN weapons. This study reports on the development of an algorithm for calculating the ‘risk’ of a terrorist seeking CBRN weaponry with 67.3 percent prediction accuracy.
Amanda Sussman discusses how to influence government decisions. How to work within the system to make the government work for you. How to shape decisions and influence government policy and encourages people with an issue to progress to do more than just vote. Individuals can influence government policy and decisions.
All too often, military operations are planned and conducted without a clear understanding of the political endgame expected to occur on the adversary’s side, or by simply assuming rational calculation.
This article explores how the interwar period resulted in imperial commitments, military, strategic and political culture that severely constrained Britain and France’s ability to prepare for and fight war in Europe.
This paper argues that while Britain and France did face some constraints in their need to balance imperial commitments with European war preparations in the 19th and 20th centuries, their respective imperial possessions provided some essential benefits in their attempts to ready themselves for a continental war.