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Core Areas of Study

4 min

On Resilience - After dinner address to ADFA 2 August 2019

When I informed my daughter that I was to speak to 300 ADFA cadets on the subject of resilience, she said to me:” ‘Don’t do it. They will see you as a dinosaur’. To which I replied, ‘well, dinosaurs ruled the earth for millions of years before becoming extinct, so they must have known something of value’.

3 min

Moving tanks by water: A short history of Australia’s tank-capable amphibious capability

Responsibility for maintaining a sea-going, tank- or heavy vehicle-capable landing craft capability has historically shifted between the Army and Navy. Today, the ADF lacks a dedicated green-water amphibious capability to support operations in a region characterised by great rivers, but poor transport infrastructure.

6 min

Changes in warfare in the 16th and 17th centuries - a ‘military revolution’?

The 16th and 17th century was a period of significant change in the character of war. The drivers accounting for these changes were not all based in military reforms, despite Western Europe being engaged almost continuously in war. While tactical applications is interesting, it was the beginnings of some profound changes in the development of warfare; the professional military, the standing army, scale of warfare and subsequent emergence of the state (Crown) owning the monopoly on violence and the arrival of proper naval forces.

4 min

The Commander’s call: Re-defining rules of engagement (ROE) during Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations

The author writes on the inherent contradiction that exists between the implementation of international humanitarian law and the military operations in the conflict environment. The case in study is about ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Syria, where the U.S troops along with their ISAF colleagues face a dual challenge fighting the insurgents while working within the framework of international humanitarian and domestic laws. The article discusses the necessity of involving the field commander's view while developing rules of engagement so that the operational imperatives aren't lost while guarding against collateral damage.

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