Operational Art
and Future Conflicts

These essays have been selected as the best submissions by ACSC Students in 2022

Twelve papers will be published over the next four weeks

Destryed Russion Tank in the Ukraine

Lessons from the 2022 Russian-Ukraine War

Lessons from the 2022 Russian-Ukraine War: What can the Australian Defence Force learn from the failures of the Russian Federation Armed Forces military campaign that can be utilised when planning future military operations and campaigns?
This essay was written on 23 September 2022, before the Ukrainian recapture of Kherson in the South in October 2022.

Imperfect Tools

Even Imperfect Tools Can Be Useful

Even Imperfect Tools Can Be Useful: An analysis of the MAP and its utility in combating complex adaptive systems.

Cyber purchasing

Evolution or Revolution

An Analysis of Capability Development to Support the Future.
Research and public discourse indicate that the ADF needs to reform its acquisition and force design processes to make acquiring military power a faster process.[2] Many within the national security space continue to ask whether the current system can support the development of military technologies in an all-domain kill-web environment.

System Engineers View

A Systems Engineer’s view of the Military Appreciation Process

Linear can be good enough: Enhancing the ADF’s Military Appreciation Process by using Systems Engineering methods to help define complex adaptive systems in war.

Ukrain border on fire

Plan for the Reality

The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces was a significant escalation of ongoing tension and conflict between the two countries. This essay will evaluate three elements of military campaign planning against Putin’s strategic objectives. Noting the Russia-Ukraine War is still ongoing, an assessment of ‘success’ will not be made; instead, Russian-Ukraine War campaigns conducted between 24 February 2022 to September 2022 (Ukraine retakes 2400 square miles, including the city of Kharkiv) will be used to evaluate military campaign planning effectiveness.

Space Force

Increasing Australian’s relative superiority through multi-domain kill webs

This essay argues that the ADF should primarily consider joint multi-domain systems to create adaptive ‘kill webs’ to succeed in the contemporary environment. This paper evaluates the historical ‘service, platform, and network-driven’ models to discern limitations in the ADF’s ability to generate critical joint systems of Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) to defend and Joint Fires and Effects (JFE) to attack potential adversaries.